The idea of infinity here is wrong. 1/infinity would not be zero, but infinitesimal. You can see that while solving integrals. We divide an area into infinite divisions, but each division must have non-zero area. This is how points make a line, or lines make a plane. Given infinite time, anything can happen. Also, you cannot say things with less chance cannot happen, even in finite time. Hence, we can entirely exist without reincarnation.
I don't think that you're right that 1/infinity is just infinitesimal but even if it is, if Huemer's argument establishes that the odds you'd exist are reasonably high on his view an infinitesimal (As in 1/infinity) on the other view, that's a very good reason to accept his view.
I didn't say things with less chance can't happen, just that if something is maximally unlikely on one hypothesis and likely on another, that thing happening is evidence for the second hypothesis over the first.
I guess I have to clarify my comment. First of all, Infinity is not a number. 1/infinity is meaningless. What we were talking about, is the value of 1/n, where n keeps increasing. Hence, 1/n nears zero. However, this value is never zero, as there is no end to numbers.
Now, for the other point I did not make earlier. You talk as if our existence is due to random chance. Although there is some truth to it, it is not completely true. Our current models suggest that universe started with big bang. Everything since then is due to a combination of chance, time and physical laws. We should probably ask if big bang that resulted birth of our universe is the only one. We can certainly also wonder about the fine-tuned physical constants. However, once we assume current laws of physics, time is enough to create life.
Now, you can say why we, with our current bodies, were not born in some other time. My reply would be due to causality. Life started with molecules combining with the capacity to replicate themselves. Within its copies, only those that replicated themselves survived. Our bodies are like this because it is the easiest way to form self-replicating molecular arrangements with these elements. Then, a complex interaction with environment and chance resulted in your birth. All of these are casual; you exist because your parents existed in their past situation. You could have been born only in this particular way.
I say all of this because, no matter how improbable big bang was, add something like souls to it, and it becomes way more improbable. Where are these souls formed? How they interact with body? How come they did not interact just after big bang, but waited for humans to form? All very improbable. This theory is way less probable than materialism. Also, even if you assume soul theory is correct, what is the probability that their infinite time is at the same level as that of universe? I think this soul argument is flawed.
If event A has a probability of zero that does not imply that A is impossible. Randomly choose a real number between 0 and 1. The odds that you chose that particular number are zero.
Sure but it means it has arbitrarily low odds, so if some other hypothesis predicts the data, then it's infinitely strong evidence for that hypothesis.
What is the probability that I am living in this century, reading Huemer's paper? Obviously it is certain. This is the century in which I am living. Yet he addresses the reader, stating "You would be more likely to be living now if persons could live many times than if persons could only live once in the history of the universe." The certain fact that I am living now says nothing about how many times a person can live in this universe/multiverse. In section 5.5 he tries to address this objection, saying "And what matters to the probabilistic reasoning is not the probability of an observation compared to the other possible observations. What matters is the probability of an observation given a particular theory, compared to the probability of that same observation given an alternative theory." This is wrong but it sounds right. The alternate theories have to predict different observations. If I flip a coin 10 times and get 10 heads, a theory that the coin is not fair is more likely. If instead I observed some heads and some tails, this gives less evidence that the coin is not fair. Probability is fundamentally about observations compared to other possible observations. In Huemer's paper there is only one possible observation, "I am alive now." If I am not alive I make no observation. You get the same observation with either theory so the observation gives us no information about the theories. The reincarnation theory doesn't make the observation more probable. The reincarnation theory says that the observation happens many times, but we are allowed only one observation. We are not able to count how many lives we had where we made the observation. We do not remember our past lifes. Like Huemer I take a secular stance. I do not care whether reincarnation happens or we just live one life. If we are reincarnated, our past and future lives are probably just like this one - in that they are full of uncertainty about what comes after.
Suppose I rolled 35 sixes in a row. The odds of that having happened is 100%, but it's still evidence for the die being rigged, because if the die is rigged, it's guaranteed to happen, but if all we knew was the die wasn't rigged, we'd think it super unlikely that it would happen.
