I had a long section replying to the main objection. There were other objections that I could have gone to in more detail (E.g. that it freed up Iranian funds for more terrorism) but I generally didn't think those were very serious.
I mean, it might provide a bit more funding for its proxies, but this effect seems way less significant than the others, especially long-term. Long-term I'd guess being richer and friendlier with the west would reduce terrorist funding. But in any case, this seems like a rounding error compared to risk of nuclear armament and impoverishing millions of people.
One indication of this is the attitude of Iranian hardliners.
It's clear that you only want to preach to the choir and don't want to persuade JCPOA opponents, or you wouldn't glibly mock Trump's alleged "affinity for randomly attacking Iran", a "set-things-on-fire strategy", and "swing his dick around." Even if you think these are accurate characterizations, they're rhetorical poison for persuading Iran hawks by suggesting they're just idiots. Not sure your goals with this piece -- maybe it's engagement bait (if so clearly working!) -- but would suggest you consider a different strategy.
I agree the "kicking the can down the road" objection gets a few paragraphs and a good treatment, but many JCPOA opponents had many deeper concerns: Iran's ballistic missile program (not covered), regional aggression (not covered), sunset clauses that importantly legitimized eventual enrichment, and the strong limitations inspection regimes.
The missile program in particular, which Iran accelerated during JCPOA, gave Iran potential delivery systems for future weapons. The sunset clauses effectively meant accepting a nuclear Iran in 10-15 years.
Note that October 7 killed 1,200 Israelis even despite significant sanctions on Iranian funding. With Iran unleashed, Iran could maybe have coordinated the full "unity of fronts" - Hamas, Hezbollah's 150,000 missiles, Iraqi militias, all at once and ramp up the death count significantly.
Additionally, you assume we can cleanly separate nuclear risk from terrorism risk. But October 7 nearly triggered nuclear escalation itself. Hezbollah involvement could have meant Israeli tactical nukes. These risks compound, not subtract.
Lastly, Iran perhaps could've and likely would've enriched in secret during the JCPOA. Iran built Natanz and Fordow in secret - we only discovered them through intelligence breakthroughs. The JCPOA's inspection regime, while better than nothing, had serious gaps - military sites were off-limits, inspections of new suspicious sites faced up to 24-day delays (plenty of time to sanitize), and the IAEA couldn't do "anytime, anywhere" inspections.
Important context is that Iran mastered concealment over decades. They could have maintained a parallel program at military facilities while staying technically compliant at declared sites. By the time we discovered it, they'd have both sanctions relief profits and further nuclear capability.
I agree staying in likely was marginally better, but I don't think it's as obvious a calculus as you say. But dismissing hundreds of annual terror deaths as a bit more funding while over-catastrophizing about nuclear risk doesn't seem like fully honest utilitarian accounting. I completely agree that the JCPOA was master diplomatic work and that a better deal likely was never on the table, but thre are legitimate concerns that you completely don't account for.
I grant that this article could have been more comprehensive! Were I rewriting it, I'd probably address more of the objections that you list.
I'm really skeptical that a slight boost in Iranian funding would have majorly improved their ability to unite the fronts.
Regarding the other things not in the deal: I mean, you can just look at history since we pulled out of the deal. Have we gotten a better deal? Does anyone think we're likely to? I also think the net impact on terrorism is relatively unclear: having a nation being starved by the west is likely to help Iranian hardliners long-term.
What about the objection that it did give more capital to the regime to work with through lessening sanctions, and that they have a history of not following agreements. I don’t see how we can fully keep an eye on the regime when they have evil intentions.
“Iran lied when it said it never sought to develop nuclear weapons”, and then “cheated by failing to reveal all its weapons programme information to an international watchdog group charged with monitoring the deal”
Under the sunset clauses Iran would have very little incentive in 2030 to enter a new deal. Yes, there were still US primary sanctions, so it's not like there would be no leverage at that point, but if Iran wanted to do exactly what it ended up doing (namely enriching a ton of uranium to 60% and becoming a nuclear threshold state) it could have done that even without withdrawing from the NPT and even under IAEA inspections. So the bet was always that by 2030 either the regime would be different, or it would have moderated. Obviously we don't know the counterfactual but given that we are now in 2025 I think it's a fair bet that that would not have happened. In addition, even before the pullout, it was clear that its behavior was not moderating in terms of its missile program or its support for proxies around the region or its core ethos of trying to destroy Israel.
