I've always thought that morality should emerge from simple rules, i.e. those that hug closely the underlying reason why we even have morality at all: that consciousness, suffering, and pleasure exist. Suffering is bad and pleasure is good are simple rules from which the complex, higher-order rules of morality should follow. Making anything else fundamental, to me, seems like rationalizing faulty intuitions. It also makes your moral beliefs less predictable to others, which isn't good.
I think another interesting conclusion of this--one which I'm sure people who post a lot about animal suffering care about, although I don't hear about it as much as I would expect!!--is that it seems REALLY IMPORTANT to improve our knowledge of whether and/or how much various sorts of animals suffer.
If, say, shrimp don't suffer at all, then giving to shrimp welfare projects is **actively bad**--it's throwing resources away into a Money Pit. Likewise, if there's a significant (even if not overwhelming) chance that Insect Suffering is not only not the largest problem in the world (as Bentham has said), but isn't even a problem *at all*, then figuring out which is the case becomes of paramount importance, obviously.
(And this holds too for questions like "do they suffer x% as much as humans or 2x% as much as humans.)
This also implies cognitive science and philosophy of mind research are much more of value than nearly any other type of scientific research and nearly any other sort of philosophy.
(FWIW, my ethical beliefs diverge substantially from Bentham's FAR before these kinds of questions. Just spinning out the implications here.)
One day I threw a grape at another grape, and two bananas appeared and flew away in opposite directions. Or so I thought. I went over and picked up the bananas, one in each hand. Trying to give myself a free hand to pick up the grapes as well, I transferred one banana to my other hand, where it touched the other banana. To my surprise, they both disappeared in a flash of light!
Basically this happens in particle colliders all the time, and despite it being weird for our brains that evolved in the savannah hundreds of thousands of years ago, we don't throw out physics because it seems to produce weird results. We're not good at intuitive thinking about really big, small, fast, slow, numerous, etc. things unless we really train in it. And only kinda even if we do.
This is an underrated and important insights. However, the ethical judgments we act upon are often strongly reinforced by how others view them, by media portrayals of things as "bad" and "evil", or by a gut reaction to injustice that might be stronger when we feel more connected to the victims.
This is (in part) why it might be easier to distance oneself from animal advocacy compared to other causes. To stay driven by 'weird' ethics, one has to be either highly resistant to the apathy displayed by most people (regarding animal suffering, for example), or possess a level of interspecies empathy akin to Tomasik’s. For most people, it's probably the former.
Hi, I would like to press your calculus a bit. It seems to me that your moral reasoning assumes standard units of pain and pleasure for all conscious beings. Furthermore, you seem to think that we have reliable means to calculate and weigh these units. This is why you feel confident in claiming that factory farming is worse than the Holocaust. You see the matter as one of simple math, and according to your simple math, insect suffering has more units weighing down on the scale than the human suffering brought on by the Holocaust.
I have many problems with this line of argumentation, but before I express them, would you like to clarify why you think your calculus reliably accounts for all the relevant factors we should consider in ethical reasoning?
Humans are capable of grasping universals. Universals are immaterial and eternal. For human cognition to be able to grasp them, it must have an immaterial and eternal component. Ergo, human souls must be able to persist beyond death.
Animal souls cannot grasp universals, therefore, there is good reason to believe that their souls do not persist beyond death.
Therefore, humans matter infinitely more than animals.
Therefore, any amount of animal suffering, considered by itself, is less important and meaningful than a single human suffering.
You can mentally grasp the concept of a perfect circle, even though perfect circles are impossible to instantiate in material reality. Therefore, the perfect circle must be immaterial, since it exists (otherwise what are you grasping exactly), but not materially, as it will run into the plank length. But if we can mentally grasp the immaterially existing concept, at least part of our cognition must be immaterial. This is the classic Platonic argument for the immortality of the soul.
Universals are also eternal, in the sense that the concept of the perfect circle will be around even after the heat death of the universe.
>They're just words.
The words map to sets that can be defined. Even if you are a hardcore naturalist, a computer vision model can mathematically define what object belongs to different sets.
>We are animals and no evidence is provided for this claim.
We are rational animals, and other animals are irrational, wherein rational is defined as being able to grasp universals.
