//It’s worth noting that this is almost certainly an impossible thought experiment — one that couldn’t happen in any possible world. The moral facts are necessary — they’re true in all possible worlds. Thus, it couldn’t be the case that there were bizarre but true moral facts any more than it could turn out to be the case that 1+1 was equal to 2 in some far-off world. //
This is a non sequitur that misconstrues the objection. First, it's highly controversial whether the moral facts are necessary and a critic could object to that. But even if we assume they are necessary, the thought experiment could just ask whether you'd endorse the necessary moral facts, no matter what they were. You seem to be implicitly assuming the thought experiment doesn't accept that moral facts are necessary, which it doesn't need to do. As a result, it's a mistake to say there couldn't be any bizarre moral facts. Bizarre doesn't mean contingent or non-necessary. It could be that the necessary moral facts are bizarre, and require you to do things like scream at tables or convert all matter into bananas.
Your argument also seems to presume that you know what the substantive normative facts are, but this is something a thought experiment can challenge. That some facts may be necessary doesn't entail that they're self evident or that your judgments about them are infallible.
I think you've failed to show the thought experiment is impossible. And I don't think it is impossible. Yet I think you are at pains to argue that it's impossible even though it isn't because you don't have a good answer to it. If moral realism required us to torture everyone or spend all day screaming at tables, realists would be committed to doing so.
My friend. One only needs to read this blog to confirm that you are a moral fetishist
//It’s worth noting that this is almost certainly an impossible thought experiment — one that couldn’t happen in any possible world. The moral facts are necessary — they’re true in all possible worlds. Thus, it couldn’t be the case that there were bizarre but true moral facts any more than it could turn out to be the case that 1+1 was equal to 2 in some far-off world. //
This is a non sequitur that misconstrues the objection. First, it's highly controversial whether the moral facts are necessary and a critic could object to that. But even if we assume they are necessary, the thought experiment could just ask whether you'd endorse the necessary moral facts, no matter what they were. You seem to be implicitly assuming the thought experiment doesn't accept that moral facts are necessary, which it doesn't need to do. As a result, it's a mistake to say there couldn't be any bizarre moral facts. Bizarre doesn't mean contingent or non-necessary. It could be that the necessary moral facts are bizarre, and require you to do things like scream at tables or convert all matter into bananas.
Your argument also seems to presume that you know what the substantive normative facts are, but this is something a thought experiment can challenge. That some facts may be necessary doesn't entail that they're self evident or that your judgments about them are infallible.
I think you've failed to show the thought experiment is impossible. And I don't think it is impossible. Yet I think you are at pains to argue that it's impossible even though it isn't because you don't have a good answer to it. If moral realism required us to torture everyone or spend all day screaming at tables, realists would be committed to doing so.