I've noticed a sort of approach to refuting ethical intuitionism where people appeal to incorrect intuitions like people thinking lynching was okay. The implicit argument seems to be like "clearly, lynching is not okay, therefor intuition is bad." So, I like your part about the syllogism.
Also, if sacrificing people prevented the world from ending, then that would be a pretty good reason. But we know that's not true, so we retrospectively judge that as morally abhorrent.
These conversations always seem kind of limited to the context of the meta ethical debate. Like if there was some heinous political policy advocated by [opposing party] then I think most moral relativists would use objective language. But I can't say for certain with Handwaving. Perhaps they are principled on this point.
Nice short article. Reminds me of the older days of Bentham's! ha
I've noticed a sort of approach to refuting ethical intuitionism where people appeal to incorrect intuitions like people thinking lynching was okay. The implicit argument seems to be like "clearly, lynching is not okay, therefor intuition is bad." So, I like your part about the syllogism.
Also, if sacrificing people prevented the world from ending, then that would be a pretty good reason. But we know that's not true, so we retrospectively judge that as morally abhorrent.
These conversations always seem kind of limited to the context of the meta ethical debate. Like if there was some heinous political policy advocated by [opposing party] then I think most moral relativists would use objective language. But I can't say for certain with Handwaving. Perhaps they are principled on this point.
Nice short article. Reminds me of the older days of Bentham's! ha