Interesting points. I will respond in full at some point. Funny that we both went to Fermat's last theorem! Great minds think alike? My first thought is related to this:
>The reason you can’t conceive of zombies isn’t because of a failure of imagination — instead, it’s because you’re convinced of certain philosophical arguments that seem to render zombies inconceivable. These are analogous to proofs of Fermat’s last theorem — it’s falsity may have been conceivable absent the proof but they aren’t now that there is the proof.
I claim that even though there is now a proof, the fact that I don't have the faintest idea how it works means I can still now conceive of counterexamples (or at least I think I can), but that doesn't mean counterexamples are really possible. In principle, if we suppose a convincing physical account of consciousness, if it exists, must be roughly as complex as the proof of FLT, it's reasonable to think that no matter how correct it is, there'd still be a cognitive gap for zombies to sneak through. I.e. even if physicalism were correct, I think the same arguments against physicalism would seem equally convincing. But this all speaks more to our cognitive limitations than any objective truth imo.
But if you understood the proof, then you couldn't conceive of it actually existing given your knowledge, so you'd understand that it couldn't exist. Thus, if x is conceivable then it's possible absent a feature that renders it impossible. But what renders zombies impossible?
I think "if x is conceivable then it's possible absent a feature that renders it impossible" in the way we're discussing it would have been just as good an argument pre-proof of FLT that counterexamples to FLT are possible. Which means the whole argument hinges upon what time in history we're having it, and I don't see a good reason to imagine there will never be a good physicalist account of consciousness. But I imagine we'll disagree on that. At a certain point I think conversations like this just come down to swapping intuitions on conceivability, and either side is unlikely to convince the other.
I would be interested in empirical data on how you frame the p-zombie issue (to people who've never heard of it) impacts whether they think it's possible.
Framing 1: we explain the concept to someone the same way as Chalmers in his original treatment.
Framing 2: without any prior psychological priming, we ask someone if they can conceive of an entity with the exact same neural wiring as a human that isn't conscious.
I suspect that framing p-zombies the second way would get a lot more people saying they can't conceive of it, not that that necessarily proves anything.
Interesting points. I will respond in full at some point. Funny that we both went to Fermat's last theorem! Great minds think alike? My first thought is related to this:
>The reason you can’t conceive of zombies isn’t because of a failure of imagination — instead, it’s because you’re convinced of certain philosophical arguments that seem to render zombies inconceivable. These are analogous to proofs of Fermat’s last theorem — it’s falsity may have been conceivable absent the proof but they aren’t now that there is the proof.
I claim that even though there is now a proof, the fact that I don't have the faintest idea how it works means I can still now conceive of counterexamples (or at least I think I can), but that doesn't mean counterexamples are really possible. In principle, if we suppose a convincing physical account of consciousness, if it exists, must be roughly as complex as the proof of FLT, it's reasonable to think that no matter how correct it is, there'd still be a cognitive gap for zombies to sneak through. I.e. even if physicalism were correct, I think the same arguments against physicalism would seem equally convincing. But this all speaks more to our cognitive limitations than any objective truth imo.
But if you understood the proof, then you couldn't conceive of it actually existing given your knowledge, so you'd understand that it couldn't exist. Thus, if x is conceivable then it's possible absent a feature that renders it impossible. But what renders zombies impossible?
I think "if x is conceivable then it's possible absent a feature that renders it impossible" in the way we're discussing it would have been just as good an argument pre-proof of FLT that counterexamples to FLT are possible. Which means the whole argument hinges upon what time in history we're having it, and I don't see a good reason to imagine there will never be a good physicalist account of consciousness. But I imagine we'll disagree on that. At a certain point I think conversations like this just come down to swapping intuitions on conceivability, and either side is unlikely to convince the other.
I would be interested in empirical data on how you frame the p-zombie issue (to people who've never heard of it) impacts whether they think it's possible.
Framing 1: we explain the concept to someone the same way as Chalmers in his original treatment.
Framing 2: without any prior psychological priming, we ask someone if they can conceive of an entity with the exact same neural wiring as a human that isn't conscious.
I suspect that framing p-zombies the second way would get a lot more people saying they can't conceive of it, not that that necessarily proves anything.