Great response! These are terrible objections, lol (the claim of a Texas sharpshooter fallacy was particularly painfully bad -- I liked the royal flush analogy that you used to respond to it). I think the God-of-the-gaps objection in particular is extremely overrated. It generally ends up either creating a straw-man or begging the question (see chapter 20 of Stephen Meyer's book "Return of the God Hypothesis" for more on this).
In a nutshell, there are two basic ways to make this objection.
Firstly (the better route), you can say that the argument for God in question is an argument from ignorance, saying "we don't know what caused this, therefore God did it." This is a sound objection, but it only applies against the weakest formulations of the fine-tuning and consciousness arguments (I'm looking at you, Frank Turek). This is because the strongest formulations of these arguments are based off of what we know, not based off of ignorance. We know that God would plausibly create consciousness, and we know that evolution probably would not, for instance (as you pointed out, there are a bunch of good arguments for this). We also have strong inductive support for the principle that fine-tuned objects generally are associated with the actions of intelligent agents. So the objection only works against lame, Frank Turek type formulations of the argument.
The second version of the objection is just to say that it's simply inevitable that science will find a reductive, natural explanation of everything. But there is no plausible foundation for this other than the assumption that naturalism is true. So the argument just goes in a circle.
Either way (as Meyer nicely demonstrates in the above book) the God-of-the-gaps argument is just a terrible objection.
I think that arguments of the form "we don't know what caused X, Y has somme plausible story of why it might cause X, so X is evidence for Y," are totally fine arguments and, in fact, make up the entirety of abductive reasoning. Suppose you cite, for instance, the presence of nested hierarchies or transitional fossils or atavisms or a universal genetic code as evidence for evolution.
"Hold on," replies a creationist. "This is an evolution of the gaps fallacy. Just because we don't know what caused these things doesn't mean we can infer evolution did."
1) "It’s fine to examine something after its occurred and declare that its improbability is evidence for a theory."
The problem is that we only have access to one universe, so it's impossible to say how improbable something is. What's more, life is so rare (as a proportion of space and time) that it's hard to say that it's a desired outcome, so much as an unintended side effect.
2) The distinction of the royal flush metaphor is that we have direct experience of improbabilities of certain hands being dealt consecutively. We don't have that when it comes to universes. I've heard wayyyyy too many physicists (from Sean Carroll to Victor Stenger to Brian Greene) throw cold water on the design argument. Namely, Carroll points out that the probability is not crazy high, it's 1. Greene and Stenger point out that if you change one variable, sure, life collapses, but you could change multiple variables and life could/would emerge. I don't know what the answer is!
3) "But if there’s a God, values that produce life are likelier than other values, because it’s not astronomically unlikely that God would want to create life."
I don't see how you prove or verify this assertion in any way, and so, you're conclusion isn't very convincing.
4) "If Winegard was right, it would be impossible to ever get evidence for God—or for almost anything else. Imagine that the initial conditions of the universe spelled out “made by God.” Would that be evidence for God’s existence? Well, no initial condition is likelier than any other—so by Winegard’s logic, declaring this evidence for God would be question begging."
As someone who considers himself something of a strong Humean (which tbf is different from the historical humean), I'll admit that I don't think there's anything that could convince me of God's existence. But that's mainly because our brains intuit causality, we don't observe it. The problem with this quote is that God is something very special compared to everything else because of his lack of physical properties. It's not true that "it would be impossible to ever get evidence...for almost anything else." I have a cup in my hand, that's compelling and superior evidence to its existence in some capacity relative to God. Perhaps this is a fundamental disagreement between some versions of empiricism or intuitionism and probabilism.
5) "It simply notes that the constants we observe, that happen to produce complex structures, are likelier if God exists than if he doesn’t. This entails that they’re evidence for God."
Someone jump in here if I'm out of left field, but isn't this circular/question begging? You're proving God exists by postulating a conception of God (without evidence at least here - see point 3) to prove it's likely that God exists. All of which relies on a proof about the universe that isn't substantiated as of yet (see point 2). I think we're in the impasse similar to Pascal's Wager where people who presuppose one conclusion are completely convinced by it, while those who aren't aren't. My speculation is that either the probability isn't being communicated rigorously or the specific proof is not formulated rigorously. I.e the proof is either not elucidated or the probabilistic calculation doesn't have a number.
6) "The universe is likely infinite. Thus, there’s infinite life, which is exactly what one would expect given theism."
Again, I don't know how you can verify this.
