A being whose being set on fire isn’t bad according to Timothy Hsiao.
I’ve previously written a reply to Hsiao’s absurd defense of eating meat, which involves claiming that eating meat is not wrong at all, because animal suffering isn’t bad. But that reply involve very fine analysis of every line in his article. I thought it would be worth just generally laying out the problems with his post.
Hsiao argues that the only reason that animal cruelty is wrong is because it causes harm to one’s character or is indicative of bad character in some way. But this is clearly absurd. Several things should make us skeptical of his conclusion—a few of these are from my earlier article.
It implies that caring about animals is a type of foolish sentimentality—just like caring about plants or bacteria. If that’s true, then torturing dogs wouldn’t be indicative of evil disposition, just as torturing plants is not. It’s only if one has a vicious character which causes them to torture dogs that they’re doing something wrong.
It gets the wrong result in Norcross’ case. Suppose that you could torture a puppy to make chocolate taste better—however, this would be out of sight, out of mind, and not foster vicious disposition. His position entails that this is fine, however, it obviously is not.
It implies that it’s not wrong to inflict vast amounts of suffering for trivial reasons.
Suppose that Mr. Hsiao gained knowledge that a trillion animals were slowly having their skins ripped off by razors, inflicting profound agony on them, before eventually killing them. He could prevent all of it by pressing a button. However, doing so would cost 20 dollars, thus harming humans slightly. If the only reason harm to animals is bad is because of how it affects us, then he’d be under no obligation to push the button. In fact, he’d be wrong to push the button, because he’d be harming humans to benefit animals. This is, however, implausible.
Suppose additionally that there were two children torturing cats. One of them was torturing a real flesh-and-blood cat. The other one was torturing a robot that looks like a cat but is not conscious. Hsiao can prevent one of those from happening. On his view, given that cats don’t matter at all, he should just flip a coin. They have the same effect on people. However, this is implausible. Part of what’s bad about setting a cat on fire relates to the harm to the cat.
A forest fire kills a cat in a very painful way—it burns to death, crying out all the way. On Hsiao’s view, that isn’t bad at all.
It implies that the reason why it’s wrong to torture a severely mentally disabled person is that they have a rational nature. It has nothing to do with their current capacities or what the experience is like—it only has to do with the fact that their nature is rational, despite this not affecting their experience at all. Such a result is implausible.
Hsiao thinks that mistreating animals is wrong because it’s often cruel and cruelty is wrong. But eating meat is very plausibly cruel, on exactly these grounds.
Not very plausible, I don’t think.
If one believes that animals have any moral value at all, then eating meat is immoral.
I'll take a crack at this -
1. Yes, caring about animals is a form of sentimentality. Performing torture of dogs could still be a sign of evil disposition though. So could performing torture of plants or stuffed animals if the torturer is imagining (or even mistakenly believes) that they are causing pain and suffering, and this is making them happy. We probably shouldn't jump to the evil disposition conclusion, but witnessing someone performing torture with a big grin on their face could certainly be a red flag.
2. It's only "obviously" not fine if you already believe harming animals is bad.
3. If you believe animal suffering is no more morally salient than plant suffering or rock suffering, that will imply that inflicting vast amounts of such "suffering" is not problematic.
4. The plausibility depends on how much Hsiao and any other morally salient beings know or stand to come to know and care about the fates of those animals. If a bunch of people are going to find out about it and feel bad about it, then paying the $20 to save the animals could easily be commendable.
5. It's only implausible if you already believe harming animals is bad.
6. The badness would depend on if any humans or other morally relevant beings cared about that cat. If that cat was important to the human community, its fiery death could be very very bad. Just as the fiery death of an important shade tree might be very very bad.
7. I agree with you here. The rational nature thing seems like a kludge. There are definitely some beings with human DNA that are not morally salient - fetuses, infants, people who are brain dead, etc. It would be wrong to harm those beings to the extent that it upsets their families, but they are no more capable of morally salient suffering than animals or plants or rocks. Drawing a firm line at birth where our legal system just treats any human beings past that point as capable of morally salient suffering is more about convenience than accuracy.
8. I'm going to pass on this one since I can't freely access the linked article and I'm not really clear on the contours of the point being made here.