For proofs: people have been able to communicate with dolphins and chimpanzees. None of them can do geometric proofs as far as I know. If a dolphin or a chimpanzee can do a geometric proof on its own that it has never seen before, I'll adjust my claim.
>Second pure nonsequitor
If the duration of human consciousness is infinite and the duration of animal consciousness is finite, then human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense (any cardinality of infinity > any finite number).
>You can mentally grasp the concept of a perfect circle
No you can't, or explain to me how you can do it. "Grasp" is a unexplained metaphor. I am not familiar with any psychological science that describes what "grasping" is.
>even though perfect circles are impossible to instantiate in material reality
What evidence do you have that e.g. physics has ruled out perfect circles as possible to instantiate in material reality?
>it will run into the plank length.
You are attaching significance to the planck length that is not part of the content of any physical theory. Planck units are just the smallest measurable units derived from conventional constants like G. Physics provides no metaphysical reading that this is the smallest possible size.
>if we can mentally grasp the immaterially existing concept, at least part of our cognition must be immaterial
This is just restating the nonsequitor. Why would this entail that human cognition is immaterial? Do you agree that Penrose stairs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_stairs are impossible to instantiate in physical reality and thus that any animal that sees a picture of them has immaterial cognition?
>Universals are also eternal, in the sense that the concept of the perfect circle will be around even after the heat death of the universe
I understand concepts to be psychological features of agents that guide language usage. I don't believe that concepts will be around even after the heat death of the universe. If you don't believe this, what are concepts and how can I be sure they exist?
>The words map to sets that can be defined
I don't believe words can "map," whatever that means. This is another part of your reasoning that hangs on a metaphorical usage of a word you do not explain.
>We are rational animals, and other animals are irrational, wherein rational is defined as being able to grasp universals.
The point was that humans evolved from nonrational animals, so other animals can also understand universals, or they could understand in virtue of allowing them to evolve for a longer period of time or genetically engineering them.
>human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense
Things are valuable because agents value them. There is no reason why people can't value finite consciousness more than infinite consciousness. And there is an open empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad, so there is no sound a priori determination that having an infinite consciousness is better than a finite one.
Ok cool. I and the overwhelming majority of people (as shows by their revealed preference) say that caring about animal suffering is a sigmoid function, and I and most others place the upper bound at below the suffering of a single human.
>empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad
Ought statements cannot be empirically verified.
>so other animals can also understand universals, or they could understand in virtue of allowing them to evolve for a longer period of time or genetically engineering them
"What evidence do you have that". Show me a non-human animal that can do geometric proofs.
>Do you agree that Penrose stairs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_stairs are impossible to instantiate in physical reality and thus that any animal that sees a picture of them has immaterial cognition?
If the animal is able to articulate on its own why the Penrose stairs is impossible and how the illusion works without being fed the answer externally, then yes, I would say it likely has immaterial cognition. Bonus points for developing a geometry on its own where the stairs are possible.
>Physics provides no metaphysical reading that this is the smallest possible size
Its the smallest possible size for any known observable material object before it becomes a black hole, and the circle has to be made of material objects for it to exist in material reality for us to observe. We can of course, conceive of smaller sizes.
Alternatively alternatively, what physical evidence do you have for perfect circles physically existing? Perfect circles can physically exist is a positive claim, so burden of proof is on you.
>No you can't, or explain to me how you can do it
You can experience it for yourself. Go pick up an elementary school geometry textbook.
>what are concepts and how can I be sure they exist
Analogous to abstract types in programming, but for the material universe. One over many argument.
>I don't believe words can "map," whatever that means
Explain to me what 'means' means.
Explain to me what 'believe' means.
Explain to me what 'I' means.
Explain to me what 'can' means.
Explain to me what 'agent' means.
It seems to me that your 'reasoning' (whatever that means) hangs on the usage of words you do not explain.
I suspect however, that you know perfectly well that 'maps' means correspondence theory of truth, and you are being obtuse on purpose. If you are going to contest correspondence theory of truth, well, feel free to answer the above questions, and for that matter, explain how we are communicating at all if words don't correspond or map or however you wish to call it to concepts or reality or being or however you wish to call it.
>>empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad
>Ought statements cannot be empirically verified.
You said:
>If the duration of human consciousness is infinite and the duration of animal consciousness is finite, then human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense (any cardinality of infinity > any finite number).
There is no ought claim here.
