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Una Hornick's avatar

I'm somewhat new to this blog, so forgive me if I point out things you've covered before, but:

- Doesn't the whole "future is huge, therefore give money now" point amount to little more than Pascal's mugging? The expected-value calculation can't work (or at least shouldn't compel action) when the expected value is absurdly high, no matter how conservative your calculations are.

- If we're deeply clueless about the sign of long-run effects of saving lives, shouldn't we should be equally (or more) clueless about the long-term effects of funding AI safety orgs, growing EA, or making political donations, all of which could have unpredictable negative second- and third-order consequences over cosmic timescales?

- Given just how uncertain the spatial argument is (do we get a long future? do we end up expanding into space? how do animals or digital minds fare there? do current donations change any of that?) it seems ridiculous to use it as a deciding factor between animal welfare and global health.

- Can you also rank the sub-cause areas? Or the sub-sub-cause areas? Shouldn't you also determine which specific AI safety intervention or insect-sentience weighing people should pursue? At some point, aren't you left with just one optimal action that every EA should pursue? Surely diversification---across sub-cause and cause areas---is good.

Noah Birnbaum's avatar

lol

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