"it’s valuable to prevent enormous amounts of expected suffering"
Of course, this is where the buck stops There are levels of suffering, and human suffering should be prioritized. It is better to let one million shrimp die than to allow one boy to.
I'll start caring about shrimp when they start caring about us.
> I'll start caring about shrimp when they start caring about us.
What about newborns, or the comatose, or certain people with a developmental disability? They can't care about us, does that mean we should stop caring about them?
You haven't made a point about why you care about humans more. You've just iterated that you do. Now, this is a widespread intuition, but there are obvious reasons to be suspicious of it and powerful arguments against it. What trait do humans possess making us incalculably more important than all other animals?
Amazing post, thank you so much for doing this! It's great to have clear and accessible resources on this topic. I already donate to some of these and hope to continue having the ability to do so in the future.
"Pain and suffering are bad because they hurt. Headaches are bad not because the people who have them can do calculus but because they feel bad."
Really? How do you prove this?
If I have a headache I personally don't like it, but is it to be considered universally or existentially bad? What does that even mean? And what if the pain arises from some healing process—is it still bad? Or what if the pain arises from some other organism's activities who is living in my brain and who is receiving pleasure and life saving nutrients? Is it still bad? According to who?
Seems like you're letting your personal weakness and aversion to any sort of negative experience (literally unavoidable and part of reality) drive you to some weird conclusions (like that you would destroy all living creatures if you could do so painlessly).
Do you ask such questions when people make any moral claims? How is this one any different?
I don't think all pain is bad. I think that pain is generally bad if it doesn't bring about anything good, or if there's a very large amount of it for comparatively minimal good.
Though I notice you don't try to do a calculus of how much good these animals feel? You perform a biased and dubious calculus in order to quantify how much they suffer, in order to justify your weird claims about killing all life in order to end suffering. But such conclusions that life and its suffering are not worthwhile would require you to also quantify how much good they feel as well, no? Maybe those animals do get great pleasure form being alive, from eating, from mating? Maybe their in built instincts for survival do indeed provide enough pleasure in their few moments alive that their few moments of suffering and death are justified or worthwhile from their perspective?
But you don't. You externalize your weak perspective that all pain is bad, to baselessly assert that animals live in "hell", and that their life is not worth it.
If such a simple calculus of 'net suffering minus net pleasure' could be performed to quantify whether life is worth it, then surely more humans going through hardship would kill themselves? Seems that even for humans (who likely have the greatest capacity for suffering) the few and temporary moments of ordinary life, with little suffering or pleasure, are enough to justify living through suffering. So why would it not be the same for animals? And why would you presume to make those decisions for them?
I didn't advocate killing all life and I'm not in favor of it. This essay was about charities that reduce extreme suffering in animals! I think most farmed animals live extremely bad lives, and that's for reasons I've explained here and in other places--see here for the explanation of fish farms https://benthams.substack.com/p/underwater-torture-chambers?utm_source=publication-search
In a past essay of yours: “Imagine that humans had all left earth and we could destroy the world, killing every living thing painlessly. I would, in an instant, support doing so.”
Also, you didn't answer my question about why you fail to be so interested in quantifying sensations when it comes to pleasure, nor how you can be sure that animals don't personally feel that the moments without suffering perfectly justify their lives in spite of the suffering, as humans have in even the worst conditions?
Well, I'd now probably modify it to eliminate the phrase "in an instant" but still support doing so. But that's not what this article is about!
I am interested in quantifying pleasure. It's simply that, for reasons I've explained at considerable length, I think most animals probably have much more pain than pleasure.
Many humans have lived lives of more pain than pleasure, yet still elected to live them. Maybe animals would make the same choice (indeed, the animals which you claim have "have much more pain than pleasure" still seem very intent on living those lives). So how do you know that animals simply view their lives in terms of pleasure/pain, they might still be perfectly willing to live lives that aren't hedonically positive? What makes you think you can perform their appraisals for them?
I hate to be trite, but I am religious. A soul. There's a special something that humans possess compared to all other life forms on this planet. A qualitative difference, not a quantitative one.
Well this is a nice birthday surprise! Not sure if it was parallel thinking or if it was inspired by my note, but either way I’m very happy you’re doing this.
Thanks! Btw, for the subscription, do the donations to SWP for my birthday count? I’ve also done volunteer work for animal welfare charities like faunalyitcs. Although none of them were in your name so no worries if you think it doesn’t count.