>"What evidence do you have that". Show me a non-human animal that can do geometric proofs.
I said:
>>or they could understand
which is not a claim about the present.
>If the animal is able to articulate on its own why the Penrose stairs is impossible and how the illusion works without being fed the answer externally, then yes
You can't even explain what conceiving of a perfect circle is as I've already asked you what that means and how to do it and you have not answered me.
>Its the smallest possible size for any known observable material object before it becomes a black hole
This is not true, as again, physics is silent on the mereology of material objects, and you are implicitly smuggling in assumptions about quantization and space.
This is begging the question because physics doesn't rule out infinities.
>Perfect circles can physically exist is a positive claim, so burden of proof is on you.
Burden of proof isn't a real thing.
>You can experience it for yourself. Go pick up an elementary school geometry textbook.
I don't think anything like what you describe goes on in this case.
>Analogous to abstract types in programming, but for the material universe. One over many argument
I understand abstract types to be meaningful because of their behavioral effects in the world. Likewise for any operationalization of concept.
>It seems to me that your 'reasoning' (whatever that means) hangs on the usage of words you do not explain.
Yes, but I don't invoke technical terms without defining them.
>you know perfectly well that 'maps' means correspondence theory of truth
I take meaning to be use and so "maps" means whatever role you want it to be playing in your proposed theory, which I don't understand and suspect is meaningless.
>explain how we are communicating at all if words don't correspond or map or however you wish to call it to concepts or reality or being or however you wish to call it.
How can two LLMs communicate without the correspondence theory of truth? By repeating words to one another and behaving in mutually agreed upon appropriate ways. I don't think there is a mystery of how people communicate so I don't know what you want me to explain.
Perhaps I'm missing something, but how does one go from "pain is bad for the suffered" to "pain is bad simpliciter"? To put it in other terms: why does the pain of shrimp matter?
The purpose of morality and religion is to bind interest groups, classes, and civilizations together.
Factory farming exists to make meat cheap. Making meat and other base consumer goods cheap is part of the religion that capitalism with progressive characteristics is the best thing ever. People might stop believing this is true if it is suddenly immoral to provide people with cheap meat, if the best capitalism with progressive characteristics can do is give them ever more repulsive concoctions of high fructose corn oil and industrial chemicals in a box.
Very interesting that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, infinitely simple being would produce a world that’s so weird that ethical institutions based off of simplicity are utterly flawed.
I’m not convinced this is a good form of reasoning. Someone begins with a plausible intuition--that the Holocaust perpetrators brought about worse total consequences than factory farmers have. You think this intuition is subject to defeaters given the amount of animals that have been factory farmed. But one man’s ponens is another man’s tollens.
You offer us the plausible intuitions: “Suffering experienced by other animals isn’t intrinsically less important than suffering experienced by humans” and that insect suffering accounts for most of the suffering that happens. The anti-effective altruist will say these beliefs are subject to defeaters because they lead us to absurd conclusions. Specifically, these intuitions require us to believe that insect suffering and factory farming are among the worst moral atrocities in the world. So, the above-mentioned plausible intuitions are actually mistaken.
In case you think this is a question-begging move, consider the structural similarity. Just as you ask us to revise our intuitions about the badness of the Holocaust in light of an alleged defeater, we can ask you to revise your intuition about the badness of pain in light of an alleged defeater. At the end of the day, what do we have to rely on other than our own plausibility judgments?
Hi BB, I've been checking out Aron Wall's blog, based on your earlier recommendation. There isn't anything there about factory farming, though he writes a lot about Christianity. Since you know him personally, do you know how he views our moral obligations (if any) toward animals?
I've always thought that morality should emerge from simple rules, i.e. those that hug closely the underlying reason why we even have morality at all: that consciousness, suffering, and pleasure exist. Suffering is bad and pleasure is good are simple rules from which the complex, higher-order rules of morality should follow. Making anything else fundamental, to me, seems like rationalizing faulty intuitions. It also makes your moral beliefs less predictable to others, which isn't good.
I agree. This speaks directly to why deriving morals from religious principles because they represent divine judgment can be problematic.
I think another interesting conclusion of this--one which I'm sure people who post a lot about animal suffering care about, although I don't hear about it as much as I would expect!!--is that it seems REALLY IMPORTANT to improve our knowledge of whether and/or how much various sorts of animals suffer.
