For any action X if X is justified by consequentialism it makes things better. This is definitionally true — a necessary entailment of consequentialism. But when put in this light, all the objections to consequentialism begin to ring rather hollow. Consider, for an illustrative example, the organ harvesting case.
For this to be an objection to consequentialism, it would have to be the case that the person being killed and having their organs harvested is a good thing — something that makes the world better. But once that’s true, then it stops seeming like any objection to consequentialism.
It seems odd to say ‘it would be great if that guy dropped dead and his organs were harvested and if someone killed him and harvested his organs that would make the world a better place, but, nonetheless, it’s deeply wrong to kill him and harvest his organs’. I think that a lot of our intuitions go awry at the level of evaluating the state of affairs — it doesn’t seem intuitively like a good state of affairs if the guy is killed and has his organs harvested.
But when we reflect on whether it’s a good state of affairs, of course, it is. That’s why there’s no version of consequentialism that I know of that would deny this. One person dying rather than five people dying is clearly better — fewer people die.
So let’s be clear on what non-consequentialism has to say. While it’s better that the organ harvesting happened, while it improved the world, it’s still deeply wrong to do. This is not, I think, plausible.