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It seems as though the entire issue reduces to whether we're more incline to trust (1) Barak, Clinton, and Ross, or (2) Pundak and Arieli. You say that Ross' account ought to be given greater weight since "Ross was in the room—Pundak and Arieli were not." But this is seems mistaken to me: the fact that Ross was involved in the negotiations on the US-Israeli side surely ought to make us *more* skeptical of his account, not less. The same applies to Barak and Clinton. If it seems as though I'm being unduly harsh, consider the matter from the other side: suppose somebody were to cite Arafat's account as evidence for the Israelis being at fault for the failure of Camp David. Would you take that seriously? If not, why take Barak, Clinton, and Ross seriously, especially when the best Israeli scholarship contradicts them? At the very least, this seems like a flimsy ground for stating authoritatively that "No, the Camp David proposal didn't cantonize the West Bank."

You also say that "the Israelis, unlike the Palestinians, were quick to accept the Clinton Parameters." But this seems inaccurate: Israel accepted the parameters with reservations on December 28, while Arafat accepted them with reservations on January 2. This was confirmed on January 3, when the White House stated that "both sides have now accepted the president's ideas with some reservations." The later claim that Arafat rejected the parameters (made in the "Honest Reporting" article that you cite) seems to be false, at least based on the other source that you cite (Wikipedia's article on the Clinton Parameters).

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