If, say, shrimp don't suffer at all, then giving to shrimp welfare projects is **actively bad**--it's throwing resources away into a Money Pit. Likewise, if there's a significant (even if not overwhelming) chance that Insect Suffering is not only not the largest problem in the world (as Bentham has said), but isn't even a problem *at all*, then figuring out which is the case becomes of paramount importance, obviously.
(And this holds too for questions like "do they suffer x% as much as humans or 2x% as much as humans.)
This also implies cognitive science and philosophy of mind research are much more of value than nearly any other type of scientific research and nearly any other sort of philosophy.
(FWIW, my ethical beliefs diverge substantially from Bentham's FAR before these kinds of questions. Just spinning out the implications here.)
I agree it's important to figure out which animals are conscious!
One day I threw a grape at another grape, and two bananas appeared and flew away in opposite directions. Or so I thought. I went over and picked up the bananas, one in each hand. Trying to give myself a free hand to pick up the grapes as well, I transferred one banana to my other hand, where it touched the other banana. To my surprise, they both disappeared in a flash of light!
Basically this happens in particle colliders all the time, and despite it being weird for our brains that evolved in the savannah hundreds of thousands of years ago, we don't throw out physics because it seems to produce weird results. We're not good at intuitive thinking about really big, small, fast, slow, numerous, etc. things unless we really train in it. And only kinda even if we do.
This is an underrated and important insights. However, the ethical judgments we act upon are often strongly reinforced by how others view them, by media portrayals of things as "bad" and "evil", or by a gut reaction to injustice that might be stronger when we feel more connected to the victims.
This is (in part) why it might be easier to distance oneself from animal advocacy compared to other causes. To stay driven by 'weird' ethics, one has to be either highly resistant to the apathy displayed by most people (regarding animal suffering, for example), or possess a level of interspecies empathy akin to Tomasik’s. For most people, it's probably the former.
Oof.
In all seriousness though, thanks for the shout-out, Matthew! My Substack would have gone nowhere without you.
Happy to have recommended such a good substack!
Hi, I would like to press your calculus a bit. It seems to me that your moral reasoning assumes standard units of pain and pleasure for all conscious beings. Furthermore, you seem to think that we have reliable means to calculate and weigh these units. This is why you feel confident in claiming that factory farming is worse than the Holocaust. You see the matter as one of simple math, and according to your simple math, insect suffering has more units weighing down on the scale than the human suffering brought on by the Holocaust.
I have many problems with this line of argumentation, but before I express them, would you like to clarify why you think your calculus reliably accounts for all the relevant factors we should consider in ethical reasoning?
Humans are capable of grasping universals. Universals are immaterial and eternal. For human cognition to be able to grasp them, it must have an immaterial and eternal component. Ergo, human souls must be able to persist beyond death.
Animal souls cannot grasp universals, therefore, there is good reason to believe that their souls do not persist beyond death.
Therefore, humans matter infinitely more than animals.
Therefore, any amount of animal suffering, considered by itself, is less important and meaningful than a single human suffering.
>Humans are capable of grasping universals.
No they're not.
>Universals are immaterial and eternal.
They're just words.
>For human cognition to be able to grasp them, it must have an immaterial and eternal component.
Pure nonsequitor.
>Ergo, human souls must be able to persist beyond death.
This is trivially true because you define souls to be immaterial and eternal.
>Animal souls cannot grasp universals
We are animals and no evidence is provided for this claim.
>there is good reason to believe that their souls do not persist beyond death.
No there isn't.
>Therefore, humans matter infinitely more than animals.
Second pure nonsequitor.
>any amount of animal suffering, considered by itself, is less important and meaningful than a single human suffering.
Trivially true in virtue of helping yourself to various assumptions that are stated without argument.
>No they're not.
You can mentally grasp the concept of a perfect circle, even though perfect circles are impossible to instantiate in material reality. Therefore, the perfect circle must be immaterial, since it exists (otherwise what are you grasping exactly), but not materially, as it will run into the plank length. But if we can mentally grasp the immaterially existing concept, at least part of our cognition must be immaterial. This is the classic Platonic argument for the immortality of the soul.
Universals are also eternal, in the sense that the concept of the perfect circle will be around even after the heat death of the universe.
>They're just words.
