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gordianus's avatar

> Most anti-realists agree that if there are irrational desires, moral realism is true. This is true because morality is about what we have impartial reason to do, and impartiality is clearly coherent, so as long as there are desire independent reasons to do certain things and care about other things, moral realism is true.

I haven't read the Parfit book you cite, but this seems incomplete: some desires are irrational because they make it more difficult to do things that you desire more. For instance, if you want just about anything in life, also desiring to kill yourself would be irrational, both because having that desire makes it more likely that you'll act on it, & because (for most humans) having that desire is unpleasant, which is also undesirable. Or, to take a less extreme example, if you want to remain healthy, it is irrational to also want to eat lots of unhealthy food. However, if we exclude this exception, this argument seems correct.

> Here are a bunch of desires that aren’t irrational if anti-realism is true,

Most of these hypotheticals are desires that a human is very unlikely to have (e.g., wanting to eat a car, being indifferent to any amount of pain felt on Tuesdays), but that doesn't mean that it's impossible for any sort of mind to have these desires & be rational in pursuing them. (Likewise, destroying the Earth to turn it into paperclips is obviously irrational to a human, but that doesn't mean that a badly designed AI couldn't have desires that would make this action rational for it.) 4 & 7 are just illustrations of the fact that, for someone who discounts the future highly, acting rationally in the present often makes it harder to get what one will want in the future.

The criticism of noncognitivism you describe seems correct. However, if you think "that moral values are too odd to be part of the fabric of reality" (as I do, since as far as I know there is no evidence that morality is "part of the fabric of reality"), then the only possible conclusion is that there is no morality independent of people's conceptions of morality. Since people do not agree on morality, different people's or societies' ideas of morality must vary; therefore, to say that something is moral or immoral makes sense only within a particular moral worldview. Given this context, most of your supposed counterexamples to subjectivism seem reasonable; e.g., Nazi Germany acted morally by its standards but immorally by our standards. The only exceptions are "Some societal practices are immoral" (most societies have some practices that are immoral by their own standards; e.g., scams & racial stereotyping in modern American society) & "when I say “we should be utilitarians,” and Kant says “we shouldn’t be utilitarians,” we’re not actually disagreeing" (since these quotes clearly refer to objective & not subjective morality).

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Apr 30, 2022
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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

Why don't you make a substack and write up a response, post the link there, and then I can write an article responding.

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Apr 29, 2022
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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

Thanks for the reply.

"/Most anti-realists agree that if there are irrational desires, moral realism is true.//

Maybe. This seems like an empirical question. Do you mean most philosophers who identify as moral antirealists, most lay antirealists, or something else?"

I have yet to see any philosopher deny this parity. If there are desire independent reasons, that seems to be sufficient for moral reasons.

"//This is true because morality is about what we have impartial reason to do//

I disagree. I do not think it’s true that morality is about what we have impartial reason to do. It is well within the purview of a moral theory that it permit or even obligate us to act in ways that are partial, e.g., one may be licensed to exercise a personal prerogative (see e.g., G. A. Cohen, who defends a finite personal prerogative to act in one’s own self-interest, which morally permits partial behavior), or ethical egoism, or moral standards whereby one has an obligation to act partially in one’s self-interest or in the interests of particular individuals or groups over other particular individuals or groups."

Well, in that case, for that to be a moral theory, I think it would have to defend that if you were rational and impartial you'd sometimes act in self interested ways. If not, then I wouldn't classify that as a moral theory. I think, for example, that Ayn Rand would be espousing a moral theory because she tried to deduce from first principles why reason alone would be sufficient to turn someone into an egoist (she was also ofc ludicrously wrong).

"Before denying whether any of these desires are “irrational,” I’d first have to know what you mean by “irrational.”

Before knowing what you mean, I am not in a position to affirm or deny this. Instead, I’d simply say I have no determinate position pending adequate clarification of what you mean."

Well, irrational would be roughly synonymous to foolish, stupid, unwise, idiotic, and out of accord with reason. I'd be using a definition that roughly tracks ordinary language. When someone says "you're being irrational," I mean roughly what I think they mean.

"“Is it irrational to jump out of a plane?”

There’s not enough information. A person could be jumping out of a plane without a parachute because they mistakenly believe they can fly. Or a person could be jumping out of a plane with a parachute because they are skydiving. In the former case, the action may be “irrational,” while in the latter it may not be.

