what you call "pretty cool" in your last line, I don't think that includes humans bringing about the good consequences from self-serving motives (e.g. to get a reward), or the actions of the Sun, or wind somehow saving an animal from getting smashed by a car... all those may be cool in more than one way of course, but I take it that's not what you mean!! do correct me if I'm wrong
so...
if what you call 'cool' in your last line is what you call *morality*, and the things that are not cool in your sense you don't count as *morality* (e.g. the actions of the Sun), then (assuming you are right about morality), consequentialism is false
What I call pretty cool isn't all of morality. I just explain that we have the ability to respond to moral reasons which is pretty cool and totally uncontroversial regardless of whether one is a consequentialist.
Well, the label 'moral' is ambiguous and often has a lot to say about motives. It would be strange to say Hitler's grandmother having sex was doing something very immoral, because morality is generally based on the knowledge one has at the time. But there are axiologically dictated facts that make it so that we should want to sun to do various things and we should want people to take various actions, regardless of motives. Call that morality if you like or don't, I don't care about the semantic question. What matters is that there is a fact of the matter about what you should do -- I care about discovering what the fact of the matter is and acting upon it.
1. I think there's plenty of ambiguous terms in the moral (and the larger practical) domain, but 'moral' doesn't seem to me to be one of them.
In this regard, I find it strange you tend to treat 'good' as univocal and 'morality' as equivocal when, for instance, we use 'moral' to qualify 'good' in reference to a specific kind of goodness (e.g. people distinguish between the 'morally good' and the 'prudentially good' --not that I think 'prudentially good' is the right word to use in the context where philosophers tend to use it, but anyway... btw, I use 'felicific' instead).
2. I don't think the Hitler's grandmother reply addresses my point. Namely, this is a good reply to 'cluelessness objections', but that's not the kind of objection I'm raising!! Mine relates to the moral significance of motives, and I take motives/maxims to be a separate element in the equation.
Hence, I can imagine someone acting strictly in accordance with the best account of expected benefits and the best information available to them concerning the means for promoting universal happiness, yet failing completely to act morally (e.g. they do it to get a tasty reward in heaven).
3. I agree we hope for happiness (not only for ourselves but also for others) regardless of motives, including that the Sun don't exploit tomorrow!! What I don't see is what that shows about *the nature of morality*. Surely, for instance, it doesn't show that the Sun would act immorally would it to exploit tomorrow, or (worse!!!) that some ruthless act would be moral if by chance its consequences happened to be "optimal" (e.g. there is an invisible switch that needs to be pressed in the next ten seconds to prevent all nuclear bombs in the planet to go off and someone unintentionally presses it in the middle of carrying a mass shooting).
1. I don't think that good is univocal -- it's used in lots of different ways.
2. Well, if on my account being moral relates to aiming at the good rather than doing the good, then this can explain the intuitions about people who do the right thing for the wrong reason.
3. I think all concepts that have anything to do with morality are either complex natural properties or fall out strictly from the axiology. I think acting morally would probably be the former -- you act morally if you do what you think will make things go best.
what you call "pretty cool" in your last line, I don't think that includes humans bringing about the good consequences from self-serving motives (e.g. to get a reward), or the actions of the Sun, or wind somehow saving an animal from getting smashed by a car... all those may be cool in more than one way of course, but I take it that's not what you mean!! do correct me if I'm wrong
so...
if what you call 'cool' in your last line is what you call *morality*, and the things that are not cool in your sense you don't count as *morality* (e.g. the actions of the Sun), then (assuming you are right about morality), consequentialism is false
What I call pretty cool isn't all of morality. I just explain that we have the ability to respond to moral reasons which is pretty cool and totally uncontroversial regardless of whether one is a consequentialist.
so humans doing it from self-serving motives, and the Sun doing it, you also call acting morally?
& if so, have you offered an argument for this kind of view?
*I mean, for the view thus expressed (as entailing that the actions of the non-moral agents are fitting objects of moral evaluation)?
Well, the label 'moral' is ambiguous and often has a lot to say about motives. It would be strange to say Hitler's grandmother having sex was doing something very immoral, because morality is generally based on the knowledge one has at the time. But there are axiologically dictated facts that make it so that we should want to sun to do various things and we should want people to take various actions, regardless of motives. Call that morality if you like or don't, I don't care about the semantic question. What matters is that there is a fact of the matter about what you should do -- I care about discovering what the fact of the matter is and acting upon it.
1. I think there's plenty of ambiguous terms in the moral (and the larger practical) domain, but 'moral' doesn't seem to me to be one of them.
In this regard, I find it strange you tend to treat 'good' as univocal and 'morality' as equivocal when, for instance, we use 'moral' to qualify 'good' in reference to a specific kind of goodness (e.g. people distinguish between the 'morally good' and the 'prudentially good' --not that I think 'prudentially good' is the right word to use in the context where philosophers tend to use it, but anyway... btw, I use 'felicific' instead).
2. I don't think the Hitler's grandmother reply addresses my point. Namely, this is a good reply to 'cluelessness objections', but that's not the kind of objection I'm raising!! Mine relates to the moral significance of motives, and I take motives/maxims to be a separate element in the equation.
Hence, I can imagine someone acting strictly in accordance with the best account of expected benefits and the best information available to them concerning the means for promoting universal happiness, yet failing completely to act morally (e.g. they do it to get a tasty reward in heaven).
3. I agree we hope for happiness (not only for ourselves but also for others) regardless of motives, including that the Sun don't exploit tomorrow!! What I don't see is what that shows about *the nature of morality*. Surely, for instance, it doesn't show that the Sun would act immorally would it to exploit tomorrow, or (worse!!!) that some ruthless act would be moral if by chance its consequences happened to be "optimal" (e.g. there is an invisible switch that needs to be pressed in the next ten seconds to prevent all nuclear bombs in the planet to go off and someone unintentionally presses it in the middle of carrying a mass shooting).
1. I don't think that good is univocal -- it's used in lots of different ways.
2. Well, if on my account being moral relates to aiming at the good rather than doing the good, then this can explain the intuitions about people who do the right thing for the wrong reason.
3. I think all concepts that have anything to do with morality are either complex natural properties or fall out strictly from the axiology. I think acting morally would probably be the former -- you act morally if you do what you think will make things go best.