"Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think [the two paragraphs that begin "Sometimes people think that bodily autonomy justifies getting an abortion"] is the only section that directly addresses this line of argument. If so, I see 4 arguments, which I'll address in turn:
(1) Do we commandeer men's kidneys for their children without their consent? If (1) were true, shouldn't we expect that? Why only commandeer their mothers' wombs, unless we implicitly devalue her autonomy?
(2) This is just a restatement of (1), and again, we don't behave as though this is a general moral principle. Are parents even required to provide something as benign as blood donation to save their children?
(4) Granted. Remove the fetus carefully under the supervision of a guardian [ad] litem and hope for the best."
On further reflection, I notice that I may be responding to a misconstrual of your points. There are two distinct pro-life/pro-choice debates: (1) the question of whether it is impermissible for an individual to intentionally bring about an abortion (personal morality), and (2) the question of whether the state should or may ban abortion (political morality). My arguments as written go to political morality (I was responding to @ghostcoase's tweet here: https://twitter.com/GhostCoase/status/1589848885480288256); I take your arguments to be about personal morality, although at other parts of your post (e.g. the rapid fire responses to "terrible arguments") the distinction is less clear.
Rephrased in personal moral terms, my arguments don't work as well; it is plausible to me that e.g. a father has a moral obligation to give a kidney to save his child. The best restatement in terms of personal morality is that it is possible for an abortion to be moral or immoral, but the woman is best placed to know the relevant facts and so it is presumptively moral. But that's question begging for the purposes of the impairment argument, which holds that abortion is never moral.
To your impairment argument, I'd reject (1) and (2).
(1) Is true, but it is a strawman. Abortion can be permissible in some circumstances or by some methods without it being permissible in all circumstances or by all methods, so the pro-choice argument does not need to hold that abortion is permissible simpliciter.
(2) Is false. It does not follow from the permissibility of X by means [A,B,C] that [A,B,C] is permissible absent the intent to do X, much less that A is permissible absent B and C. For example: it is permissible to cut someone open for surgery, but it is not generally permissible to cut someone open; it is permissible to cut someone open [carefully, with their consent, with the intent to sew them up again], but it is not permissible to cut someone open carefully, absent consent and an intent to sew them up again.
[In the spirit of steelmanning, I’ll take a stab (pardon the pun) at your argument. P2 seems a bit confused, it should say it’s permissible to *conduct abortions* by removing 1 limb. Since removing limbs is only permitted for abortions, removing 1 limb is never permitted.
In other words, removing limbs without the intent of abortion is not permitted, so removing 1 limb, since that doesn’t cause abortion, is not permitted. But if it did cause abortion, then it would be permitted.]
Here I am arguing with that the claim “ it’s permissible to painlessly chop off one of a fetus’s arms” is a non sequitur because it is supposed to follow from “it would be permissible to conduct an abortion by painlessly chopping off all of a fetus’s arms and legs” where the operative phrase “to conduct an abortion” is not present in the statement I quoted in premise 2.
So my point is that it is permissible to maim a fetus for the purpose of conducting an abortion, whether it be 1 limb or all limbs that are removed. But since removing only 1 limb is not sufficient for conducting an abortion, it is never permissible.
Therefore it does not follow from the fact that it’s impermissible to remove a single limb from a fetus that abortion is impermissible.
To be clear, I’m pro-life and am defending a view that I don’t hold.
But none of those arguments address my objection. I’m saying that the claim in P2 doesn’t follow from P1 because it equivocates on maiming for the purpose of abortion and maiming in general.
Well, I give three arguments establishing that if one is permissible they both are. Nothing you've said addresses that. They're obviously different, but morally they're equivalent.
The only argument in support of P2 which touches on this is the first one. But although it is true that cutting off 1 limb doesn’t create an obligation to cut off the rest, this doesn’t mean that cutting off 1 limb for some purpose other than abortion is permissible. It’s the purpose of abortion which makes it permissible. And since cutting off 1 limb is never for the purpose of abortion, it’s therefore never permissible.
The other two arguments also apply. But if cutting off all of them isn't wrong but one of them is wrong, then if you've cut off one, you should cut off all of them,
Cutting off all of them may be wrong, but it may not be, if it’s for the purpose of abortion. So it’s not true that cutting off all the limbs isn’t wrong, rather, that’s only true if it’s for the purpose of abortion. So this line of reasoning doesn’t work.
As I explain in the article, they're committed to it not just being slightly wrong but very wrong. Obviously future experiences matter, but if they only start to matter after consciousness, then this implies a strange hypersensitivity.
But on the account you give that only frustrated interests are bad but pleasure isn't intrinsically good, it would be morally neutral to deprive a being without any desires unfulfilled of 90% of the pleasure it would otherwise have. This is not plausible.
(Copied from here by request: https://twitter.com/mcorliss/status/1590211283429003264)
"Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think [the two paragraphs that begin "Sometimes people think that bodily autonomy justifies getting an abortion"] is the only section that directly addresses this line of argument. If so, I see 4 arguments, which I'll address in turn:
(1) Do we commandeer men's kidneys for their children without their consent? If (1) were true, shouldn't we expect that? Why only commandeer their mothers' wombs, unless we implicitly devalue her autonomy?
