I think Torres was endorsing Frick's view. Torres mentions "the conditional wide person-affecting view", and Dustin Crummett responded with discussion of Frick. I'm pretty sure they're referring to the views in this paper:
1 and 7 don't apply to wide person-affecting views, and Torres claimed to hold such a view. Wide person-affecting views, by design, address the non-identity problem, so that it's better to bring into existence someone with a very good life than someone with a good life. I think such a difference can generally be worth paying for at a cost to existing people on wide person-affecting views, as I expect Torres and Frick would agree, although I don't recall if either addresses this explicitly.
2, 3, 5 and 8 can be addressed by allowing good lives to offset but not outweigh bad lives, while allowing bad lives to offset or outweigh good lives (if enough of them are bad enough). I think this is the case for actualist views (which I discuss here https://rychappell.substack.com/p/death-extinction-and-the-epicurean/comment/13820735) and the views in Thomas, 2022. In Thomas, 2022, from my understanding, an extra population with non-negative (including positive) expected total welfare is neutral to add, and a population with negative expected total welfare is bad to add, all else equal (so ignoring the interests of those who would exist anyway and any wide person-affecting reasons). I think such views are closer to common-sense than the standard total view.
I don't think Frick said anything about such offsetting, and I don't know either way if Frick's view can be further developed to accommodate such offsetting and avoid antinatalism. Given that Torres claims not to be an antinatalist, Torres might move onto an offsetting view or something else if Frick's view is inevitably antinatalist.
That being said, I find it plausible that good lives can't offset bad lives and that there are no "good" lives.
4 doesn't really seem problematic at all without elaboration. What exactly are Temkin's arguments? The claim "it would be bad if this happened" also seems overconfident, as if one had access to objective moral truth.
In 6, I'm not really sure what you mean by "troubling". If it's the implications of asymmetry, then I've responded to those above. If it's that the asymmetry is unmotivated or hard to justify, Frick and actualist views have arguments for the asymmetry that are worth engaging with.
Whoever this Torres is, you're arguing against an anaemic strawman. Engage with the literature or not at all. Chalmers has more sophisticated things to say, as does Benatar. Population ethics is a terrible example of a near-resolved philosophical field.
The Asymmetry Thesis is one of the dumbest views in philosophy. I honestly think I have more respect for trivialists than for people like Benatar.
Me before going 8 rounds with Mr. Bulldog:
I love asymmetry. Your expected value calculations are BS. Longtermism is bunk.
Me after going 8 rounds with Mr. Bulldog:
Q_Q …. good thing logic is false.
I think Torres was endorsing Frick's view. Torres mentions "the conditional wide person-affecting view", and Dustin Crummett responded with discussion of Frick. I'm pretty sure they're referring to the views in this paper:
Frick, J. (2020). Conditional reasons and the procreation asymmetry. Philosophical Perspectives, 34(1), 53-87. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpe.12139
1 and 7 don't apply to wide person-affecting views, and Torres claimed to hold such a view. Wide person-affecting views, by design, address the non-identity problem, so that it's better to bring into existence someone with a very good life than someone with a good life. I think such a difference can generally be worth paying for at a cost to existing people on wide person-affecting views, as I expect Torres and Frick would agree, although I don't recall if either addresses this explicitly.
2, 3, 5 and 8 can be addressed by allowing good lives to offset but not outweigh bad lives, while allowing bad lives to offset or outweigh good lives (if enough of them are bad enough). I think this is the case for actualist views (which I discuss here https://rychappell.substack.com/p/death-extinction-and-the-epicurean/comment/13820735) and the views in Thomas, 2022. In Thomas, 2022, from my understanding, an extra population with non-negative (including positive) expected total welfare is neutral to add, and a population with negative expected total welfare is bad to add, all else equal (so ignoring the interests of those who would exist anyway and any wide person-affecting reasons). I think such views are closer to common-sense than the standard total view.
Thomas, T. (2022). The Asymmetry, Uncertainty, and the Long Term. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpr.12927
I don't think Frick said anything about such offsetting, and I don't know either way if Frick's view can be further developed to accommodate such offsetting and avoid antinatalism. Given that Torres claims not to be an antinatalist, Torres might move onto an offsetting view or something else if Frick's view is inevitably antinatalist.
That being said, I find it plausible that good lives can't offset bad lives and that there are no "good" lives.
4 doesn't really seem problematic at all without elaboration. What exactly are Temkin's arguments? The claim "it would be bad if this happened" also seems overconfident, as if one had access to objective moral truth.
In 6, I'm not really sure what you mean by "troubling". If it's the implications of asymmetry, then I've responded to those above. If it's that the asymmetry is unmotivated or hard to justify, Frick and actualist views have arguments for the asymmetry that are worth engaging with.
Whoever this Torres is, you're arguing against an anaemic strawman. Engage with the literature or not at all. Chalmers has more sophisticated things to say, as does Benatar. Population ethics is a terrible example of a near-resolved philosophical field.