1. Yes, caring about animals is a form of sentimentality. Performing torture of dogs could still be a sign of evil disposition though. So could performing torture of plants or stuffed animals if the torturer is imagining (or even mistakenly believes) that they are causing pain and suffering, and this is making them happy. We probably shouldn't jump to the evil disposition conclusion, but witnessing someone performing torture with a big grin on their face could certainly be a red flag.
2. It's only "obviously" not fine if you already believe harming animals is bad.
3. If you believe animal suffering is no more morally salient than plant suffering or rock suffering, that will imply that inflicting vast amounts of such "suffering" is not problematic.
4. The plausibility depends on how much Hsiao and any other morally salient beings know or stand to come to know and care about the fates of those animals. If a bunch of people are going to find out about it and feel bad about it, then paying the $20 to save the animals could easily be commendable.
5. It's only implausible if you already believe harming animals is bad.
6. The badness would depend on if any humans or other morally relevant beings cared about that cat. If that cat was important to the human community, its fiery death could be very very bad. Just as the fiery death of an important shade tree might be very very bad.
7. I agree with you here. The rational nature thing seems like a kludge. There are definitely some beings with human DNA that are not morally salient - fetuses, infants, people who are brain dead, etc. It would be wrong to harm those beings to the extent that it upsets their families, but they are no more capable of morally salient suffering than animals or plants or rocks. Drawing a firm line at birth where our legal system just treats any human beings past that point as capable of morally salient suffering is more about convenience than accuracy.
8. I'm going to pass on this one since I can't freely access the linked article and I'm not really clear on the contours of the point being made here.
If one believes that animals have any moral value at all, then eating meat is immoral.
I'll take a crack at this -
1. Yes, caring about animals is a form of sentimentality. Performing torture of dogs could still be a sign of evil disposition though. So could performing torture of plants or stuffed animals if the torturer is imagining (or even mistakenly believes) that they are causing pain and suffering, and this is making them happy. We probably shouldn't jump to the evil disposition conclusion, but witnessing someone performing torture with a big grin on their face could certainly be a red flag.
2. It's only "obviously" not fine if you already believe harming animals is bad.
3. If you believe animal suffering is no more morally salient than plant suffering or rock suffering, that will imply that inflicting vast amounts of such "suffering" is not problematic.
4. The plausibility depends on how much Hsiao and any other morally salient beings know or stand to come to know and care about the fates of those animals. If a bunch of people are going to find out about it and feel bad about it, then paying the $20 to save the animals could easily be commendable.
5. It's only implausible if you already believe harming animals is bad.
6. The badness would depend on if any humans or other morally relevant beings cared about that cat. If that cat was important to the human community, its fiery death could be very very bad. Just as the fiery death of an important shade tree might be very very bad.
7. I agree with you here. The rational nature thing seems like a kludge. There are definitely some beings with human DNA that are not morally salient - fetuses, infants, people who are brain dead, etc. It would be wrong to harm those beings to the extent that it upsets their families, but they are no more capable of morally salient suffering than animals or plants or rocks. Drawing a firm line at birth where our legal system just treats any human beings past that point as capable of morally salient suffering is more about convenience than accuracy.
8. I'm going to pass on this one since I can't freely access the linked article and I'm not really clear on the contours of the point being made here.