"Theism+moral realism explains why pain pairs with desctructive bodily stimuli. None of the other views do."
Obviously, any kind of naturalism does. Pain feels bad -- in an "I want to avoid this" way -- because it means your body is being damaged. Pain is a damage signal, so it needs to be aversive. Naturalism perhaps can't explain why pain is morally wrong, but that is not prima facie fact anyway.
Sure it does. Disharmonious world's aren't evolutionarily possible, because significantly disharmonious organisms would have no survival ability, even if they are physically possible.
And for physicalist they are not physically possible anyway, because physicslism means that all facts are physical facts or derivable from them...so given a set of physical facts , there is only one possible set of "mental" facts (which are really physical facts anyway).
The conceivability of disharmonious worlds is no counterargument, since it can be attributed to lack of complete understanding of the laws of nature. Faster than light travel was always conceivable, but never possible.
Is that epiphenomenalism? If so, the evolutionist can avoid it by rejecting dualism. As I have been trying to say, evolution plus physical monism is a strong solution to PPH, and stronger than evolution alone.
It's easier to accept a naturalistic explanation when you view pain as a seeming of badness, the badness itself being, e.g. bodily destruction, analogously with the relation of the other senses to external facts. Undoubtedly, Matthew would find the very notion absurd, claiming that to the extent pain is mistaken, it's still obviously bad qua pain. I don't find it absurd at all. Whenever someone tries to describe the badness of biologically dysfunctional pain to me (e.g. phantom limb syndrome), it invariably involves lots of large functional badness, such as inability to concentrate, perform daily tasks, sleep, or have normal social interactions. I don't find "pain zombies" or "pleasure zombies" conceivable, except on the sense of "conceive" that means something like 'vaguely describe in language'.
Pain zombiehood is a real thing. In any case, it's not the existence of pain qualia that is in question, is their supposedly mysterious relationship to physical damage.
"Theism+moral realism explains why pain pairs with desctructive bodily stimuli. None of the other views do."
Obviously, any kind of naturalism does. Pain feels bad -- in an "I want to avoid this" way -- because it means your body is being damaged. Pain is a damage signal, so it needs to be aversive. Naturalism perhaps can't explain why pain is morally wrong, but that is not prima facie fact anyway.
But it’s easy to imagine some other experience accompanying harmful bodily experience.
But it's hard to imagine "damage feels good" as an evolutionary strategy.
See my earlier post where I explain why evolution doesn’t explain psychophysical harmony.
Sure it does. Disharmonious world's aren't evolutionarily possible, because significantly disharmonious organisms would have no survival ability, even if they are physically possible.
And for physicalist they are not physically possible anyway, because physicslism means that all facts are physical facts or derivable from them...so given a set of physical facts , there is only one possible set of "mental" facts (which are really physical facts anyway).
The conceivability of disharmonious worlds is no counterargument, since it can be attributed to lack of complete understanding of the laws of nature. Faster than light travel was always conceivable, but never possible.
If the behavior of the disharmonious organisms is the same as that of the harmonious organisms then they are just as evolutionarily fit.
Is that epiphenomenalism? If so, the evolutionist can avoid it by rejecting dualism. As I have been trying to say, evolution plus physical monism is a strong solution to PPH, and stronger than evolution alone.
It's easier to accept a naturalistic explanation when you view pain as a seeming of badness, the badness itself being, e.g. bodily destruction, analogously with the relation of the other senses to external facts. Undoubtedly, Matthew would find the very notion absurd, claiming that to the extent pain is mistaken, it's still obviously bad qua pain. I don't find it absurd at all. Whenever someone tries to describe the badness of biologically dysfunctional pain to me (e.g. phantom limb syndrome), it invariably involves lots of large functional badness, such as inability to concentrate, perform daily tasks, sleep, or have normal social interactions. I don't find "pain zombies" or "pleasure zombies" conceivable, except on the sense of "conceive" that means something like 'vaguely describe in language'.
Pain zombiehood is a real thing. In any case, it's not the existence of pain qualia that is in question, is their supposedly mysterious relationship to physical damage.
You know that pain zombies exist? How?
Anaesthesia, congenital insensitvity to pain.
Are those observable from a third-person perspective?
Then it's not a pain zombie.