Imagine accusing someone of "conceiving God as an ultimately simple utility monster" and also claiming that the only thing that matters is how many people are Christians because everyone else are doomed to eternal torture.
Imagine actually believing that God sends every non-Christian to eternal Hell and also thinking that this God deserves worship, and is basis for all morality. And then having the audacity to mock people that care about animal suffering.
Personally, I don't find arguments in favor of shrimp welfare at all persuasive and think probability that shrimp experience any qualia at all to be absolutely tiny (contrary to, say, probability that pigs have subjective experience which is around 50%). But I can see where people who care about shrimp welfare are comming from. That it's a question of different probability estimate about a complicated question without a very clear answer yet. Not overal moral or epistemic brokenness.
I don't see how one can worship a God of Eternal Torture without being deeply broken in some sense.
That's why, more often than not, Christians need Christ more than anyone else. They're usually the ones who are more deeply broken. I don't have a specific passage to support this, but it seems obviously true.
I would love for you to make a post about what you think the weakest points of EA are -- in terms of philosophy, practice, culture, and everything else.
I am not sure what he is trying to convince you of. This is a mess of arguments like "EAs have failed to take San Francisco by fire and sword", "if you meant what you said you would pick a long series of devilish actions for no other reason than to satisfy me", "animal pain is fake", what is he trying to recommend?
Unless you are panpsychic, there is a threshold at which the first "generation" of self-assembling amino chains that eventually became unicellular organisms that eventually became us mattered infinitely more than the generation before it.
In which you appealed to a general principle that no generation mattered infinitely more than the one before it. Sei shows that this "plausible principle" is, in fact, wrong in a general case, unless we assume panpsychism. That there is such generation which matters infinitely less than other.
Whether this divide is before shrimps or after is another question. But the deduction: "any generation matter -> shrimps matter" doesn't work, even if shrimps were indeed our ancestors.
I imagine that Stone, being a Christian, likely believes in some sort of threshold at which humans became humans and thus infinitely more important than the non-human animals God said we should eat.
There are weird implications to imagining an infinite value threshold between shrimps and humans the way we have one between shrimps and atoms but you can avoid a lot of then simply by believing in divine intervention.
I suspect you are correct. However, in principle, one needn't believe that there must be an infinity laying between humans and the animals they're supposed to eat. It'd be sufficient if animals mattered so much less than humans that the pleasure of eating them would outweigh their suffering. This does depend on some phil assumptions of course, eg that (taste) pleasure vs. suffering can be weighed against one another (which is denied by eg suffering-based utilitarianism).
I do appreciate how he begins by stating that he declines to think of EA as an idea and has reconceptualized it as a ‘social body.’ Better to let people know up front that you have no intention of engaging with the substance of their view and just want to blather about something else.
Imagine accusing someone of "conceiving God as an ultimately simple utility monster" and also claiming that the only thing that matters is how many people are Christians because everyone else are doomed to eternal torture.
Imagine actually believing that God sends every non-Christian to eternal Hell and also thinking that this God deserves worship, and is basis for all morality. And then having the audacity to mock people that care about animal suffering.
Personally, I don't find arguments in favor of shrimp welfare at all persuasive and think probability that shrimp experience any qualia at all to be absolutely tiny (contrary to, say, probability that pigs have subjective experience which is around 50%). But I can see where people who care about shrimp welfare are comming from. That it's a question of different probability estimate about a complicated question without a very clear answer yet. Not overal moral or epistemic brokenness.
I don't see how one can worship a God of Eternal Torture without being deeply broken in some sense.
That's why, more often than not, Christians need Christ more than anyone else. They're usually the ones who are more deeply broken. I don't have a specific passage to support this, but it seems obviously true.
Christians usually have better outcomes on most empirical things (better lives, character, etc) so this isn't true. Most atheists aren't EA vegans.
Well, you do have a point there. I mean, I'm only speaking from my own experiences with Christians, but that's not solid evidence, is it?
Sorry that you've had that experience. Maybe you'd find some Christians you'd feel more at home with in the Christian Effective Altruists group.
Thanks 🫂
My friend Alex Strasser on Twitter can help you get started with them. x.com/astrasser116
I would love for you to make a post about what you think the weakest points of EA are -- in terms of philosophy, practice, culture, and everything else.
I am not sure what he is trying to convince you of. This is a mess of arguments like "EAs have failed to take San Francisco by fire and sword", "if you meant what you said you would pick a long series of devilish actions for no other reason than to satisfy me", "animal pain is fake", what is he trying to recommend?
Fantastic, you should write more criticisms.
Unless you are panpsychic, there is a threshold at which the first "generation" of self-assembling amino chains that eventually became unicellular organisms that eventually became us mattered infinitely more than the generation before it.
But I was just talking about between shrimp and people
In which you appealed to a general principle that no generation mattered infinitely more than the one before it. Sei shows that this "plausible principle" is, in fact, wrong in a general case, unless we assume panpsychism. That there is such generation which matters infinitely less than other.
Whether this divide is before shrimps or after is another question. But the deduction: "any generation matter -> shrimps matter" doesn't work, even if shrimps were indeed our ancestors.
I imagine that Stone, being a Christian, likely believes in some sort of threshold at which humans became humans and thus infinitely more important than the non-human animals God said we should eat.
There are weird implications to imagining an infinite value threshold between shrimps and humans the way we have one between shrimps and atoms but you can avoid a lot of then simply by believing in divine intervention.
I suspect you are correct. However, in principle, one needn't believe that there must be an infinity laying between humans and the animals they're supposed to eat. It'd be sufficient if animals mattered so much less than humans that the pleasure of eating them would outweigh their suffering. This does depend on some phil assumptions of course, eg that (taste) pleasure vs. suffering can be weighed against one another (which is denied by eg suffering-based utilitarianism).
Keep refuting these bad arguments, Matthew. You are doing genuinely important work here! God bless you man!
I do appreciate how he begins by stating that he declines to think of EA as an idea and has reconceptualized it as a ‘social body.’ Better to let people know up front that you have no intention of engaging with the substance of their view and just want to blather about something else.
I did like that he brought up the Benatar; paper Famine, affluence and procreation. Such an interesting paper!