(2) This is just a restatement of (1), and again, we don't behave as though this is a general moral principle. Are parents even required to provide something as benign as blood donation to save their children?
(3) Millions of people per year do not donate kidneys. But reasonable estimates put QALYs at 140:1 in favor of the state commandeering kidneys without consent. (https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/yTu9pa9Po4hAuhETJ/kidney-donation-is-a-reasonable-choice-for-effective) etc. etc.
(4) Granted. Remove the fetus carefully under the supervision of a guardian [ad] litem and hope for the best."
On further reflection, I notice that I may be responding to a misconstrual of your points. There are two distinct pro-life/pro-choice debates: (1) the question of whether it is impermissible for an individual to intentionally bring about an abortion (personal morality), and (2) the question of whether the state should or may ban abortion (political morality). My arguments as written go to political morality (I was responding to @ghostcoase's tweet here: https://twitter.com/GhostCoase/status/1589848885480288256); I take your arguments to be about personal morality, although at other parts of your post (e.g. the rapid fire responses to "terrible arguments") the distinction is less clear.
Rephrased in personal moral terms, my arguments don't work as well; it is plausible to me that e.g. a father has a moral obligation to give a kidney to save his child. The best restatement in terms of personal morality is that it is possible for an abortion to be moral or immoral, but the woman is best placed to know the relevant facts and so it is presumptively moral. But that's question begging for the purposes of the impairment argument, which holds that abortion is never moral.
To your impairment argument, I'd reject (1) and (2).
(1) Is true, but it is a strawman. Abortion can be permissible in some circumstances or by some methods without it being permissible in all circumstances or by all methods, so the pro-choice argument does not need to hold that abortion is permissible simpliciter.
(2) Is false. It does not follow from the permissibility of X by means [A,B,C] that [A,B,C] is permissible absent the intent to do X, much less that A is permissible absent B and C. For example: it is permissible to cut someone open for surgery, but it is not generally permissible to cut someone open; it is permissible to cut someone open [carefully, with their consent, with the intent to sew them up again], but it is not permissible to cut someone open carefully, absent consent and an intent to sew them up again.
I commented the following on Twitter:
[In the spirit of steelmanning, I’ll take a stab (pardon the pun) at your argument. P2 seems a bit confused, it should say it’s permissible to *conduct abortions* by removing 1 limb. Since removing limbs is only permitted for abortions, removing 1 limb is never permitted.
In other words, removing limbs without the intent of abortion is not permitted, so removing 1 limb, since that doesn’t cause abortion, is not permitted. But if it did cause abortion, then it would be permitted.]
Here I am arguing with that the claim “ it’s permissible to painlessly chop off one of a fetus’s arms” is a non sequitur because it is supposed to follow from “it would be permissible to conduct an abortion by painlessly chopping off all of a fetus’s arms and legs” where the operative phrase “to conduct an abortion” is not present in the statement I quoted in premise 2.
So my point is that it is permissible to maim a fetus for the purpose of conducting an abortion, whether it be 1 limb or all limbs that are removed. But since removing only 1 limb is not sufficient for conducting an abortion, it is never permissible.
Therefore it does not follow from the fact that it’s impermissible to remove a single limb from a fetus that abortion is impermissible.
To be clear, I’m pro-life and am defending a view that I don’t hold.
Well I give three arguments for p2. I don't think it's self evident -- it is, however, supported by argument.
But none of those arguments address my objection. I’m saying that the claim in P2 doesn’t follow from P1 because it equivocates on maiming for the purpose of abortion and maiming in general.
Well, I give three arguments establishing that if one is permissible they both are. Nothing you've said addresses that. They're obviously different, but morally they're equivalent.
The only argument in support of P2 which touches on this is the first one. But although it is true that cutting off 1 limb doesn’t create an obligation to cut off the rest, this doesn’t mean that cutting off 1 limb for some purpose other than abortion is permissible. It’s the purpose of abortion which makes it permissible. And since cutting off 1 limb is never for the purpose of abortion, it’s therefore never permissible.
The other two arguments also apply. But if cutting off all of them isn't wrong but one of them is wrong, then if you've cut off one, you should cut off all of them,
Cutting off all of them may be wrong, but it may not be, if it’s for the purpose of abortion. So it’s not true that cutting off all the limbs isn’t wrong, rather, that’s only true if it’s for the purpose of abortion. So this line of reasoning doesn’t work.
I certainly agree with the case! Good work, convincing steel man. Would be cool to see how you go about responding to it
Thanks!
As I explain in the article, they're committed to it not just being slightly wrong but very wrong. Obviously future experiences matter, but if they only start to matter after consciousness, then this implies a strange hypersensitivity.
I argue against this asymmetry here. https://benthams.substack.com/p/longtermism-is-correct-part-1
But on the account you give that only frustrated interests are bad but pleasure isn't intrinsically good, it would be morally neutral to deprive a being without any desires unfulfilled of 90% of the pleasure it would otherwise have. This is not plausible.