7) "God has no reason not to waste space because he doesn’t face any resource constraints. He’s not like other agents."
I think I commented on your linked article why this wasn't a good metaphor. Basically efficiency and resilience are typical explanation for specific resource allocation (your business is efficient, your military should be resiliant), and I don't think either should apply to God, author of the universe and all powerful.
8) "A vast and explorable universe gives rise to great aesthetic goods. Exploring a huge cosmos is quite a valuable endeavor. "
This is a subjective taste. Even if it weren't most humans/living creatures are not going to enjoy the aesthetic goods of the explorable universe.
9) "Something likely has a designer if it has components that are set to extremely improbable values, where those values are much likelier to be set that way by an agent than by chance."
See point 1
10) "God doesn’t have any parts. He’s generally been conceived to have only one essential property that’s completely without limits."
See point 3
11) For argument 2.4, I'll admit that argument for goodness is a good one, but that's only because I'm a human, with human biology, and thus I naturally like and equate thinks I like as "good." This seems to anthropomorphic to me.
The 'variables' that we observe as being necessary for life do not really exist. They are numbers we plug into equations that model how the world works. Some of these models are very inaccurate guesswork, especially ones dealing with the early history of the universe. The best theory out there has no answer for why the universe started as it did. Fine Tuning is giving selective preferences to some mysteries over others. Why is the variable in the model convenient for life? God did it, obviously, science says so. What is God in our model of the universe? Well science can't answer that, honey, so stop asking.
At most, Fine Tuning (FT) argues for a designed universe by assuming **things we've never observed** might have existed if things could have been different. Umm ... Ok, but FT tells us nothing about any supposed designer (in the uncertain event of things being not as they are).
Referring to this supposed designer as "God" asserts additional things about this designer, things not necessary, and not necessarily true. "God" is after all, a very ladened name. This supposed designer is uncertain enough; designating it as "God" only compounds the uncertainty.
At most, FT supports belief in some supposed designer BUT NOT "God".
One could certainly choose to call this supposed designer "God", but one could also choose to call their left shoe "God". Calling things "God" does not make them so. Since FT does not support calling this designer "God", and since there are many, many, many gods believed in, FT does not support any particular beliefs about this supposed designer beyond the bare possibility of existence.
And even this much is AT MOST; only if FT is correct. In fact, we really don't know that our universe is designed. We don't know it even should be. Our expectations are based on incomplete information about a single instance of universes.
Re. "An evil God also fits much less well with the evidence."
For the sake of argument in this context, your assertion might be plausible. But in regard to the Problem of Evil, an evil god fits the evidence quite well.
We don't know that. The universe MIGHT BE infinite. But a physically real infinity isn't likely. No doubt the universe is VAST; much larger than we can observe. But *infinite*? Truly, physically *infinite*? That we just don't know. The energy released during the "big bang" and cosmic inflation was doubtless enormous. But actually infinite? That's a stretch.
Every thing predicated on the assumption of an infinite universe inherits that uncertainty.
I won't defend Winegard's comments about the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy, but this bit about fine tuning is not right:
"... if we assume naturalism then every value of the constants is equally likely. But if there’s a God, values that produce life are likelier than other values, because it’s not astronomically unlikely that God would want to create life. Therefore, finding out that the values of the constants fall in a tiny range needed for life is very strong evidence for God’s existence. It’s a lot likelier they’d fall in this tiny range if God exists than if God doesn’t."
The problem is: why would we think natural constants really could have values other than what they are observed to have? This is the fundamental flaw of Fine Tuning; it assumes other values were possible. We don't know that.
We don't know why the fundamental constants have the values they have.
We don't know that we've even found them all!
We don't know what "set" them at the beginning of our universe.
We don't know if they are independent, or if some constants are interconnected.
We don't know the actual effect of altering combinations of them (if such a thing is physically possible).
We have only one universe to observe; we don't know if others were possible.
To serve as "very strong evidence for God’s existence" we have to make a host of assumptions which -- as assumptions usually are! -- they are unverifiable.
Fine tuning is "very strong evidence for God’s existence" PHILOSOPHICALLY, but does any God ACTUALLY exist? We don't know and, on that question, Fine Tuning tells us nothing at all because we don't know how the universe **should be**; we can only observe how some of it **appears to be**.
> Fine tuning is "very strong evidence for God’s existence" PHILOSOPHICALLY, but does any God ACTUALLY exist? We don't know.
What? "[V]ery strong evidence" for something is reason to think it exists. That's literally what evidence means. But I think I know what's really happening.