It's true that if you were dead you wouldn't guess anything, But that's irrelevant--you being able to exist multiple times is evidence that you'll be around for a while; it's more strongly predicted on that hypothesis. Imagine a firing squad of 5,000 people missed you when they tried to shoot you. That would be evidence for a conspiracy--even though you wouldn't be able to make predictions if dead.
If you're looking for a good time you can play around with the Indian answers to these various arguments on both sides. If there is only one consciousness, which in that tradition one might call Shiva, most of these problems are resolved. This solution is repugnant to most Westerners who want to believe in the individuality of the soul, even after confronting the transient and brain dependent Nature of any specific part of their experience of individuality.
When philosophy gets this ridiculous, maybe you should consider whether there's something wrong with the methods of the person doing said philosophy. What's next, an a priori argument for astrology?
I think the methods are "give arguments for things and then see if they work." These arguments will often appeal to empirical premises, other times to our intuitions. I am not sure what the better methodology is.
There are uncontroversial empirical refutations of astrology. There are no such refutations of dualism, or even Huemer's reincarnation view. These views might be "weird," and Huemer's arguments for them might be unsuccessful (I think they are), but I don't see any principled way of deeming these topics to be invalid without simultaneously throwing out all of metaphysics (unless that was your point, of course).
To be fair to our author here it certainly looks as though he is mocking the idea of souls and reincarnation both. Concepts that are philosophical by nature can only be dealt with philosophically, after all.
Did you come up with that argument yourself? It's very clever. And I agree with it.
FWIW I think something like 2) is correct, the argument makes mistaken assumptions about probabilistic reasoning with de se beliefs: https://jaeger.hosting.nyu.edu/IB.pdf
I’m not sure about Huemer’s conception of the soul, but I do think that the notion you can be in multiple places at once is reasonable given the science. Quantum experimentation shows that an object can be in a superposition over multiple locations. Experimentally, we can only induce this state in small objects, but the size of objects we can achieve this with has been increasing over time and there is no known mechanism that imposes any size limit. It stands to reason that you could put a person into a superposition too.
Is this exactly the same as showing a soul can be in multiple bodies simultaneously? I don’t know, but it’s certainly suggestive. Maybe the weirdness of the universe should lead people to question their intuitions here.
Ok. My counter argument after thinking of this for 10 minutes in bed:
Doesn’t the chain of logic really only say that reincarnation is true OR that we’re in multiple places at once?
I say this because the initial argument is based on time, while your “absurd” (and I agree it’s a strong absurdity) counterpoint extends it so space.
But space and time are two sides of the same coin. We can imagine the universe as an infinite collection of space-time points. If a being only exists in a finite number of random points, the the chances of it existing are (so the argument claims) zero.
But if a being reincarnates infinitely, then it exists in an infinite number of these points. Thus (apparently) its chances of existing randomly are not zero.
The same is true for a being in an infinite hunger of positions at once.
But either of these is sufficient to avoid the 0% issue. If you really do reincarnate, then the chance of you being at this specific point in space is above 0, because you will visit an infinite number of points in space.
Now you might say that it’s not a question of whether you’ll at some time visit a random point, but whether you’ll visit a random point at a given time.
I don’t think that you can separate time and space that easily. As a factual matter, the two are inseparable as per physics or whatever. Even imagining them separated, the logic doesn’t hold. Although you’re at this random point with a 1/infinity chance, this is just one of an infinite number of points you will be reincarnated into. Given that knowledge, it would be surprising if you weren’t in this point at some moment that is your “now”.
There is some sense in which time and space are part of the same thing, but they are not literally identical in the way they'd have to be for your suggestion to succeed. The argument can be used to imply that, for any axis on which people vary, if they are randomly distributed along that axis, there must be infinity copies of them on the axis. So the same argument could be reconstructed with dimensions. If we discovered that there were infinite versions of us that were either above or below us, it would still be that the odds that we'd have our particular X and Y coordinates would be zero if there was only one of us distributed across those dimensions.
The idea of infinity here is wrong. 1/infinity would not be zero, but infinitesimal. You can see that while solving integrals. We divide an area into infinite divisions, but each division must have non-zero area. This is how points make a line, or lines make a plane. Given infinite time, anything can happen. Also, you cannot say things with less chance cannot happen, even in finite time. Hence, we can entirely exist without reincarnation.