How do we know that suffering is even subjectively bad for insects? Do they have the same qualia of experience that we do? I know you could argue that we don't know other people do, but it seems pretty natural to me to assume that suffering of creatures that look like me is more qualitatively similar to how I experience suffering, and as the distance to me grows, so shrinks my ability to underwrite the quantum of suffering (or joy) experienced by that being.
Ultimately, whether rationally or just instinctually, I end up a pretty firm species-ist here. There isn't any more of a really firm moral grounding in either philosophy, but I am simply unwilling to sign up for a moral framework that allows for equivalence between human and non-human suffering and joy, at least in extremis. I.e., there is no number of shrimp I would not sacrifice or condemn to eternal suffering to save a single human.
You could argue some inconsistency, like "well then would you eliminate all shrimp to satisfy the desire of one person to see shrimp tortured, since his joy is not translateable into shrimp suffering?" But again, I would want to take the human-centric lens - I want to do what is best for humanity as a whole, which would almost certainly not mean eliminating all shrimp.
I’m sorry I can’t follow your moral logic. Wouldn’t the same reasoning lead to “For every whale we eliminate, millions of krill will be able to live out their lives to the fullest.”
The net effect of whales on krill is unclear. But it doesn't seem unreasonable in principle to subordinate the interests of one creature to the millions it routinely kills.
Also, if you're reading comments right now, can you fix the part in your April 1st post where you cite normalcy bias? That's wrong, the bandwagon effect would be more relevant.
Great article as usual. One typo I think: “They’ve already helped a staggering more than 3 billion shrimp avoid a horrifying fate. That’s half the number of people in the United States!”
Donated! Thanks for writing this.
:)
"it’s valuable to prevent enormous amounts of expected suffering"
Of course, this is where the buck stops There are levels of suffering, and human suffering should be prioritized. It is better to let one million shrimp die than to allow one boy to.
I'll start caring about shrimp when they start caring about us.
> I'll start caring about shrimp when they start caring about us.
What about newborns, or the comatose, or certain people with a developmental disability? They can't care about us, does that mean we should stop caring about them?
Please focus on my main point of focusing on humans as a whole.
I think small exceptions do not violate this rule.
You haven't made a point about why you care about humans more. You've just iterated that you do. Now, this is a widespread intuition, but there are obvious reasons to be suspicious of it and powerful arguments against it. What trait do humans possess making us incalculably more important than all other animals?
Why do you think it's a widespread Intuition?
By default, if we don't empathize with a creature, we don't value its interests.
Amazing post, thank you so much for doing this! It's great to have clear and accessible resources on this topic. I already donate to some of these and hope to continue having the ability to do so in the future.
"Pain and suffering are bad because they hurt. Headaches are bad not because the people who have them can do calculus but because they feel bad."
Really? How do you prove this?
If I have a headache I personally don't like it, but is it to be considered universally or existentially bad? What does that even mean? And what if the pain arises from some healing process—is it still bad? Or what if the pain arises from some other organism's activities who is living in my brain and who is receiving pleasure and life saving nutrients? Is it still bad? According to who?
Seems like you're letting your personal weakness and aversion to any sort of negative experience (literally unavoidable and part of reality) drive you to some weird conclusions (like that you would destroy all living creatures if you could do so painlessly).
Do you ask such questions when people make any moral claims? How is this one any different?
I don't think all pain is bad. I think that pain is generally bad if it doesn't bring about anything good, or if there's a very large amount of it for comparatively minimal good.
Though I notice you don't try to do a calculus of how much good these animals feel? You perform a biased and dubious calculus in order to quantify how much they suffer, in order to justify your weird claims about killing all life in order to end suffering. But such conclusions that life and its suffering are not worthwhile would require you to also quantify how much good they feel as well, no? Maybe those animals do get great pleasure form being alive, from eating, from mating? Maybe their in built instincts for survival do indeed provide enough pleasure in their few moments alive that their few moments of suffering and death are justified or worthwhile from their perspective?
But you don't. You externalize your weak perspective that all pain is bad, to baselessly assert that animals live in "hell", and that their life is not worth it.
If such a simple calculus of 'net suffering minus net pleasure' could be performed to quantify whether life is worth it, then surely more humans going through hardship would kill themselves? Seems that even for humans (who likely have the greatest capacity for suffering) the few and temporary moments of ordinary life, with little suffering or pleasure, are enough to justify living through suffering. So why would it not be the same for animals? And why would you presume to make those decisions for them?