Whether I would consider a desire “rational” or not is going to turn on whether the desire is instrumental or non-instrumental. If it’s non-instrumental, then I think it’s a category mistake to label any of these desires “irrational,” for the same reason it makes no sense to tell someone whose favorite color is blue that they’re being irrational: one’s non-instrumental desires are just psychological facts about the agent that are no more subject to evaluation as “rational” or not as their age or hair color. If it’s instrumental, then whether it’s “rational” or not would depend on a variety of considerations, such as whether its conducive to their non-instrumental desires. If e.g., eating a car was conducive to someone’s non-instrumental desires, then why would it be irrational to eat a car? What’s irrational about simply wanting to eat a car? What would it even mean for it to be “irrational”?"

Well, there's nothing irrational about having the thought that it would be fun to eat a car. What would be irrational would be aiming to eat a car if one derived no happiness from it. I think it's useful to distinguish desires and deeper aims. I'm referring to deeper aims here. So I'd like to be able to say that deontologists are making some sort of error, as are those who want to set themselves on fire, despite not finding doing so to be at all pleasant.

"Don Loeb endorses moral incoherentism; I endorse a non-semantic generalized antirealism which denies the existence of stance-independent moral facts but isn’t committed to any particular account of the meaning of ordinary terms; this position is coupled with moral quietism and metaethical indeterminacy/variability"

I'll look into the Loeb view. However, if your view is that moral statements express one of those three views, depending on context and the speaker, then you'd have to hold that the reductios to some of those views would apply. So when I utter the statement "it's immoral to torture infants," what I'm saying is false, given that I think I'm appealing to an external standard.

"These may not be common positions, but a position does not have to be common to represent a legitimate alternative. Incoherentism, the IV thesis, and moral quietism (my view) are all legitimate alternatives to the conventional three metaethical positions."

Moral quietism doesn't seem to be much of a view, it just seems to be the notion that we don't need an account of what people mean by it.

"//(a) Evaluative statements take the form of declarative sentences, rather than, say, imperatives, questions, or interjections. //

Imperatives in English are often expressed in declarative form. For instance, if a teenager is caught trying to sneak out of the house, their mother or father may say:

“You will not go to that party.”

This is phrased as a declarative sentence, yet it is best understood (and the parent might confirm this) to be an imperative, not a declarative sentence. Declarative sentences can borrow the rhetorical force of a declarative sentence as a form of emphasis. Sentences that appear declarative can and are used for non-declarative purposes."

That's true, but these are rare exceptions. Most of the time such statements are declarative. It can't be settled by a priori reasoning, but a priori reasoning can reveal its implausible implications.

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Apr 30, 2022Edited
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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

Yeah, I'll reformat it for future. Let's just discuss over call at some point, this is getting very jumbled and drawn out.

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Apr 29, 2022Edited
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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

"“Do the right thing” could mean “Doing what we both agree would be the ‘good’ thing to? Yay.” or “Act in a way consistent with an intersubjective set of normative standards we both regard as the ideal standard to emulate” or any number of nonpropositional things. Nothing puzzling about this, and it’s easy for a noncognitivist to handle. “Hurray for virtue” is even easier to handle. Firstly, this is probably not something most people would say or think. But second, even if they did, what’s the issue? Such a person could be conveying a positive attitude for some generalized notion of being courageous or generous or whatever. What’s the problem? No disrespect to Huemer, but I don’t think he’s making much of an attempt to stretch his imagination on these utterances. These can easily be understood by a noncognitivist."

If do the right thing means "do the thing that we'd agree upon under x conditions," then x being right is propositional--it describes what we'd do under x conditions.

"///Even more puzzlingly for the non-cognitivist, you can imagine appropriate contexts for such remarks as, 'We shouldn't be doing this, but I don't care; let's do it anyway'. This is perfectly intelligible, but it would be unintelligible if 'We shouldn't be doing this' either expressed an aversive emotion towards the proposed action or issued an imperative not to do it/

Again, Huemer doesn’t seem to be exercising his interpretative imagination here.

When someone says “We shouldn’t be doing this,” they could be acknowledging descriptive norms, such as norms about what society approves or disapproves of. And these norms may conflict with their desires or emotions. So this sentence could mean something like

“This action would be met with the disapproval of our community if they knew about it, but I don’t care, let’s do it anyway.” Normative language such as “shouldn’t” can be used to reference knowledge of descriptive norms rather than being, itself, an expression of the speaker’s normative standards."