From Israel's perspective, the missile program, building 10,000 ballistic missiles, was also viewed as an existential threat and so at some point Israel may have attacked in any case.
Iran has been the main source of regional instability both with and without the deal. The deal made it much easier for them to do so while lowering the chance of their going nuclear, which is... a bad exchange. Look at North Korea: they did go nuclear but they are so poor that they can't even cause real trouble to South Korea. Or look at (nuclear) Russia that used to have its finger in every pie but was forced to concentrate its resources in one place and immediately saw its proxies elsewhere losing (Syria) or changing affiliations (Caucasus, Central Asia). Being nuclear just isn't worth that much except as a good deterrent from being attacked. Iran having Da Bomb but unable to fund Houthis, Hesbollah, Hamas, and so many more is preferable to the reverse the deal was delivering.
If Iran can successfully hide a nuclear program with JCPOA inspections in place, then it can hide one without such inspections. If such a program is uncovered by covert intelligence, then military intervention might be required. Further, one can always attempt to extend an existing agreement. Having an agreement is a dominant strategy.
Recent history has shown us that non-nuclear states can simply be bombed with impunity whenever more powerful neighbors feel like it. The answer to that is supposed to be "diplomacy", but when deals aren't worth the paper they're written on the incentives are obvious.
It doesn't seem like you even tried to look up what opponents of the JCPOA were saying at all?
I had a long section replying to the main objection. There were other objections that I could have gone to in more detail (E.g. that it freed up Iranian funds for more terrorism) but I generally didn't think those were very serious.
I think "it freed up Iranian funds for more terrorism" is a pretty serious objection!
I mean, it might provide a bit more funding for its proxies, but this effect seems way less significant than the others, especially long-term. Long-term I'd guess being richer and friendlier with the west would reduce terrorist funding. But in any case, this seems like a rounding error compared to risk of nuclear armament and impoverishing millions of people.
One indication of this is the attitude of Iranian hardliners.
It's clear that you only want to preach to the choir and don't want to persuade JCPOA opponents, or you wouldn't glibly mock Trump's alleged "affinity for randomly attacking Iran", a "set-things-on-fire strategy", and "swing his dick around." Even if you think these are accurate characterizations, they're rhetorical poison for persuading Iran hawks by suggesting they're just idiots. Not sure your goals with this piece -- maybe it's engagement bait (if so clearly working!) -- but would suggest you consider a different strategy.
I agree the "kicking the can down the road" objection gets a few paragraphs and a good treatment, but many JCPOA opponents had many deeper concerns: Iran's ballistic missile program (not covered), regional aggression (not covered), sunset clauses that importantly legitimized eventual enrichment, and the strong limitations inspection regimes.
The missile program in particular, which Iran accelerated during JCPOA, gave Iran potential delivery systems for future weapons. The sunset clauses effectively meant accepting a nuclear Iran in 10-15 years.
Note that October 7 killed 1,200 Israelis even despite significant sanctions on Iranian funding. With Iran unleashed, Iran could maybe have coordinated the full "unity of fronts" - Hamas, Hezbollah's 150,000 missiles, Iraqi militias, all at once and ramp up the death count significantly.
Additionally, you assume we can cleanly separate nuclear risk from terrorism risk. But October 7 nearly triggered nuclear escalation itself. Hezbollah involvement could have meant Israeli tactical nukes. These risks compound, not subtract.
Lastly, Iran perhaps could've and likely would've enriched in secret during the JCPOA. Iran built Natanz and Fordow in secret - we only discovered them through intelligence breakthroughs. The JCPOA's inspection regime, while better than nothing, had serious gaps - military sites were off-limits, inspections of new suspicious sites faced up to 24-day delays (plenty of time to sanitize), and the IAEA couldn't do "anytime, anywhere" inspections.
Important context is that Iran mastered concealment over decades. They could have maintained a parallel program at military facilities while staying technically compliant at declared sites. By the time we discovered it, they'd have both sanctions relief profits and further nuclear capability.
