Nice point! A helpful analogy might be to a world in which a (not easily identifiable) subset of the world's population are phenomenal zombies. Although this is in one sense ontologically "simpler" (more parsimonious), as there is less phenomenology existing, it is in the relevant sense far more complex, because it's harder to specify which individuals do or do not have conscious experiences.
Yeah, that's a decent way of putting it. I think Chalmers has a nice way of thinking about simplicity as being about the most basic facts needed to fully describe the world.
I think that it’s a question of generality. You say we should evaluate complexity at the level of value atoms. I say we should do so at the level of actually value generating things (list of mental states, list of friendships, etc.), in which case neither side has an advantage.
Why prefer one over the other? I don’t see that here.
Nice point! A helpful analogy might be to a world in which a (not easily identifiable) subset of the world's population are phenomenal zombies. Although this is in one sense ontologically "simpler" (more parsimonious), as there is less phenomenology existing, it is in the relevant sense far more complex, because it's harder to specify which individuals do or do not have conscious experiences.
Yeah, that's a decent way of putting it. I think Chalmers has a nice way of thinking about simplicity as being about the most basic facts needed to fully describe the world.
I think that it’s a question of generality. You say we should evaluate complexity at the level of value atoms. I say we should do so at the level of actually value generating things (list of mental states, list of friendships, etc.), in which case neither side has an advantage.
Why prefer one over the other? I don’t see that here.