You’re raising all of these objections because you’re sleeping with your girlfriend. Am I right? All the blood drains from your face. You are caught. You are rejecting God because you don't like God’s morality.
Philosophical arguments are not necessarily referring to anything that actually exists. Philosophical concepts don't necessarily exist in reality. FT is a strong argument IFF you accept all the assumptions. But there's no reason to do that.
Your quick resort to ad hominem gives me greater confidence in my argument! Thanks!
" I understand what it means to adopt the religious life, without believing it, for pragmatic reasons. But what the hell does it mean to treat religion as a poem or symbol? When people profess their genuine belief that Jesus rose from the dead and has literally become the wine and wafer, in what sense are they engaged in poetry? Certainly that’s not what they believe themself to be doing, and typically when people are engaged in poetry, they are aware of that fact."
I apologize for nitpicking only this one part of your post. I don't mean to engage with the main arguments but rather try to explore the nature of religious worldviews and explain why I find your view of religion so alien, unsatisfying, and bereft of the poetic and symbolic value inherent in religion. Poetry, as I understand it, tries to transcend the limitations of language from within language, a twisting or enchanting of it to reach towards the ineffable, or to prompt an emotional engagement which in some way lifts words beyond their seeming potential.
As someone positively disposed towards spirituality, mythology, and religion for their value in improving one's life, I find the literalism of religion to be a bizarre complication. I don't think we should need for the supernatural elements of religion to be literal for religion to have value, but I think a worldview rooted in values derived from religion is worth striving towards. Even your SIA argument, which you are very fond of, and which I'm interested in but unconvinced by (I won't claim I have a coherent counterargument), has seemingly no bearing or relevance to the rich tapestry of characters and mythology described in Abrahamic literature. And if the world has a creator, there's no good reason to assume any of the world's religions are more or less correct than any other; they are good stories, good poetry, and good symbolism, and at any rate profound.
Transubstantiation is perhaps the supreme example of symbolism vs. literalism. It is profoundly symbolic, but I don't understand why we should take Aristotelian arguments, like those involving ideas like substance and "accidental" qualities inhering beyond a change in substance, seriously. I understand that religion can anchor one's worldview in a way that engenders meaning, love, and appreciation of one's existence and of the world. I understand that these can be the supreme narratives by which we interpret mystical experience, or extreme/peak emotional states, or our place in the world. But I think, for the most part, literalism concerning the deeds of deities seems wrongheaded; deities are better interpreted symbolically or poetically as a kind of psychoanalysis of the world itself from a fundamentally human perspective, or as psychological elements projected onto the world, as in animism, crystallized into archetypal characters. They are certainly "real" in that sense and have profound effects upon consciousness.
Forgive me for this long ramble. I am a fan of your work (perhaps more your work on ethics than "all the God stuff") and my objection to your whole intersection with religion is more a matter of taste or intuition than an argument (as should be obvious) and so you may regard this as utterly irrelevant. Overly technical theological proofs of God's existence are, to me, almost the furthest thing from real, practiced spiritual work/religion and spiritual/mystical literature. But anyway, thank you and keep doing what you do!
Thanks for your response. It’s not just your argument for fine tuning. You made the same basic argument also for consciousness (“The only thing an argument for consciousness needs to claim is that the existence of consciousness is likelier given theism than given naturalism”).
Thoughtful piece. Obviously I do not agree with most of your arguments, but it's a good discussion to have. Thanks for writing it.
Bo Winegard
Thanks! Would you like to come on the podcast to discuss in more detail?
Great response! These are terrible objections, lol (the claim of a Texas sharpshooter fallacy was particularly painfully bad -- I liked the royal flush analogy that you used to respond to it). I think the God-of-the-gaps objection in particular is extremely overrated. It generally ends up either creating a straw-man or begging the question (see chapter 20 of Stephen Meyer's book "Return of the God Hypothesis" for more on this).
In a nutshell, there are two basic ways to make this objection.
Firstly (the better route), you can say that the argument for God in question is an argument from ignorance, saying "we don't know what caused this, therefore God did it." This is a sound objection, but it only applies against the weakest formulations of the fine-tuning and consciousness arguments (I'm looking at you, Frank Turek). This is because the strongest formulations of these arguments are based off of what we know, not based off of ignorance. We know that God would plausibly create consciousness, and we know that evolution probably would not, for instance (as you pointed out, there are a bunch of good arguments for this). We also have strong inductive support for the principle that fine-tuned objects generally are associated with the actions of intelligent agents. So the objection only works against lame, Frank Turek type formulations of the argument.
