Oh Please. If Jesus Christ came back down from Heaven and started turning Wine into Water you would find a way to get yourself into heaven, even if that meant believing in God.
I’ve thought about the question of empirical facts that could falsify ethical theories.
If utilitarianism is true, intelligent and rational people should be persuaded by it. I think this would apply to alien civilizations as well. If aliens were utilitarian, I would be more confident in it. If they weren’t, I would be less confident in it. The same goes for AI.
Similarly, if we are actually in a simulation, I would feel less confident that moral realism is true because this world is filled with suffering. It could be a simulation of myself but I suffer at times as well. I would think if simulated minds were possible and utilitarianism were true, I feel like I should be in a happy simulation, not a world filled with suffering. The probability of finding oneself in a suffering world or as an observer who suffers should be vanishingly small across time. Utilitarian overlords should’ve created tons of happy simulations. I guess this argument depends on what you think the right way to reason about observer selection effects is.
Oh Please. If Jesus Christ came back down from Heaven and started turning Wine into Water you would find a way to get yourself into heaven, even if that meant believing in God.
I’ve thought about the question of empirical facts that could falsify ethical theories.
If utilitarianism is true, intelligent and rational people should be persuaded by it. I think this would apply to alien civilizations as well. If aliens were utilitarian, I would be more confident in it. If they weren’t, I would be less confident in it. The same goes for AI.
Similarly, if we are actually in a simulation, I would feel less confident that moral realism is true because this world is filled with suffering. It could be a simulation of myself but I suffer at times as well. I would think if simulated minds were possible and utilitarianism were true, I feel like I should be in a happy simulation, not a world filled with suffering. The probability of finding oneself in a suffering world or as an observer who suffers should be vanishingly small across time. Utilitarian overlords should’ve created tons of happy simulations. I guess this argument depends on what you think the right way to reason about observer selection effects is.