But that would be propositional. That wouldn't be non cognitivist. In this case, x is good means "x is the thing that would be approved of by our community"

"Virtually every argument here falls back on brute appeals to realist intuitions, or what strikes me as an embarrassingly inadequate method for evaluating the meaning of ordinary moral claims: armchair / a priori philosophy, which, while not useless, comes nowhere close to capably establishing that cognitivism or noncognitivism is true."

Well, they are appeals to intuition. But the point of the article was that anti-realism is unintuitive.

"I don’t have realist intuitions, and I don’t think antirealists have any problems handling moral language, nor does moral language strike me as supporting realism, anyway. The best and most recent empirical research on how ordinary people respond to questions about metaethics suggests that most, at least in the United States, favor antirealist positions. Polzler and Wright found that relativism and other antirealist positions were consistently favored over realist positions across a variety of paradigms, while Davis found that, out of all the positions made available to participants, noncognitivism was the most common."

But I think people aren't great at telling the words that they're using. I think people often claim to be relativists at first, until they hear the implications of it. I don't think that studies that you agree are shoddy are necessarily a trump card to robust a priori arguments.

I know you don't, but the claim here is that many do. Ordinary moral language renders the implications of error theory, subjectivism, and non-cognitivism implausible.

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Apr 29, 2022
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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

"You can do the same with emotions, e.g., sadness. This doesn’t suggest much. In any case, the fact that they can be transformed into abstract nouns does not entail that ordinary people speak or think as cognitivists. Merely because one can do so doesn’t mean that people in fact do so, or that a commitment to doing so is implicit in the way they speak or think. Again, this is an empirical question that cannot be resolved from the armchair."

Right, and I think saying "that movie was sad" is propositional, likely subjectivist. But if most people use words like goodness and badness then that shows that they think of it as expressing propositional content. People don't have words like shutthedoorness.

"

Same problem as above. Words and concepts can be employed in different ways in different contexts. Simply because people *can* embed moral properties in ways that are suitable for propositional claims does not entail that the primary or central function of moral utterances is to make propositional claims. One simply could use them to make non-propositional utterances in their primary or central usages, or at least some of those uses, and not do so in other instances. Language is flexible and dynamic, and moral terms and concepts can be used, in principle, *both* to convey emotions without conveying propositional content, *and* to convey propositional content, with or without conveying emotions or other non-propositional content. This is why “You will not go to the party” *could* be used as a declarative sentence (e.g., a prediction) or an imperative (e.g., “don’t go to the party”)."

But if it seems semantically propositional, that seems like good evidence that it's thought to be propositional. This wouldn't be good evidence that if you asked people if moral statements were propositional, after explaining the meaning of terms, they'd say yes. Instead, it's good evidence that based on actual usage, people treat it as propositional. If people didn't treat it as propositional, it's unclear how they would intelligibly ask things like "is this moral?"

"The terms and concepts we employ in everyday discourse don’t have fixed, rigid meanings. Their meanings unfold in the relevant contexts of deployment. When philosophers sit around thinking about moral language, they notice that moral language is frequently conveyed using the structure of a declarative sentence. On reflection, nothing seems odd about talking about the properties of “rightness” or “wrongness” … to philosophers, who’ve read Plato and Aristotle and are used to talking about “properties.” But how do they know, and why would they presume, that the way *they* think about these topics, while sitting in the grad student lounge or in a classroom, is reflective of the way most ordinary people out in the world use moral language in everyday contexts?"

I hear people describe acts rightness--they don't use it that much but it's a thing people say, even lay people.

"If you want to know what people mean when they say things like “murder is wrong,” why on earth would you opt to use the methods of armchair philosophy? Why not use the methods of the social sciences, which are specifically intended for the purpose of gathering systematic data about exactly these sorts of questions."

We should use both. However, I think a priori reasoning can figure out what people mean even if they don't realize they mean it. People will often say they're cultural relativists, until they realize its implications. Most people don't have intelligible fleshed out views about how they use particular moral language.

"Just the same, it could turn out that people use moral claims to express imperatives or emotions 85% of the time, and to make propositional claims 15% of the time, and this is all that would be necessary for (a) - (g) to make sense, yet still not demonstrate that the central, primary, or exclusive function of moral utterances is to make propositional claims."

But it seems like in most uses of moral language that are intended to be moral (So this would rule out sentences like "this is a good ruler," or "that cake tasted good,") if you ask "is that good," it seems people would find that intelligible. If a person says something like "abortion is moral," and you say "do you really think it's moral," they would understand the question (though perhaps being annoyed by your repetitivenesss).