Jun 13, 2023·edited Jun 13, 2023Liked by Bentham's Bulldog
I agree that it is unclear what people mean when they complain that utilitarianism fails to consider the separateness of persons. I thought I agreed with the objection myself until I realized that I couldn't find the objection clearly explained in a sensible way that wasn't just equivalent to other common objections.
Anyway, when I reflect on what I think I had in mind with this objection, it seems that we have a moral intuition that persons themselves have a special kind of value, a value that cannot be merely reduced to the value of their welfare. The idea is that utilitarianism fails to appreciate this special value because it gives prescriptions in a way that would make sense only if this special value didn't exist. For example, if it turned out that there are no persons (or if we were actually just parts of one person), then utilitarian prescriptions seem like they would make perfect sense. If that were the case, then it makes perfect sense to maximize aggregative well-being. But given that there *really are* persons with special intrinsic value, that should make some difference to the prescriptions of the correct moral theory, hence the prescription of the correct moral theory can't just be maximize aggregative well-being. Utilitarianism doesn't make this difference, so it fails to respect the separateness of persons. Or at least I think that was the reasoning that I would have said when I thought I agreed with this objection.
I guess there are different ways to explain what is required to respect the special intrinsic value of persons. Maybe persons require their autonomy to be respected (independently of concerns with well-being), or that trade-offs made across persons have a higher standard to justify than trade-offs made within a person's life, or that persons have various rights that must be respected, etc. In fact, it seems like many of the common objections to utilitarianism (e.g., rights, desert, responsibility, equality, promise-keeping, etc.) appeal to an intuition about the way persons should be valued. For example, I don't think people value equality because of something impersonally valuable about flat distributions of utility; rather, the idea is that persons have a special claim to be treated as equals or something like that. So, really, it seems like the "separateness of persons" objection functions as just a generic placeholder for any objection to utilitarianism. So I don't find it to be an independently interesting objection, at least from what I've read so far.
Consider this a bit of evidence against the reliability of philosophical intuitions. I'd also put forward the hypothesis that some objections are popular for reasons unrelated to their quality. Philosophy as an academic enterprise is a social institution and arguments, ideas, philosophers, positions, and so on can become popular as a result of factors other than how good the ideas in question actually are.
Given how many philosophers love taking shots at utilitarianism, they're probably biased towards favoring any readily available means of doing so. My continued impression is that you put too much stock in what philosophers think.
I’ve always found utilitarianism ridiculous for the simple reason that it can’t answer the questions:
1. Utility - WHOSE utility?
2. Good - GOOD for whom?
Utility and good are so subjective that utilitarianism totally fails as a moral philosophy (a fact that equally applies to all other objective moral systems. They’re all bullshit).
I agree that it is unclear what people mean when they complain that utilitarianism fails to consider the separateness of persons. I thought I agreed with the objection myself until I realized that I couldn't find the objection clearly explained in a sensible way that wasn't just equivalent to other common objections.
Anyway, when I reflect on what I think I had in mind with this objection, it seems that we have a moral intuition that persons themselves have a special kind of value, a value that cannot be merely reduced to the value of their welfare. The idea is that utilitarianism fails to appreciate this special value because it gives prescriptions in a way that would make sense only if this special value didn't exist. For example, if it turned out that there are no persons (or if we were actually just parts of one person), then utilitarian prescriptions seem like they would make perfect sense. If that were the case, then it makes perfect sense to maximize aggregative well-being. But given that there *really are* persons with special intrinsic value, that should make some difference to the prescriptions of the correct moral theory, hence the prescription of the correct moral theory can't just be maximize aggregative well-being. Utilitarianism doesn't make this difference, so it fails to respect the separateness of persons. Or at least I think that was the reasoning that I would have said when I thought I agreed with this objection.
I guess there are different ways to explain what is required to respect the special intrinsic value of persons. Maybe persons require their autonomy to be respected (independently of concerns with well-being), or that trade-offs made across persons have a higher standard to justify than trade-offs made within a person's life, or that persons have various rights that must be respected, etc. In fact, it seems like many of the common objections to utilitarianism (e.g., rights, desert, responsibility, equality, promise-keeping, etc.) appeal to an intuition about the way persons should be valued. For example, I don't think people value equality because of something impersonally valuable about flat distributions of utility; rather, the idea is that persons have a special claim to be treated as equals or something like that. So, really, it seems like the "separateness of persons" objection functions as just a generic placeholder for any objection to utilitarianism. So I don't find it to be an independently interesting objection, at least from what I've read so far.
Egoism does not take seriously the distinction between moments!
Consider this a bit of evidence against the reliability of philosophical intuitions. I'd also put forward the hypothesis that some objections are popular for reasons unrelated to their quality. Philosophy as an academic enterprise is a social institution and arguments, ideas, philosophers, positions, and so on can become popular as a result of factors other than how good the ideas in question actually are.
Given how many philosophers love taking shots at utilitarianism, they're probably biased towards favoring any readily available means of doing so. My continued impression is that you put too much stock in what philosophers think.
I’ve always found utilitarianism ridiculous for the simple reason that it can’t answer the questions:
1. Utility - WHOSE utility?
2. Good - GOOD for whom?
Utility and good are so subjective that utilitarianism totally fails as a moral philosophy (a fact that equally applies to all other objective moral systems. They’re all bullshit).
The “metaphysical” nature of the claim seems to be clearly specious. As for the practical critique, Jay M. explains it very nicely.