Your attempt to rebut the argument from empirical skepticism is patently circular, as it depends on inferring something from experience; yet this only provides a good reason to think the relevant claim is true insofar as such experiences are caused (reason to suspect a deviant causal chain w.r.t. one's experiences are frequently taken to be defeaters in the literature; a fortiori *uncaused* experiences), which is precisely what is at issue.
Nor could you attempt to avoid this by saying you know all physical things have physical causes a priori, for (a) you obviously cannot hold that to be a necessary / a priori truth, especially given your commitment to the thesis that contingency is insufficient to infer causal explicability a priori; and (b) you don't know your perceptual experiences are physically constituted a priori.
Your attempt to rebut the argument from empirical skepticism is patently circular, as it depends on inferring something from experience; yet this only provides a good reason to think the relevant claim is true insofar as such experiences are caused (reason to suspect a deviant causal chain w.r.t. one's experiences are frequently taken to be defeaters in the literature; a fortiori *uncaused* experiences), which is precisely what is at issue.
Nor could you attempt to avoid this by saying you know all physical things have physical causes a priori, for (a) you obviously cannot hold that to be a necessary / a priori truth, especially given your commitment to the thesis that contingency is insufficient to infer causal explicability a priori; and (b) you don't know your perceptual experiences are physically constituted a priori.