Also the whole god hypo creates the same problem again.
If we don't play games with the necessity of god then the existence of the particular sort of god claimed (eg one which would create our universe) is itself a kind of fine-tuning which should support the existence of a meta-creator.
And any games u can play with necessity to avoid talking about universes with and w/o god can be played just as well w/o god.
A more basic problem is that no one has really given a very convincing argument for fine tuning in the first place.
Sure, you can make arguments showing that if the physical constants had been a bit different or we'd had different initial conditions then life which is recognizable to us wouldn't exist. But so what? That's not the thing to be proved.
You'd need an argument showing that it's relatively unlikely to have a universe which produces artifacts that look like complex computations of a certain kind (eg agentic ones that can make complex predictions about their futures). And note that you can't assume that those computations occur at the same scale (could happen subnuclear or span vast numbers of galaxies) as us or even have the same arrow of time as we do (for instance certain kinds of tiling rules can represent Turing machines with forward evolution occuring along some spacial dimension).
It's a really hard problem showing that there is any kind of fine tuning and we certainly haven't done it yet.
More fundamentally there is a problem with the choice of measure. For some reason we imagine that the initial conditions and constants are easy to change and the physical laws aren't? Why?
I don't really get it. According to Huemer, is it always irrational to explain something with luck?
Also the whole god hypo creates the same problem again.
If we don't play games with the necessity of god then the existence of the particular sort of god claimed (eg one which would create our universe) is itself a kind of fine-tuning which should support the existence of a meta-creator.
And any games u can play with necessity to avoid talking about universes with and w/o god can be played just as well w/o god.
A more basic problem is that no one has really given a very convincing argument for fine tuning in the first place.
Sure, you can make arguments showing that if the physical constants had been a bit different or we'd had different initial conditions then life which is recognizable to us wouldn't exist. But so what? That's not the thing to be proved.
You'd need an argument showing that it's relatively unlikely to have a universe which produces artifacts that look like complex computations of a certain kind (eg agentic ones that can make complex predictions about their futures). And note that you can't assume that those computations occur at the same scale (could happen subnuclear or span vast numbers of galaxies) as us or even have the same arrow of time as we do (for instance certain kinds of tiling rules can represent Turing machines with forward evolution occuring along some spacial dimension).
It's a really hard problem showing that there is any kind of fine tuning and we certainly haven't done it yet.
More fundamentally there is a problem with the choice of measure. For some reason we imagine that the initial conditions and constants are easy to change and the physical laws aren't? Why?