The second version of the objection is just to say that it's simply inevitable that science will find a reductive, natural explanation of everything. But there is no plausible foundation for this other than the assumption that naturalism is true. So the argument just goes in a circle.
Either way (as Meyer nicely demonstrates in the above book) the God-of-the-gaps argument is just a terrible objection.
I think that arguments of the form "we don't know what caused X, Y has somme plausible story of why it might cause X, so X is evidence for Y," are totally fine arguments and, in fact, make up the entirety of abductive reasoning. Suppose you cite, for instance, the presence of nested hierarchies or transitional fossils or atavisms or a universal genetic code as evidence for evolution.
"Hold on," replies a creationist. "This is an evolution of the gaps fallacy. Just because we don't know what caused these things doesn't mean we can infer evolution did."
That's a really good point, actually.
I don't like this argument, so it must be question-begging
1) "It’s fine to examine something after its occurred and declare that its improbability is evidence for a theory."
The problem is that we only have access to one universe, so it's impossible to say how improbable something is. What's more, life is so rare (as a proportion of space and time) that it's hard to say that it's a desired outcome, so much as an unintended side effect.
2) The distinction of the royal flush metaphor is that we have direct experience of improbabilities of certain hands being dealt consecutively. We don't have that when it comes to universes. I've heard wayyyyy too many physicists (from Sean Carroll to Victor Stenger to Brian Greene) throw cold water on the design argument. Namely, Carroll points out that the probability is not crazy high, it's 1. Greene and Stenger point out that if you change one variable, sure, life collapses, but you could change multiple variables and life could/would emerge. I don't know what the answer is!
3) "But if there’s a God, values that produce life are likelier than other values, because it’s not astronomically unlikely that God would want to create life."
I don't see how you prove or verify this assertion in any way, and so, you're conclusion isn't very convincing.
4) "If Winegard was right, it would be impossible to ever get evidence for God—or for almost anything else. Imagine that the initial conditions of the universe spelled out “made by God.” Would that be evidence for God’s existence? Well, no initial condition is likelier than any other—so by Winegard’s logic, declaring this evidence for God would be question begging."
As someone who considers himself something of a strong Humean (which tbf is different from the historical humean), I'll admit that I don't think there's anything that could convince me of God's existence. But that's mainly because our brains intuit causality, we don't observe it. The problem with this quote is that God is something very special compared to everything else because of his lack of physical properties. It's not true that "it would be impossible to ever get evidence...for almost anything else." I have a cup in my hand, that's compelling and superior evidence to its existence in some capacity relative to God. Perhaps this is a fundamental disagreement between some versions of empiricism or intuitionism and probabilism.
5) "It simply notes that the constants we observe, that happen to produce complex structures, are likelier if God exists than if he doesn’t. This entails that they’re evidence for God."
Someone jump in here if I'm out of left field, but isn't this circular/question begging? You're proving God exists by postulating a conception of God (without evidence at least here - see point 3) to prove it's likely that God exists. All of which relies on a proof about the universe that isn't substantiated as of yet (see point 2). I think we're in the impasse similar to Pascal's Wager where people who presuppose one conclusion are completely convinced by it, while those who aren't aren't. My speculation is that either the probability isn't being communicated rigorously or the specific proof is not formulated rigorously. I.e the proof is either not elucidated or the probabilistic calculation doesn't have a number.
6) "The universe is likely infinite. Thus, there’s infinite life, which is exactly what one would expect given theism."
Again, I don't know how you can verify this.
7) "God has no reason not to waste space because he doesn’t face any resource constraints. He’s not like other agents."
I think I commented on your linked article why this wasn't a good metaphor. Basically efficiency and resilience are typical explanation for specific resource allocation (your business is efficient, your military should be resiliant), and I don't think either should apply to God, author of the universe and all powerful.
8) "A vast and explorable universe gives rise to great aesthetic goods. Exploring a huge cosmos is quite a valuable endeavor. "
This is a subjective taste. Even if it weren't most humans/living creatures are not going to enjoy the aesthetic goods of the explorable universe.
9) "Something likely has a designer if it has components that are set to extremely improbable values, where those values are much likelier to be set that way by an agent than by chance."
See point 1
10) "God doesn’t have any parts. He’s generally been conceived to have only one essential property that’s completely without limits."
See point 3
11) For argument 2.4, I'll admit that argument for goodness is a good one, but that's only because I'm a human, with human biology, and thus I naturally like and equate thinks I like as "good." This seems to anthropomorphic to me.
