The principle: "creating and then satisfying a preference is morally on a par with not creating a preference" generates a version of the procreation asymmetry, but seems defensible.
For example, giving me a preference for a silver statue of a duck and then gifting me such a statue doesn't intuitively seem to benefit me.
This doesn't seem to imply your parodies: raising someone from the dead is good because death frustrates preferences for most people. Similarly, preventing someone from dying prevents their preferences from being frustrated. And creating a miserable baby means creating a bunch of preferences that go unsatisfied, a bad thing.
"A Pareto Principle for possible people" talks more about this, better than I can.
The principle: "creating and then satisfying a preference is morally on a par with not creating a preference" generates a version of the procreation asymmetry, but seems defensible.
For example, giving me a preference for a silver statue of a duck and then gifting me such a statue doesn't intuitively seem to benefit me.
This doesn't seem to imply your parodies: raising someone from the dead is good because death frustrates preferences for most people. Similarly, preventing someone from dying prevents their preferences from being frustrated. And creating a miserable baby means creating a bunch of preferences that go unsatisfied, a bad thing.
"A Pareto Principle for possible people" talks more about this, better than I can.