> 6 Rights run into a problem based on the aims of a benevolent third party observer. Presumably a third party observer should hope that you do what is right. However, a third party observer, if given the choice between one person killing one other to prevent 5 indiscriminate murders and 5 indiscriminate murders, should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5.
What is meant by "benevolent" in the phrase "benevolent third party observer"? There seems to be two plausible meanings: either a benevolent third-party observer is someone who (1) hopes the world is made better, or (2) hopes agents do what is right.
If you mean (1), then the statement "a third party observer should hope that you do what is right" is question-begging against deontology. Deontology explicitly affirms that it is sometimes right to perform actions that make the world worse. Therefore, deontology explicitly affirms that agents should sometimes perform actions that go against the wishes of a third-party observer.
But if you mean (2), then the statement "a third party observer...should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5" is question-begging against deontology. The statement can be translated to "an observer who wants agents to do what is right...should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5". But this premise obviously just negates deontology by itself.
There's a similar issue with the ring case:
> Giving perfectly moral beings more options that they don’t have to choose cannot make the situation morally worse.
This premise seems sufficient to negate deontology. Deontology explicitly states that we are sometimes morally required to perform actions that make the world worse. If that's right, then there are obviously going to be cases where giving a perfectly moral agent more options will make the world worse. E.g. giving more power to perfect deontologists instead of perfect consequentialists will obviously make the world worse, so long as the deontologist has to choose between violating rights and making the world better. That's just what the view affirms.
Just want to respond to a few points:
> 6 Rights run into a problem based on the aims of a benevolent third party observer. Presumably a third party observer should hope that you do what is right. However, a third party observer, if given the choice between one person killing one other to prevent 5 indiscriminate murders and 5 indiscriminate murders, should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5.
What is meant by "benevolent" in the phrase "benevolent third party observer"? There seems to be two plausible meanings: either a benevolent third-party observer is someone who (1) hopes the world is made better, or (2) hopes agents do what is right.
If you mean (1), then the statement "a third party observer should hope that you do what is right" is question-begging against deontology. Deontology explicitly affirms that it is sometimes right to perform actions that make the world worse. Therefore, deontology explicitly affirms that agents should sometimes perform actions that go against the wishes of a third-party observer.
But if you mean (2), then the statement "a third party observer...should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5" is question-begging against deontology. The statement can be translated to "an observer who wants agents to do what is right...should obviously choose the world in which the one person does the murder to prevent 5". But this premise obviously just negates deontology by itself.
There's a similar issue with the ring case:
> Giving perfectly moral beings more options that they don’t have to choose cannot make the situation morally worse.
This premise seems sufficient to negate deontology. Deontology explicitly states that we are sometimes morally required to perform actions that make the world worse. If that's right, then there are obviously going to be cases where giving a perfectly moral agent more options will make the world worse. E.g. giving more power to perfect deontologists instead of perfect consequentialists will obviously make the world worse, so long as the deontologist has to choose between violating rights and making the world better. That's just what the view affirms.