And finally, I wrote my own review of Douthat. As a sidenote, your posts have gotten much easier to read. They're always interesting, even if I disagree with you 65% of the time. https://open.substack.com/pub/joerjames3/p/ross-douthats-lazy-argument-for-belief?r=110d4&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
it's hard to say which one of his arguments is the worst, they are all soooo terrible.
The Fine Tuning argument is weak because:
The 'variables' that we observe as being necessary for life do not really exist. They are numbers we plug into equations that model how the world works. Some of these models are very inaccurate guesswork, especially ones dealing with the early history of the universe. The best theory out there has no answer for why the universe started as it did. Fine Tuning is giving selective preferences to some mysteries over others. Why is the variable in the model convenient for life? God did it, obviously, science says so. What is God in our model of the universe? Well science can't answer that, honey, so stop asking.
At most, Fine Tuning (FT) argues for a designed universe by assuming **things we've never observed** might have existed if things could have been different. Umm ... Ok, but FT tells us nothing about any supposed designer (in the uncertain event of things being not as they are).
Referring to this supposed designer as "God" asserts additional things about this designer, things not necessary, and not necessarily true. "God" is after all, a very ladened name. This supposed designer is uncertain enough; designating it as "God" only compounds the uncertainty.
At most, FT supports belief in some supposed designer BUT NOT "God".
One could certainly choose to call this supposed designer "God", but one could also choose to call their left shoe "God". Calling things "God" does not make them so. Since FT does not support calling this designer "God", and since there are many, many, many gods believed in, FT does not support any particular beliefs about this supposed designer beyond the bare possibility of existence.
And even this much is AT MOST; only if FT is correct. In fact, we really don't know that our universe is designed. We don't know it even should be. Our expectations are based on incomplete information about a single instance of universes.
Typo at the start of 2.4? "Douthat’s last argument is that the designer might be evil or incompetent."
Thanks will fix!
Then read a much more thorugh and science-based takedown of Douthat's fine tuning argument at Richard Carrier's blog: https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/33451
"Why would the designer love evil rather than paperclips?"
Why would the designer love good rather than paperclips?
"There are an infinite number of motivations that an agent might have, so the odds of them just desiring evil are very low."
The same for desiring good: very low.
"This doesn’t apply to a good God because the good is self-motivating."
Why would evil not be self-motivating?
"Recognizing something is good (at least plausibly) gives one a motivation to bring it about" [if one desires the good.]
Recognizing something is evil (at least plausibly) gives one a motivation to bring it about, if one desires evil.
Re. "Might there be an evil designer"
Something about the argument in this section seems off. I'm not sure at this moment what it is, but still.
Regarding the argument in 2.4; How is good defined? Or evil?
Re. "An evil God also fits much less well with the evidence."
For the sake of argument in this context, your assertion might be plausible. But in regard to the Problem of Evil, an evil god fits the evidence quite well.
A matter for a different thread, I'm sure.
Re. "The universe is likely infinite."
We don't know that. The universe MIGHT BE infinite. But a physically real infinity isn't likely. No doubt the universe is VAST; much larger than we can observe. But *infinite*? Truly, physically *infinite*? That we just don't know. The energy released during the "big bang" and cosmic inflation was doubtless enormous. But actually infinite? That's a stretch.
Every thing predicated on the assumption of an infinite universe inherits that uncertainty.
I won't defend Winegard's comments about the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy, but this bit about fine tuning is not right:
"... if we assume naturalism then every value of the constants is equally likely. But if there’s a God, values that produce life are likelier than other values, because it’s not astronomically unlikely that God would want to create life. Therefore, finding out that the values of the constants fall in a tiny range needed for life is very strong evidence for God’s existence. It’s a lot likelier they’d fall in this tiny range if God exists than if God doesn’t."
The problem is: why would we think natural constants really could have values other than what they are observed to have? This is the fundamental flaw of Fine Tuning; it assumes other values were possible. We don't know that.
We don't know why the fundamental constants have the values they have.
We don't know that we've even found them all!
We don't know what "set" them at the beginning of our universe.
We don't know if they are independent, or if some constants are interconnected.
We don't know the actual effect of altering combinations of them (if such a thing is physically possible).
We have only one universe to observe; we don't know if others were possible.
To serve as "very strong evidence for God’s existence" we have to make a host of assumptions which -- as assumptions usually are! -- they are unverifiable.
