I don't understand how non-hedonistic views are required to deny EPTLW. An objective list theorist could just say that all terms in the objective wellbeing function that don't correspond to hedonic goods are bounded. Then the sum of the upper bounds for non-hedonic goods would be L.
I'm not going to read the paper because the argument is completely absurd. Say someone experiences a large amount of pain in their lives, but still helps people, heroically stops an insane utilitarian from forcing people to be wireheaded, and generally has great and loving relationships. I don't see how you can establish an arbitrary limit L on the amount of "goodness" in his life (if such a thing can even be quantified).
I have read the paper since I posted the comment. The entire paper relies on the assumption that the argument is plausible, which is flawed. Additionally, I believe that non-hedonistic things count among them making the world a better place, but we can substitute random things for that if need be. I have also separately contacted you via other means.
I do, the Paper says that a pluralist would be hard pressed to accept the conclusion that a person's well-being is limited by a constant L if they have no pleasure and experience an amount of pain P greater then some finite amount. I'm agnostic on that analysis. However the Paper then goes on to argue that since the above thing is pretty intuitive, it's strong evidence for hedonism, I disagree, It's obviously nonsense. That's a direct response to the paper.
That's a reductio to the view. L can be whatever we want. So we can say that if a person undergoes the total suffering experienced by Jews during the holocaust every second their life can't be better conjunctively than all the joy in the world currently--assuming they have no happiness.
If it's metaphysically possible for a bring to experience that much pain in one moment, then it should also be metaphysically possible for them to experience some absurdly vast amount of non-hedonic goodness, which could outweigh all the holocaust pain.
The argument is flawed because its essentially converting the extremely unintuitive of a nature of a being that experiences "no pleasure" and an absurd amount of pain and then saying that it somehow shows non hedonism is unintuitive, when really its the positing of this being in the first place that makes no sense.
I don't understand how non-hedonistic views are required to deny EPTLW. An objective list theorist could just say that all terms in the objective wellbeing function that don't correspond to hedonic goods are bounded. Then the sum of the upper bounds for non-hedonic goods would be L.
I'm not going to read the paper because the argument is completely absurd. Say someone experiences a large amount of pain in their lives, but still helps people, heroically stops an insane utilitarian from forcing people to be wireheaded, and generally has great and loving relationships. I don't see how you can establish an arbitrary limit L on the amount of "goodness" in his life (if such a thing can even be quantified).
You're totally missing the argument. It's not about the amount of goodness he brings to the world, it's about how good his life is for him.
Read the paper before you critique it.
I have read the paper since I posted the comment. The entire paper relies on the assumption that the argument is plausible, which is flawed. Additionally, I believe that non-hedonistic things count among them making the world a better place, but we can substitute random things for that if need be. I have also separately contacted you via other means.
You have no objection to anything said in the paper.
I do, the Paper says that a pluralist would be hard pressed to accept the conclusion that a person's well-being is limited by a constant L if they have no pleasure and experience an amount of pain P greater then some finite amount. I'm agnostic on that analysis. However the Paper then goes on to argue that since the above thing is pretty intuitive, it's strong evidence for hedonism, I disagree, It's obviously nonsense. That's a direct response to the paper.
That's a reductio to the view. L can be whatever we want. So we can say that if a person undergoes the total suffering experienced by Jews during the holocaust every second their life can't be better conjunctively than all the joy in the world currently--assuming they have no happiness.
If it's metaphysically possible for a bring to experience that much pain in one moment, then it should also be metaphysically possible for them to experience some absurdly vast amount of non-hedonic goodness, which could outweigh all the holocaust pain.
The argument is flawed because its essentially converting the extremely unintuitive of a nature of a being that experiences "no pleasure" and an absurd amount of pain and then saying that it somehow shows non hedonism is unintuitive, when really its the positing of this being in the first place that makes no sense.