I feel like there is some sematnic trickery at play here.
Huemer doesn't define his first premise as:
"1.if no one has control over X and X entails Y then no one has any control over Y."
Really, his article only includes the word 'control' once, when he says that free will requires open alternate possibilities + control of actions. 'Control of actions' is distinct from the sense of control present in your article, he defines it as 'you determining which possibilities are realized', not you having a causal relationship with subsequent events in the causal chain.
I rephrased his premise in the same universal way you did, and I can no longer see what the drone example can do to challenge it:
1.If no matter what anyone does, X, and X entails Y, then no matter what anyone does, Y.
> Now, the initial conditions of the universe does entail the way the drone works, so this argument would prove too much...
No it doesn't. You forgot about me controlling the controller. I'm a free agent not completely bound by the initial conditions of the universe. Also the engineers not bound by the initial conditions of the universe.
> In the free will case, just as in the remote control case, you are in control of the things that come after you, even if they’re ultimately determined by the things that come before you, because you are part of the causal chain.
So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.
We can imagine a drone without a human controller. It would still be controlled by a remote control.
//So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.//
Affecting something is not the same as controlling it. If the tree dictated entirely what would happen to the cabin, it would control it.
> We can imagine a drone without a human controller. It would still be controlled by a remote control.
Then your argument fails. It no longer has control in any significant sense.
Huemer defines free will as this in Knowledge, Reality, and Value:
i. Alternate possibilities: You must sometimes have more than one thing that you can do.
ii. Self-control: You must have control of your own actions.
Unless this non-human has those things, it doesn't have free will in Huemer's sense. I doubt he's defining control as something else - and any other definition isn't control in any significantly relevant sense. Maybe he should've been clearer in the thing you responded to.
> Affecting something is not the same as controlling it. If the tree dictated entirely what would happen to the cabin, it would control it.
Exactly my point! (Except you don't have the relevant definition of control right in the second sentence).
The remote would still have control. It obviously doesn't have free will, but it does have control. Huemer's argument tries to establish that we don't control anything in a deterministic universe, and thus this is a counterexample. The counterexample doesn't have to show free will, just that there is no control.
Sure, if Huemer's argument mistakenly just uses control (his argument uses technical symbols so it's hard to tell without looking at it for a while. It was hard for me to understand too), you would be right. But if we just replace the premise with my understanding of free will, then I think his argument would be saved.
The idea of Huemer's argument is that control is a prerequisite for free will, but determinism means we have no free will. I'm not sure what your argument is--obviously remote controllers don't have free will.
Yeah I don't really like this argument from Huemer. I think arguing against compatibilism on ground of ultimate responsibility or alternative possibilities is much stronger.
Roughly :
1.) If you have free will, your are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions.
2.) If you are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions, you are the ultimate cause of them.
3.) If determinism is true, you can't be the ultimate cause of your actions.
4.) Therefore, if determinism is true, you don't have free will.
or
1.) If you have free will, you should have been able to do otherwise than you did.
2.) If determinism is true, you couldn't have done otherwise than you did.
3.) If determinism is true, you don't have free will.
i like this
I feel like there is some sematnic trickery at play here.
Huemer doesn't define his first premise as:
"1.if no one has control over X and X entails Y then no one has any control over Y."
Really, his article only includes the word 'control' once, when he says that free will requires open alternate possibilities + control of actions. 'Control of actions' is distinct from the sense of control present in your article, he defines it as 'you determining which possibilities are realized', not you having a causal relationship with subsequent events in the causal chain.
I rephrased his premise in the same universal way you did, and I can no longer see what the drone example can do to challenge it:
1.If no matter what anyone does, X, and X entails Y, then no matter what anyone does, Y.
> Now, the initial conditions of the universe does entail the way the drone works, so this argument would prove too much...
No it doesn't. You forgot about me controlling the controller. I'm a free agent not completely bound by the initial conditions of the universe. Also the engineers not bound by the initial conditions of the universe.
> In the free will case, just as in the remote control case, you are in control of the things that come after you, even if they’re ultimately determined by the things that come before you, because you are part of the causal chain.
So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.
We can imagine a drone without a human controller. It would still be controlled by a remote control.
//So because I'm part of the causal chain, that gives me free will? That doesn't make sense. If a tree is cut down and hits a cabin, the tree is part of the causal chain, but it doesn't control the cabin in any significant sense.//
Affecting something is not the same as controlling it. If the tree dictated entirely what would happen to the cabin, it would control it.
> We can imagine a drone without a human controller. It would still be controlled by a remote control.
Then your argument fails. It no longer has control in any significant sense.
Huemer defines free will as this in Knowledge, Reality, and Value:
i. Alternate possibilities: You must sometimes have more than one thing that you can do.
ii. Self-control: You must have control of your own actions.
Unless this non-human has those things, it doesn't have free will in Huemer's sense. I doubt he's defining control as something else - and any other definition isn't control in any significantly relevant sense. Maybe he should've been clearer in the thing you responded to.
> Affecting something is not the same as controlling it. If the tree dictated entirely what would happen to the cabin, it would control it.
Exactly my point! (Except you don't have the relevant definition of control right in the second sentence).
The remote would still have control. It obviously doesn't have free will, but it does have control. Huemer's argument tries to establish that we don't control anything in a deterministic universe, and thus this is a counterexample. The counterexample doesn't have to show free will, just that there is no control.
Sure, if Huemer's argument mistakenly just uses control (his argument uses technical symbols so it's hard to tell without looking at it for a while. It was hard for me to understand too), you would be right. But if we just replace the premise with my understanding of free will, then I think his argument would be saved.
The idea of Huemer's argument is that control is a prerequisite for free will, but determinism means we have no free will. I'm not sure what your argument is--obviously remote controllers don't have free will.
Yes, control is a prerequisite for free will. But it's not sufficient.
Yeah I don't really like this argument from Huemer. I think arguing against compatibilism on ground of ultimate responsibility or alternative possibilities is much stronger.
Roughly :
1.) If you have free will, your are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions.
2.) If you are ultimately responsible for your (voluntary) actions, you are the ultimate cause of them.
3.) If determinism is true, you can't be the ultimate cause of your actions.
4.) Therefore, if determinism is true, you don't have free will.
or
1.) If you have free will, you should have been able to do otherwise than you did.
2.) If determinism is true, you couldn't have done otherwise than you did.
3.) If determinism is true, you don't have free will.