Fine tuning is "very strong evidence for God’s existence" PHILOSOPHICALLY, but does any God ACTUALLY exist? We don't know and, on that question, Fine Tuning tells us nothing at all because we don't know how the universe **should be**; we can only observe how some of it **appears to be**.
> Fine tuning is "very strong evidence for God’s existence" PHILOSOPHICALLY, but does any God ACTUALLY exist? We don't know.
What? "[V]ery strong evidence" for something is reason to think it exists. That's literally what evidence means. But I think I know what's really happening.
You’re raising all of these objections because you’re sleeping with your girlfriend. Am I right? All the blood drains from your face. You are caught. You are rejecting God because you don't like God’s morality.
lol
Philosophical arguments are not necessarily referring to anything that actually exists. Philosophical concepts don't necessarily exist in reality. FT is a strong argument IFF you accept all the assumptions. But there's no reason to do that.
Your quick resort to ad hominem gives me greater confidence in my argument! Thanks!
" I understand what it means to adopt the religious life, without believing it, for pragmatic reasons. But what the hell does it mean to treat religion as a poem or symbol? When people profess their genuine belief that Jesus rose from the dead and has literally become the wine and wafer, in what sense are they engaged in poetry? Certainly that’s not what they believe themself to be doing, and typically when people are engaged in poetry, they are aware of that fact."
I apologize for nitpicking only this one part of your post. I don't mean to engage with the main arguments but rather try to explore the nature of religious worldviews and explain why I find your view of religion so alien, unsatisfying, and bereft of the poetic and symbolic value inherent in religion. Poetry, as I understand it, tries to transcend the limitations of language from within language, a twisting or enchanting of it to reach towards the ineffable, or to prompt an emotional engagement which in some way lifts words beyond their seeming potential.
As someone positively disposed towards spirituality, mythology, and religion for their value in improving one's life, I find the literalism of religion to be a bizarre complication. I don't think we should need for the supernatural elements of religion to be literal for religion to have value, but I think a worldview rooted in values derived from religion is worth striving towards. Even your SIA argument, which you are very fond of, and which I'm interested in but unconvinced by (I won't claim I have a coherent counterargument), has seemingly no bearing or relevance to the rich tapestry of characters and mythology described in Abrahamic literature. And if the world has a creator, there's no good reason to assume any of the world's religions are more or less correct than any other; they are good stories, good poetry, and good symbolism, and at any rate profound.
Transubstantiation is perhaps the supreme example of symbolism vs. literalism. It is profoundly symbolic, but I don't understand why we should take Aristotelian arguments, like those involving ideas like substance and "accidental" qualities inhering beyond a change in substance, seriously. I understand that religion can anchor one's worldview in a way that engenders meaning, love, and appreciation of one's existence and of the world. I understand that these can be the supreme narratives by which we interpret mystical experience, or extreme/peak emotional states, or our place in the world. But I think, for the most part, literalism concerning the deeds of deities seems wrongheaded; deities are better interpreted symbolically or poetically as a kind of psychoanalysis of the world itself from a fundamentally human perspective, or as psychological elements projected onto the world, as in animism, crystallized into archetypal characters. They are certainly "real" in that sense and have profound effects upon consciousness.
Forgive me for this long ramble. I am a fan of your work (perhaps more your work on ethics than "all the God stuff") and my objection to your whole intersection with religion is more a matter of taste or intuition than an argument (as should be obvious) and so you may regard this as utterly irrelevant. Overly technical theological proofs of God's existence are, to me, almost the furthest thing from real, practiced spiritual work/religion and spiritual/mystical literature. But anyway, thank you and keep doing what you do!
You reason from “likelihood” here a few times. For example, in essence you are saying:
Let A be “the universe’s initial conditions are suitable for life”.
Let B be “god exists”.
Let C be “god does not exist”.
We have observed A to be true.
You assert:
P(A|B) > P(A|C). [from "the constants we observe, that happen to produce complex structures, are likelier if God exists than if he doesn’t"]
You then claim: P(B) > P(C). [from "This entails that they’re evidence for God"]
How does the claim necessarily follow from your assertion? The best I can derive from Bayes theorem is: P(B)P(C|A) > P(C)P(B|A)
It doesn't follow. One would, of course, have to consider all the arguments rather than just fine-tuning.
Thanks for your response. It’s not just your argument for fine tuning. You made the same basic argument also for consciousness (“The only thing an argument for consciousness needs to claim is that the existence of consciousness is likelier given theism than given naturalism”).