I don't think that you're right that 1/infinity is just infinitesimal but even if it is, if Huemer's argument establishes that the odds you'd exist are reasonably high on his view an infinitesimal (As in 1/infinity) on the other view, that's a very good reason to accept his view.
I didn't say things with less chance can't happen, just that if something is maximally unlikely on one hypothesis and likely on another, that thing happening is evidence for the second hypothesis over the first.
I guess I have to clarify my comment. First of all, Infinity is not a number. 1/infinity is meaningless. What we were talking about, is the value of 1/n, where n keeps increasing. Hence, 1/n nears zero. However, this value is never zero, as there is no end to numbers.
Now, for the other point I did not make earlier. You talk as if our existence is due to random chance. Although there is some truth to it, it is not completely true. Our current models suggest that universe started with big bang. Everything since then is due to a combination of chance, time and physical laws. We should probably ask if big bang that resulted birth of our universe is the only one. We can certainly also wonder about the fine-tuned physical constants. However, once we assume current laws of physics, time is enough to create life.
Now, you can say why we, with our current bodies, were not born in some other time. My reply would be due to causality. Life started with molecules combining with the capacity to replicate themselves. Within its copies, only those that replicated themselves survived. Our bodies are like this because it is the easiest way to form self-replicating molecular arrangements with these elements. Then, a complex interaction with environment and chance resulted in your birth. All of these are casual; you exist because your parents existed in their past situation. You could have been born only in this particular way.
I say all of this because, no matter how improbable big bang was, add something like souls to it, and it becomes way more improbable. Where are these souls formed? How they interact with body? How come they did not interact just after big bang, but waited for humans to form? All very improbable. This theory is way less probable than materialism. Also, even if you assume soul theory is correct, what is the probability that their infinite time is at the same level as that of universe? I think this soul argument is flawed.
If event A has a probability of zero that does not imply that A is impossible. Randomly choose a real number between 0 and 1. The odds that you chose that particular number are zero.
Sure but it means it has arbitrarily low odds, so if some other hypothesis predicts the data, then it's infinitely strong evidence for that hypothesis.
What is the probability that I am living in this century, reading Huemer's paper? Obviously it is certain. This is the century in which I am living. Yet he addresses the reader, stating "You would be more likely to be living now if persons could live many times than if persons could only live once in the history of the universe." The certain fact that I am living now says nothing about how many times a person can live in this universe/multiverse. In section 5.5 he tries to address this objection, saying "And what matters to the probabilistic reasoning is not the probability of an observation compared to the other possible observations. What matters is the probability of an observation given a particular theory, compared to the probability of that same observation given an alternative theory." This is wrong but it sounds right. The alternate theories have to predict different observations. If I flip a coin 10 times and get 10 heads, a theory that the coin is not fair is more likely. If instead I observed some heads and some tails, this gives less evidence that the coin is not fair. Probability is fundamentally about observations compared to other possible observations. In Huemer's paper there is only one possible observation, "I am alive now." If I am not alive I make no observation. You get the same observation with either theory so the observation gives us no information about the theories. The reincarnation theory doesn't make the observation more probable. The reincarnation theory says that the observation happens many times, but we are allowed only one observation. We are not able to count how many lives we had where we made the observation. We do not remember our past lifes. Like Huemer I take a secular stance. I do not care whether reincarnation happens or we just live one life. If we are reincarnated, our past and future lives are probably just like this one - in that they are full of uncertainty about what comes after.
Suppose I rolled 35 sixes in a row. The odds of that having happened is 100%, but it's still evidence for the die being rigged, because if the die is rigged, it's guaranteed to happen, but if all we knew was the die wasn't rigged, we'd think it super unlikely that it would happen.
It's true that if you were dead you wouldn't guess anything, But that's irrelevant--you being able to exist multiple times is evidence that you'll be around for a while; it's more strongly predicted on that hypothesis. Imagine a firing squad of 5,000 people missed you when they tried to shoot you. That would be evidence for a conspiracy--even though you wouldn't be able to make predictions if dead.
