Are there neural correlates of consciousness? This paper argues no. Specifically, it argues that there are no internal brain states whose representational content matches that which is represented in consciousness. More specifically, the authors argue that the information represented in consciousness is not matched by the information represented by any physical mental system. Specifically, the authors argue:
There’s only empirical evidence that there is a correlation between brain regions and consciousness, not that they have matching content.
“Perceptual content is, as we shall say, structurally coherent, intrinsically experiential, and active and attentional. RF-content, on the other hand, seems to be none of these. For this reason, it is doubtful that there could be content matches between perceptual experiences and RF neural representational systems.” This would be like suggesting that a bowl of rice represents the same thing as is represented on a computer hard drive—they’re too different in principle to have matching information.
“3 Consider that in visual perception the kind of structurally coherent content with which we are concerned is that as of a figureon-a-ground located in egocentric space (see Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 101). Egocentric space is defined by one’s whole body and the possible ways it can move (or so we think it reasonable to assume). But what sense can be made of the notion of a neural representation having as part of its content that a figure (more precisely: a stimulus with which it causally covaries) is located in egocentric space?”
One has a single unified experience, while neurons provide various diverse sources of data.
Apparently there are some purely philosophical arguments from here and two Dennett papers, though they’re not described in detail in the original paper.
But critical responses argue yes! Baars seems mad—he starts his reply with:
Unfortunately Noë and Thompson’s article scrambles the evidence, its interpretation, and even the nature of the scientific enterprise. The authors have turned a remarkable scientific literature into a stew of confusion and misunderstanding.
Yikes! Though Baars response seems to erroneously assume that Noe and Thompson are arguing that there are no NCCs rather than that the NCCs don’t match the content of consciousness, so his response—if I’m understanding correctly which I may not be—seems like a huge swing and a miss.
Speaking of consciousness, the CEMI field theory seems to have a lot of supportive empirical evidence, best solving the binding problem and explaining the various neural correlates of consciousness. The various criticisms of it seem mostly bunk! Though McFadden, one of its biggest proponents, seems to have interesting scientific views but somewhat confused philosophical views which makes me a bit skeptical. I’ll have to look more into it though!
Interesting book review of The Dawn of Everything.
One good reason to oppose Trump—his extremely cavalier attitude towards nuclear war.
Michael Huemer recommends passivity.
Extremely funny book review by Scott Alexander.
I’m a bit late on this train, but Joe Schmid’s book is out! Check it out. Schmid is super smart and has spent more time thinking about existential inertia than any other human on the planet.
David Pallmann has a nice video out critiquing the moral argument for God. Pallmann is a theist and an anti-realist, while I’m a moral realist, so we disagree there, but many of the criticisms are very good.
The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps podcast provides what the title describes—a detailed investigation of history of philosophy that’s missing nothing. Important listening for anyone taking a history of philosophy class (which I’m currently doing).
Very good self-help advice from Richard Hanania. Hanania details how he overcame social anxiety.
Alex Nowrasteh testified before congress and it was hilarious. Chip Roy exploded and began to yell about how pointing out that the odds of being killed by a foreign-born terrorist is about 1 in 4.3 million since 1970 is of little comfort to the people who died. Utter clownery.
Speaking of Nowrasteh, he has another article that devastatingly refutes the brain-drain objection to immigration. Maybe the most thorough and devastating takedown of a common argument I’ve ever seen.
Amusing debate between Richard Carrier and Tomas Bogardus about Bogardus’s argument against naturalism. Carrier is obviously wrong in the exchange. My favorite part is that Carrier randomly puts quotation marks around random words for “rhetorical effect,” causing much confusion, and then alludes to “rhetorical quotation marks.” Note, when I use quotation marks here, I use them correctly. This adds to the list of Bogardus arguing with people who are deeply confused. One of Bogardus’s opponents called Vaush eventually declared "things that are true have constructed premises that lead necessarily to an outcome, a resolution. But a definition is applied presuppositionally." Whatever that means.
Halstead has a very detailed report explaining why he doesn’t think climate change is a major risk and why it’s not one of the more important things to work on. See also his summary here—and the various criticisms in the comments. I think Halstead is right in his response to the criticisms.
Timothy Williamson had a debate about Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy (topic sounds boring, is not). It got testy, and was quite fun to watch.
Speaking of Williamson, I just started his debate book with Boghosian. Looks interesting, though I’m only about a page in.
I honestly don't know why Bogardus continues to subject himself to online debate. I can't imagine it's doing anything other than giving him clinical depression and a splitting headache.
(Also, Richard Carrier is the Kent Hovind of atheism.)
Pallmann is a moral skeptic who doesn't endorse moral realism, but also doesn't affirm moral antirealism, so wouldn't technically be a moral antirealist.