I agree staying in likely was marginally better, but I don't think it's as obvious a calculus as you say. But dismissing hundreds of annual terror deaths as a bit more funding while over-catastrophizing about nuclear risk doesn't seem like fully honest utilitarian accounting. I completely agree that the JCPOA was master diplomatic work and that a better deal likely was never on the table, but thre are legitimate concerns that you completely don't account for.
I've now added a note at the top of the article expressing that I think I was overconfident and pointing people in the direction of your note.
Thanks! I think it's really cool that you did that!
I grant that this article could have been more comprehensive! Were I rewriting it, I'd probably address more of the objections that you list.
I'm really skeptical that a slight boost in Iranian funding would have majorly improved their ability to unite the fronts.
Regarding the other things not in the deal: I mean, you can just look at history since we pulled out of the deal. Have we gotten a better deal? Does anyone think we're likely to? I also think the net impact on terrorism is relatively unclear: having a nation being starved by the west is likely to help Iranian hardliners long-term.
What about the objection that it did give more capital to the regime to work with through lessening sanctions, and that they have a history of not following agreements. I don’t see how we can fully keep an eye on the regime when they have evil intentions.
“Iran lied when it said it never sought to develop nuclear weapons”, and then “cheated by failing to reveal all its weapons programme information to an international watchdog group charged with monitoring the deal”
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/04/30/netanyahu-evidence-proves-iran-deal-based-lies-and-iranian-deception/565347002/
I don't really trust statements by Netanyahu.
LOL fair enough, but you do agree that it gave additional funds to work with and that it is extremely difficult to surveil all of Iran’s operations?
I mean, it's somewhat difficult, but I think overall the odds of an Iranian nuclear weapon while the deal was in place is very low.
Under the sunset clauses Iran would have very little incentive in 2030 to enter a new deal. Yes, there were still US primary sanctions, so it's not like there would be no leverage at that point, but if Iran wanted to do exactly what it ended up doing (namely enriching a ton of uranium to 60% and becoming a nuclear threshold state) it could have done that even without withdrawing from the NPT and even under IAEA inspections. So the bet was always that by 2030 either the regime would be different, or it would have moderated. Obviously we don't know the counterfactual but given that we are now in 2025 I think it's a fair bet that that would not have happened. In addition, even before the pullout, it was clear that its behavior was not moderating in terms of its missile program or its support for proxies around the region or its core ethos of trying to destroy Israel.
From Israel's perspective, the missile program, building 10,000 ballistic missiles, was also viewed as an existential threat and so at some point Israel may have attacked in any case.
Iran has been the main source of regional instability both with and without the deal. The deal made it much easier for them to do so while lowering the chance of their going nuclear, which is... a bad exchange. Look at North Korea: they did go nuclear but they are so poor that they can't even cause real trouble to South Korea. Or look at (nuclear) Russia that used to have its finger in every pie but was forced to concentrate its resources in one place and immediately saw its proxies elsewhere losing (Syria) or changing affiliations (Caucasus, Central Asia). Being nuclear just isn't worth that much except as a good deterrent from being attacked. Iran having Da Bomb but unable to fund Houthis, Hesbollah, Hamas, and so many more is preferable to the reverse the deal was delivering.
(The problem, of course, is that Trump's erratic behavior is likely to deliver the worst of both worlds.)
If Iran can successfully hide a nuclear program with JCPOA inspections in place, then it can hide one without such inspections. If such a program is uncovered by covert intelligence, then military intervention might be required. Further, one can always attempt to extend an existing agreement. Having an agreement is a dominant strategy.
Recent history has shown us that non-nuclear states can simply be bombed with impunity whenever more powerful neighbors feel like it. The answer to that is supposed to be "diplomacy", but when deals aren't worth the paper they're written on the incentives are obvious.
Typo: “Yet one of the where” —> “Yet one of the issues where”
Thanks
Only 1 man can stop Iran and save the Middle East...
https://youtube.com/watch?v=YgiyWGyJcIc
Have you ever thought about getting in touch with Avi Bitterman to discuss this? I’d tune in for that.
He and I are probably going to talk about fine-tuning and honey at some point, so maybe this after that.