The words map to sets that can be defined. Even if you are a hardcore naturalist, a computer vision model can mathematically define what object belongs to different sets.
>We are animals and no evidence is provided for this claim.
We are rational animals, and other animals are irrational, wherein rational is defined as being able to grasp universals.
For proofs: people have been able to communicate with dolphins and chimpanzees. None of them can do geometric proofs as far as I know. If a dolphin or a chimpanzee can do a geometric proof on its own that it has never seen before, I'll adjust my claim.
>Second pure nonsequitor
If the duration of human consciousness is infinite and the duration of animal consciousness is finite, then human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense (any cardinality of infinity > any finite number).
>You can mentally grasp the concept of a perfect circle
No you can't, or explain to me how you can do it. "Grasp" is a unexplained metaphor. I am not familiar with any psychological science that describes what "grasping" is.
>even though perfect circles are impossible to instantiate in material reality
What evidence do you have that e.g. physics has ruled out perfect circles as possible to instantiate in material reality?
>it will run into the plank length.
You are attaching significance to the planck length that is not part of the content of any physical theory. Planck units are just the smallest measurable units derived from conventional constants like G. Physics provides no metaphysical reading that this is the smallest possible size.
>if we can mentally grasp the immaterially existing concept, at least part of our cognition must be immaterial
This is just restating the nonsequitor. Why would this entail that human cognition is immaterial? Do you agree that Penrose stairs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_stairs are impossible to instantiate in physical reality and thus that any animal that sees a picture of them has immaterial cognition?
>Universals are also eternal, in the sense that the concept of the perfect circle will be around even after the heat death of the universe
I understand concepts to be psychological features of agents that guide language usage. I don't believe that concepts will be around even after the heat death of the universe. If you don't believe this, what are concepts and how can I be sure they exist?
>The words map to sets that can be defined
I don't believe words can "map," whatever that means. This is another part of your reasoning that hangs on a metaphorical usage of a word you do not explain.
>We are rational animals, and other animals are irrational, wherein rational is defined as being able to grasp universals.
The point was that humans evolved from nonrational animals, so other animals can also understand universals, or they could understand in virtue of allowing them to evolve for a longer period of time or genetically engineering them.
>human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense
Things are valuable because agents value them. There is no reason why people can't value finite consciousness more than infinite consciousness. And there is an open empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad, so there is no sound a priori determination that having an infinite consciousness is better than a finite one.
>Things are valuable because agents value them
Ok cool. I and the overwhelming majority of people (as shows by their revealed preference) say that caring about animal suffering is a sigmoid function, and I and most others place the upper bound at below the suffering of a single human.
>empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad
Ought statements cannot be empirically verified.
>so other animals can also understand universals, or they could understand in virtue of allowing them to evolve for a longer period of time or genetically engineering them
"What evidence do you have that". Show me a non-human animal that can do geometric proofs.
>Do you agree that Penrose stairs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_stairs are impossible to instantiate in physical reality and thus that any animal that sees a picture of them has immaterial cognition?
If the animal is able to articulate on its own why the Penrose stairs is impossible and how the illusion works without being fed the answer externally, then yes, I would say it likely has immaterial cognition. Bonus points for developing a geometry on its own where the stairs are possible.
>Physics provides no metaphysical reading that this is the smallest possible size
Its the smallest possible size for any known observable material object before it becomes a black hole, and the circle has to be made of material objects for it to exist in material reality for us to observe. We can of course, conceive of smaller sizes.
Alternatively, Gabriel's horn. Exists mathematically, cannot exist physically.
Alternatively alternatively, what physical evidence do you have for perfect circles physically existing? Perfect circles can physically exist is a positive claim, so burden of proof is on you.
>No you can't, or explain to me how you can do it
You can experience it for yourself. Go pick up an elementary school geometry textbook.
>what are concepts and how can I be sure they exist
Analogous to abstract types in programming, but for the material universe. One over many argument.
>I don't believe words can "map," whatever that means
Explain to me what 'means' means.
Explain to me what 'believe' means.
Explain to me what 'I' means.
Explain to me what 'can' means.
Explain to me what 'agent' means.
It seems to me that your 'reasoning' (whatever that means) hangs on the usage of words you do not explain.
