I feel like there is some sematnic trickery at play here.
Huemer doesn't define his first premise as:
"1.if no one has control over X and X entails Y then no one has any control over Y."
Really, his article only includes the word 'control' once, when he says that free will requires open alternate possibilities + control of actions. 'Control of actions' is distinct from the sense of control present in your article, he defines it as 'you determining which possibilities are realized', not you having a causal relationship with subsequent events in the causal chain.
I rephrased his premise in the same universal way you did, and I can no longer see what the drone example can do to challenge it:
1.If no matter what anyone does, X, and X entails Y, then no matter what anyone does, Y.
> Now, the initial conditions of the universe does entail the way the drone works, so this argument would prove too much...
No it doesn't. You forgot about me controlling the controller. I'm a free agent not completely bound by the initial conditions of the universe. Also the engineers not bound by the initial conditions of the universe.
> In the free will case, just as in the remote control case, you are in control of the things that come after you, even if they’re ultimately determined by the things that come before you, because you are part of the causal chain.
So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.
Yeah I don't really like this argument from Huemer. I think arguing against compatibilism on ground of ultimate responsibility or alternative possibilities is much stronger.
Roughly :
1.) If you have free will, your are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions.
2.) If you are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions, you are the ultimate cause of them.
3.) If determinism is true, you can't be the ultimate cause of your actions.
4.) Therefore, if determinism is true, you don't have free will.
or
1.) If you have free will, you should have been able to do otherwise than you did.
2.) If determinism is true, you couldn't have done otherwise than you did.
3.) If determinism is true, you don't have free will.
I feel like there is some sematnic trickery at play here.
Huemer doesn't define his first premise as:
"1.if no one has control over X and X entails Y then no one has any control over Y."
Really, his article only includes the word 'control' once, when he says that free will requires open alternate possibilities + control of actions. 'Control of actions' is distinct from the sense of control present in your article, he defines it as 'you determining which possibilities are realized', not you having a causal relationship with subsequent events in the causal chain.
I rephrased his premise in the same universal way you did, and I can no longer see what the drone example can do to challenge it:
1.If no matter what anyone does, X, and X entails Y, then no matter what anyone does, Y.
> Now, the initial conditions of the universe does entail the way the drone works, so this argument would prove too much...
No it doesn't. You forgot about me controlling the controller. I'm a free agent not completely bound by the initial conditions of the universe. Also the engineers not bound by the initial conditions of the universe.
> In the free will case, just as in the remote control case, you are in control of the things that come after you, even if they’re ultimately determined by the things that come before you, because you are part of the causal chain.
So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.
Yeah I don't really like this argument from Huemer. I think arguing against compatibilism on ground of ultimate responsibility or alternative possibilities is much stronger.
Roughly :
1.) If you have free will, your are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions.
2.) If you are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions, you are the ultimate cause of them.
3.) If determinism is true, you can't be the ultimate cause of your actions.
4.) Therefore, if determinism is true, you don't have free will.
or
1.) If you have free will, you should have been able to do otherwise than you did.
2.) If determinism is true, you couldn't have done otherwise than you did.
3.) If determinism is true, you don't have free will.