It would seem like the facts pertaining to real material objects and their measureable relations give us good reason to infer abstract realities, however we want to ground those.
But it would seem like moral facts aren't like that. And I think it is that difference that leads one to a moral nihilism.
Was reading Yetter Chappell's paper where he talks about the view regarding platonic moral facts mentioned here, and it seems as though his point is the following: the platonic facts are giving an account of the metaphysics of goodness as such, not giving an account of what things are good. He thinks that on any plausible view what ultimately is worth caring about are particular things that are good, such as helping people, rather than goodness as such. So the fact that the abstract objects don't seem obviously worth caring about in themselves is not a problem, that's what you'd expect from any account of "goodness as such".
But I guess I don't see why then a divine command theorist couldn't say the exact same thing. Just seems obvious that they could give the same response to your objection. Maybe I'm missing something?
I wonder if Chappell would agree that this response is open to a divine command theorist just as much as the moral Platonist. Is there any way to @ him on here?
> Theism only has explanatory power if we start with a conception of what’s good, and then argue that God explains why there is so much good stuff.
People have different conceptions of what's good, including being drawn to things that many call bad. The idea of theism is that it is God's conception of what is Good that is correct, and not whatever humans may conceive. This does run into the Euthyphro dilemma (how did God arrive at this conception of Good), and into perennialist issues (the different spiritual traditions often say contradictory things), but eh, both of these can be dismissed as humans trying to know the mind of God, which anyone spiritual would say is impossible. It's really not for nothing that Camus coined the term 'philosophical suicide' to refer to the act of believing in a religion. He is correct actually: spirituality is not philosophy, and you do in the end need to die to truly get it.
The special ability God has to ground morality is that you can't argue against God, but any and all philosophical conceptions can be argued against and dismissed.
I’ve also heard another reply to the “morality is God’s nature” view in response to Euthyphro. It seems that part of what I means to be good is to be given the option (the freedom) to act wrongly, but choosing to act rightly. But if what is good is just synonymous with God’s nature and thus whatever God must do, it’s not clear how God could have this good quality if he isn’t free to act wrongly.
I’m not sure how successful this is, but it strikes me as at least somewhat plausible.
My only doubt (so far) is that, this might technically be true for other conceptions of God, even one’s that seperate him from morality. For instance, there is a sense of which God could not act wrongly since he is by definition, all good. But I can’t shake the intuition that this is importantly different.
Have you read Jonathan Haidt's book The Righteous Mind? I strongly recommend it - especially for you. Among other things he argues, I think successfully, for God being invented to unite tribes. In ancient times when governments were weaker, belief in God helped keep people honest and in line with societal expectations. God is an arbiter of morality. He creates it, so it's not you or I, it's Him. And God is all knowing and powerful so if you're afraid of him I trust that you'll be ethical.
I think he's right. But perhaps you won't be convinced. At least give it a shot though. I'm sure they have the book at your University library. Haidt has done studies in other cultures that might make you see religion and philosophy differently.
Yeah I think the argument from moral agency is a pretty good one. I think theistic platonism is a good solution because God is omniscient, on this account, though I haven't read the Baras paper.
It would seem like the facts pertaining to real material objects and their measureable relations give us good reason to infer abstract realities, however we want to ground those.
But it would seem like moral facts aren't like that. And I think it is that difference that leads one to a moral nihilism.
Was reading Yetter Chappell's paper where he talks about the view regarding platonic moral facts mentioned here, and it seems as though his point is the following: the platonic facts are giving an account of the metaphysics of goodness as such, not giving an account of what things are good. He thinks that on any plausible view what ultimately is worth caring about are particular things that are good, such as helping people, rather than goodness as such. So the fact that the abstract objects don't seem obviously worth caring about in themselves is not a problem, that's what you'd expect from any account of "goodness as such".
But I guess I don't see why then a divine command theorist couldn't say the exact same thing. Just seems obvious that they could give the same response to your objection. Maybe I'm missing something?
I wonder if Chappell would agree that this response is open to a divine command theorist just as much as the moral Platonist. Is there any way to @ him on here?
> Theism only has explanatory power if we start with a conception of what’s good, and then argue that God explains why there is so much good stuff.
People have different conceptions of what's good, including being drawn to things that many call bad. The idea of theism is that it is God's conception of what is Good that is correct, and not whatever humans may conceive. This does run into the Euthyphro dilemma (how did God arrive at this conception of Good), and into perennialist issues (the different spiritual traditions often say contradictory things), but eh, both of these can be dismissed as humans trying to know the mind of God, which anyone spiritual would say is impossible. It's really not for nothing that Camus coined the term 'philosophical suicide' to refer to the act of believing in a religion. He is correct actually: spirituality is not philosophy, and you do in the end need to die to truly get it.
The special ability God has to ground morality is that you can't argue against God, but any and all philosophical conceptions can be argued against and dismissed.
I’ve also heard another reply to the “morality is God’s nature” view in response to Euthyphro. It seems that part of what I means to be good is to be given the option (the freedom) to act wrongly, but choosing to act rightly. But if what is good is just synonymous with God’s nature and thus whatever God must do, it’s not clear how God could have this good quality if he isn’t free to act wrongly.
I’m not sure how successful this is, but it strikes me as at least somewhat plausible.
My only doubt (so far) is that, this might technically be true for other conceptions of God, even one’s that seperate him from morality. For instance, there is a sense of which God could not act wrongly since he is by definition, all good. But I can’t shake the intuition that this is importantly different.
Have you read Jonathan Haidt's book The Righteous Mind? I strongly recommend it - especially for you. Among other things he argues, I think successfully, for God being invented to unite tribes. In ancient times when governments were weaker, belief in God helped keep people honest and in line with societal expectations. God is an arbiter of morality. He creates it, so it's not you or I, it's Him. And God is all knowing and powerful so if you're afraid of him I trust that you'll be ethical.
Seems way too speculative.
I think he's right. But perhaps you won't be convinced. At least give it a shot though. I'm sure they have the book at your University library. Haidt has done studies in other cultures that might make you see religion and philosophy differently.
Also, I'm not sure if you're familiar with Joshua Greene's work. Not really God related, but also on moral psychology and a bit similar to Haidt. See what you think of this essay: https://static.squarespace.com/static/54763f79e4b0c4e55ffb000c/t/5484abb5e4b0213f74375bce/1417980853923/the-secret-joke-of-kants-soul.pdf
I like Greene's work. I think he makes a good case for utilitarianism in many of his articles.
Yeah I think the argument from moral agency is a pretty good one. I think theistic platonism is a good solution because God is omniscient, on this account, though I haven't read the Baras paper.