If you're looking for a good time you can play around with the Indian answers to these various arguments on both sides. If there is only one consciousness, which in that tradition one might call Shiva, most of these problems are resolved. This solution is repugnant to most Westerners who want to believe in the individuality of the soul, even after confronting the transient and brain dependent Nature of any specific part of their experience of individuality.
When philosophy gets this ridiculous, maybe you should consider whether there's something wrong with the methods of the person doing said philosophy. What's next, an a priori argument for astrology?
I think the methods are "give arguments for things and then see if they work." These arguments will often appeal to empirical premises, other times to our intuitions. I am not sure what the better methodology is.
With sufficient ingenuity you could probably come up with a "good argument" for astrology using the conventional tools of analytic philosophers.
There are uncontroversial empirical refutations of astrology. There are no such refutations of dualism, or even Huemer's reincarnation view. These views might be "weird," and Huemer's arguments for them might be unsuccessful (I think they are), but I don't see any principled way of deeming these topics to be invalid without simultaneously throwing out all of metaphysics (unless that was your point, of course).
To be fair to our author here it certainly looks as though he is mocking the idea of souls and reincarnation both. Concepts that are philosophical by nature can only be dealt with philosophically, after all.
Yes I don't know, maybe he enjoys making faulty arguments to support desirable conclusions.
Did you come up with that argument yourself? It's very clever. And I agree with it.
FWIW I think something like 2) is correct, the argument makes mistaken assumptions about probabilistic reasoning with de se beliefs: https://jaeger.hosting.nyu.edu/IB.pdf
I did, though Huemer says other people have made the same argument before me.
"4. So I can be in multiple places at once"
Not merely can, but must, and not merely multiple, but infinite. ;-)
(According to the premises, that is, not according to my belief.)
I’m not sure about Huemer’s conception of the soul, but I do think that the notion you can be in multiple places at once is reasonable given the science. Quantum experimentation shows that an object can be in a superposition over multiple locations. Experimentally, we can only induce this state in small objects, but the size of objects we can achieve this with has been increasing over time and there is no known mechanism that imposes any size limit. It stands to reason that you could put a person into a superposition too.
Is this exactly the same as showing a soul can be in multiple bodies simultaneously? I don’t know, but it’s certainly suggestive. Maybe the weirdness of the universe should lead people to question their intuitions here.
The argument would show that a person can be in infinite places simultaneously.
Ok. My counter argument after thinking of this for 10 minutes in bed:
Doesn’t the chain of logic really only say that reincarnation is true OR that we’re in multiple places at once?
I say this because the initial argument is based on time, while your “absurd” (and I agree it’s a strong absurdity) counterpoint extends it so space.
But space and time are two sides of the same coin. We can imagine the universe as an infinite collection of space-time points. If a being only exists in a finite number of random points, the the chances of it existing are (so the argument claims) zero.
But if a being reincarnates infinitely, then it exists in an infinite number of these points. Thus (apparently) its chances of existing randomly are not zero.
The same is true for a being in an infinite hunger of positions at once.
But either of these is sufficient to avoid the 0% issue. If you really do reincarnate, then the chance of you being at this specific point in space is above 0, because you will visit an infinite number of points in space.
Now you might say that it’s not a question of whether you’ll at some time visit a random point, but whether you’ll visit a random point at a given time.
I don’t think that you can separate time and space that easily. As a factual matter, the two are inseparable as per physics or whatever. Even imagining them separated, the logic doesn’t hold. Although you’re at this random point with a 1/infinity chance, this is just one of an infinite number of points you will be reincarnated into. Given that knowledge, it would be surprising if you weren’t in this point at some moment that is your “now”.
There is some sense in which time and space are part of the same thing, but they are not literally identical in the way they'd have to be for your suggestion to succeed. The argument can be used to imply that, for any axis on which people vary, if they are randomly distributed along that axis, there must be infinity copies of them on the axis. So the same argument could be reconstructed with dimensions. If we discovered that there were infinite versions of us that were either above or below us, it would still be that the odds that we'd have our particular X and Y coordinates would be zero if there was only one of us distributed across those dimensions.