As consequentialists, we think that axiology — accounts of what is valuable — dictate not merely the action we should take but what is really worth hoping for. It’s worth hoping for a brighter and better future, it’s worth wanting that future to take hold. It’s worth preferring that there are fewer wars, less hunger, and that more people are happy.
If there was a way for one to will a better world and the better world to actually take hold, they’d of course be morally compelled to do this. This is because things that are worth hoping for are conversely worth bringing about.
But this is not some extra fact on top of the facts about axiology. The consequentialist thinks that there are some things that are well and truly good — pleasure, for example. Because these things are good, we should want there to be more of them and try to bring them about. There’s no extra duty to promote the good — the good is just worth promoting because of what it is. Compare: there’s no extra set of facts that say that if you want to be in good health you should avoid bloodletting — there are just the facts about bloodletting and the facts about what it is to want to be in good health.
Let’s see if we can put some more meat on the bones of this account. Well, first, let’s consider what good things are. As previously discussed, good things are by definition the types of things that we should want there to be — the types of things that improve the world when they exist. Thus,
If something is good, we should want it to be.
This is true by definition. Now, here’s another claim.
If we should want something to be and we can bring it about, we should, all else equal.
This is perfectly trivial. If you should want there to be an end to world hunger, then you should end world hunger if you can. In fact, by definition, you should hope that you end world hunger. But if you should hope that you take some action, you obviously should take the action. Thus,
We should bring about things that are good.
If an action is good, therefore, we should bring it about. This is a distinctly consequentialist notion.
Here we haven’t posited acts as fundamental because they’re not. They fall straightforwardly out of facts about axiology which entails facts about what we should hope happens. We just happen to be the type of being that can manipulate our limbs to bring about the things that we hope happen. This is what gives acts their special status — nothing about the act themselves, just something about us. If our will couldn’t affect our acts but could affect tornadoes, then it would make sense to give tornadoes the privileged status that we currently give acts.
This is I think a pretty important result. For one, it shows that the consequentialist needs to posit no irreducible deontic notions — instead, the deontic notions fall out of the axiology. I think it also explains a lot of the motivation for global consequentialism — if acts are not fundamental, then perhaps it no longer makes sense to think of one’s self as an act consequentialist rather than a consequentialist about all things — one who lets axiology determine their evaluations of everything from acts to climates to dispositions to tornadoes. Note, I don’t think this settles the global consequentialism debate — there are real questions about whether it is a distinct substantive position.
This also gives humans an interesting war. Everything in the universe is susceptible to value facts — every star, planet, and amoeba is either good, bad, or neutral. But we are the only beings in the universe that can respond to the value facts — the only beings that can see that things are worth bringing about and then bring them about for that reason. That’s pretty cool!
what you call "pretty cool" in your last line, I don't think that includes humans bringing about the good consequences from self-serving motives (e.g. to get a reward), or the actions of the Sun, or wind somehow saving an animal from getting smashed by a car... all those may be cool in more than one way of course, but I take it that's not what you mean!! do correct me if I'm wrong
so...
if what you call 'cool' in your last line is what you call *morality*, and the things that are not cool in your sense you don't count as *morality* (e.g. the actions of the Sun), then (assuming you are right about morality), consequentialism is false