I suspect however, that you know perfectly well that 'maps' means correspondence theory of truth, and you are being obtuse on purpose. If you are going to contest correspondence theory of truth, well, feel free to answer the above questions, and for that matter, explain how we are communicating at all if words don't correspond or map or however you wish to call it to concepts or reality or being or however you wish to call it.
>>empirical question on whether an infinite consciousness would be infinitely good or infinitely bad
>Ought statements cannot be empirically verified.
You said:
>If the duration of human consciousness is infinite and the duration of animal consciousness is finite, then human consciousness is infinitely more valuable in the subjective sense (you should make friends with those who will be around with you forever) and in the objective sense (any cardinality of infinity > any finite number).
There is no ought claim here.
>"What evidence do you have that". Show me a non-human animal that can do geometric proofs.
I said:
>>or they could understand
which is not a claim about the present.
>If the animal is able to articulate on its own why the Penrose stairs is impossible and how the illusion works without being fed the answer externally, then yes
You can't even explain what conceiving of a perfect circle is as I've already asked you what that means and how to do it and you have not answered me.
>Its the smallest possible size for any known observable material object before it becomes a black hole
This is not true, as again, physics is silent on the mereology of material objects, and you are implicitly smuggling in assumptions about quantization and space.
>Alternatively, Gabriel's horn. Exists mathematically, cannot exist physically.
This is begging the question because physics doesn't rule out infinities.
>Perfect circles can physically exist is a positive claim, so burden of proof is on you.
Burden of proof isn't a real thing.
>You can experience it for yourself. Go pick up an elementary school geometry textbook.
I don't think anything like what you describe goes on in this case.
>Analogous to abstract types in programming, but for the material universe. One over many argument
I understand abstract types to be meaningful because of their behavioral effects in the world. Likewise for any operationalization of concept.
>It seems to me that your 'reasoning' (whatever that means) hangs on the usage of words you do not explain.
Yes, but I don't invoke technical terms without defining them.
>you know perfectly well that 'maps' means correspondence theory of truth
I take meaning to be use and so "maps" means whatever role you want it to be playing in your proposed theory, which I don't understand and suspect is meaningless.
>explain how we are communicating at all if words don't correspond or map or however you wish to call it to concepts or reality or being or however you wish to call it.
How can two LLMs communicate without the correspondence theory of truth? By repeating words to one another and behaving in mutually agreed upon appropriate ways. I don't think there is a mystery of how people communicate so I don't know what you want me to explain.
Perhaps I'm missing something, but how does one go from "pain is bad for the suffered" to "pain is bad simpliciter"? To put it in other terms: why does the pain of shrimp matter?
The purpose of morality and religion is to bind interest groups, classes, and civilizations together.
Factory farming exists to make meat cheap. Making meat and other base consumer goods cheap is part of the religion that capitalism with progressive characteristics is the best thing ever. People might stop believing this is true if it is suddenly immoral to provide people with cheap meat, if the best capitalism with progressive characteristics can do is give them ever more repulsive concoctions of high fructose corn oil and industrial chemicals in a box.
Very interesting that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, infinitely simple being would produce a world that’s so weird that ethical institutions based off of simplicity are utterly flawed.
I’m not convinced this is a good form of reasoning. Someone begins with a plausible intuition--that the Holocaust perpetrators brought about worse total consequences than factory farmers have. You think this intuition is subject to defeaters given the amount of animals that have been factory farmed. But one man’s ponens is another man’s tollens.
You offer us the plausible intuitions: “Suffering experienced by other animals isn’t intrinsically less important than suffering experienced by humans” and that insect suffering accounts for most of the suffering that happens. The anti-effective altruist will say these beliefs are subject to defeaters because they lead us to absurd conclusions. Specifically, these intuitions require us to believe that insect suffering and factory farming are among the worst moral atrocities in the world. So, the above-mentioned plausible intuitions are actually mistaken.
In case you think this is a question-begging move, consider the structural similarity. Just as you ask us to revise our intuitions about the badness of the Holocaust in light of an alleged defeater, we can ask you to revise your intuition about the badness of pain in light of an alleged defeater. At the end of the day, what do we have to rely on other than our own plausibility judgments?
Hi BB, I've been checking out Aron Wall's blog, based on your earlier recommendation. There isn't anything there about factory farming, though he writes a lot about Christianity. Since you know him personally, do you know how he views our moral obligations (if any) toward animals?
Yes he thinks it is bad!