I didn't advocate killing all life and I'm not in favor of it. This essay was about charities that reduce extreme suffering in animals! I think most farmed animals live extremely bad lives, and that's for reasons I've explained here and in other places--see here for the explanation of fish farms https://benthams.substack.com/p/underwater-torture-chambers?utm_source=publication-search
In a past essay of yours: “Imagine that humans had all left earth and we could destroy the world, killing every living thing painlessly. I would, in an instant, support doing so.”
Also, you didn't answer my question about why you fail to be so interested in quantifying sensations when it comes to pleasure, nor how you can be sure that animals don't personally feel that the moments without suffering perfectly justify their lives in spite of the suffering, as humans have in even the worst conditions?
Well, I'd now probably modify it to eliminate the phrase "in an instant" but still support doing so. But that's not what this article is about!
I am interested in quantifying pleasure. It's simply that, for reasons I've explained at considerable length, I think most animals probably have much more pain than pleasure.
Okay, one last attempt to get to my point:
Many humans have lived lives of more pain than pleasure, yet still elected to live them. Maybe animals would make the same choice (indeed, the animals which you claim have "have much more pain than pleasure" still seem very intent on living those lives). So how do you know that animals simply view their lives in terms of pleasure/pain, they might still be perfectly willing to live lives that aren't hedonically positive? What makes you think you can perform their appraisals for them?
I hate to be trite, but I am religious. A soul. There's a special something that humans possess compared to all other life forms on this planet. A qualitative difference, not a quantitative one.
In what days are we different in virtue of possessing a soul?
The fact that cows aren't writing Substack posts to save humans is a pretty good demonstration.
Well this is a nice birthday surprise! Not sure if it was parallel thinking or if it was inspired by my note, but either way I’m very happy you’re doing this.
Parallel! This one’s been in the works for a bit. Happy birthday!
Thanks! Btw, for the subscription, do the donations to SWP for my birthday count? I’ve also done volunteer work for animal welfare charities like faunalyitcs. Although none of them were in your name so no worries if you think it doesn’t count.
Based.
How do we know that suffering is even subjectively bad for insects? Do they have the same qualia of experience that we do? I know you could argue that we don't know other people do, but it seems pretty natural to me to assume that suffering of creatures that look like me is more qualitatively similar to how I experience suffering, and as the distance to me grows, so shrinks my ability to underwrite the quantum of suffering (or joy) experienced by that being.
Ultimately, whether rationally or just instinctually, I end up a pretty firm species-ist here. There isn't any more of a really firm moral grounding in either philosophy, but I am simply unwilling to sign up for a moral framework that allows for equivalence between human and non-human suffering and joy, at least in extremis. I.e., there is no number of shrimp I would not sacrifice or condemn to eternal suffering to save a single human.
You could argue some inconsistency, like "well then would you eliminate all shrimp to satisfy the desire of one person to see shrimp tortured, since his joy is not translateable into shrimp suffering?" But again, I would want to take the human-centric lens - I want to do what is best for humanity as a whole, which would almost certainly not mean eliminating all shrimp.
I’m sorry I can’t follow your moral logic. Wouldn’t the same reasoning lead to “For every whale we eliminate, millions of krill will be able to live out their lives to the fullest.”
The net effect of whales on krill is unclear. But it doesn't seem unreasonable in principle to subordinate the interests of one creature to the millions it routinely kills.
You couldn't pay me to care
A lack of compassion and consistency is no thing to brag about
Even though I’ve given up on utilitarianism, I still come to Bentham’s Bulldog for the top notch literary references
No part of what I said assumes utilitarianism!
True, but the only reason I personally would decide to care would be if I were a utilitarian!
Also, if you're reading comments right now, can you fix the part in your April 1st post where you cite normalcy bias? That's wrong, the bandwagon effect would be more relevant.
Great article as usual. One typo I think: “They’ve already helped a staggering more than 3 billion shrimp avoid a horrifying fate. That’s half the number of people in the United States!”
Maybe I'm being dumb, but what's the typo?
The population of the United States is around 340 million.
Omg I'm a moron! I was looking for grammatical errors and didn't realize I'd put that for the us population and not the world population!
Yes, that’s what a meant. Thanks for clarifying!