Interesting points. I will respond in full at some point. Funny that we both went to Fermat's last theorem! Great minds think alike? My first thought is related to this:
>The reason you can’t conceive of zombies isn’t because of a failure of imagination — instead, it’s because you’re convinced of certain philosophical arguments that seem to render zombies inconceivable. These are analogous to proofs of Fermat’s last theorem — it’s falsity may have been conceivable absent the proof but they aren’t now that there is the proof.
I claim that even though there is now a proof, the fact that I don't have the faintest idea how it works means I can still now conceive of counterexamples (or at least I think I can), but that doesn't mean counterexamples are really possible. In principle, if we suppose a convincing physical account of consciousness, if it exists, must be roughly as complex as the proof of FLT, it's reasonable to think that no matter how correct it is, there'd still be a cognitive gap for zombies to sneak through. I.e. even if physicalism were correct, I think the same arguments against physicalism would seem equally convincing. But this all speaks more to our cognitive limitations than any objective truth imo.
Interesting points. I will respond in full at some point. Funny that we both went to Fermat's last theorem! Great minds think alike? My first thought is related to this:
>The reason you can’t conceive of zombies isn’t because of a failure of imagination — instead, it’s because you’re convinced of certain philosophical arguments that seem to render zombies inconceivable. These are analogous to proofs of Fermat’s last theorem — it’s falsity may have been conceivable absent the proof but they aren’t now that there is the proof.
I claim that even though there is now a proof, the fact that I don't have the faintest idea how it works means I can still now conceive of counterexamples (or at least I think I can), but that doesn't mean counterexamples are really possible. In principle, if we suppose a convincing physical account of consciousness, if it exists, must be roughly as complex as the proof of FLT, it's reasonable to think that no matter how correct it is, there'd still be a cognitive gap for zombies to sneak through. I.e. even if physicalism were correct, I think the same arguments against physicalism would seem equally convincing. But this all speaks more to our cognitive limitations than any objective truth imo.