Axiologically better is the same as being better. So you have to, as a non-consequentialist, hold that it could be the case that things would go best if you took some action but taking the action would still be deeply wrong. This is, however, implausible. It's not a deepity -- it seems odd to say 'it would be great if you killed the guy and took his organs, but nonetheless, doing so would be very wrong'.
I'm not equivocating those claims. I'm saying it seems odd to say A without B. It seems odd to say 'it would be great if X happened, but nonetheless wrong to do X'.
Axiologically better is the same as being better. So you have to, as a non-consequentialist, hold that it could be the case that things would go best if you took some action but taking the action would still be deeply wrong. This is, however, implausible. It's not a deepity -- it seems odd to say 'it would be great if you killed the guy and took his organs, but nonetheless, doing so would be very wrong'.
I'm not equivocating those claims. I'm saying it seems odd to say A without B. It seems odd to say 'it would be great if X happened, but nonetheless wrong to do X'.
We're going in circles because you are refusing to respond to the point that I made about why it's not equivocation.