Sometimes the epistemic reasons weigh up multiple beliefs as precisely equal
Epistemic reasons aren't precisely commensurable. Then sometimes there may be multiple beliefs for which no other belief has more reason-support, despite such beliefs not having precisely the same amount of support.
For the first one, if we instead choose to evaluate a set of beliefs with associated credences, the question would be: Are there distinct probability distributions over beliefs which both have equal (and maximal) support from reasons? (A subjective bayesian would think all possible priors that were updated with conditionalization, while following probabilism, would be in this class).
We're in agreement there. Only used it as a helpful (extreme) example. A moderate in-between view would have multiple permissible priors while still excluding many from the maximally reasons-supported class.
I'd recommend reading the linked Yetter Chappell paper for greater clarification. But the basic idea is pluralism by what people mean by rational. Thus, Swinburne is rational in the satisficing sense, Oppy is (I think) more rational, but none of them are maximally rational.
What I'm describing is not permissivism. I think that there are distinct concepts of rationality that ultimately converge -- thus, I'm pluralist about the various concepts. I think you should read the paper I linked -- it will clear things up.
The pluralist claim is that there are three distinct concepts of rationality -- one maximizing, one satisficing, and one scalar. I claim that the most rational views would converge -- that there is a fact of the matter about whether Swinburne or Oppy is more rational, even if neither is irrational in the satisficing sense.
I was assuming we had the same facts. But my claim is that total rationality would result in the same priors. Though also, I think that we can think that the scalar account of rationality works even if there would be ultimately rational disagreement.
3 can be false if either...
Sometimes the epistemic reasons weigh up multiple beliefs as precisely equal
Epistemic reasons aren't precisely commensurable. Then sometimes there may be multiple beliefs for which no other belief has more reason-support, despite such beliefs not having precisely the same amount of support.
On the first point, I think that would lead to assigning equal credence to the multiple beliefs weighed up as equal.
I do think epistemic reasons are commensurable, though I don't have a great argument for it -- just seems very intuitive to me.
For the first one, if we instead choose to evaluate a set of beliefs with associated credences, the question would be: Are there distinct probability distributions over beliefs which both have equal (and maximal) support from reasons? (A subjective bayesian would think all possible priors that were updated with conditionalization, while following probabilism, would be in this class).
I'm not a subjective bayesian.
We're in agreement there. Only used it as a helpful (extreme) example. A moderate in-between view would have multiple permissible priors while still excluding many from the maximally reasons-supported class.
I would reject that view too!
I'd recommend reading the linked Yetter Chappell paper for greater clarification. But the basic idea is pluralism by what people mean by rational. Thus, Swinburne is rational in the satisficing sense, Oppy is (I think) more rational, but none of them are maximally rational.
What I'm describing is not permissivism. I think that there are distinct concepts of rationality that ultimately converge -- thus, I'm pluralist about the various concepts. I think you should read the paper I linked -- it will clear things up.
The pluralist claim is that there are three distinct concepts of rationality -- one maximizing, one satisficing, and one scalar. I claim that the most rational views would converge -- that there is a fact of the matter about whether Swinburne or Oppy is more rational, even if neither is irrational in the satisficing sense.
I was assuming we had the same facts. But my claim is that total rationality would result in the same priors. Though also, I think that we can think that the scalar account of rationality works even if there would be ultimately rational disagreement.
Yes -- perfect rationality would result in different conclusions if the facts were different.