This is a rare case where antirealists and moral non-naturalists can at least agree that moral naturalism isn't able to do what we'd want an account of realism to accomplish. Naturalist accounts strike me as, at best, trivial, consisting of little more than labeling some set of descriptive facts "moral."
I could see some naturalists try to push back by insisting that they're not trying to offer an *analytic* (or conceptual) reduction, but merely a *metaphysical* one, which need not be transparent to ordinary language users.
This is a rare case where antirealists and moral non-naturalists can at least agree that moral naturalism isn't able to do what we'd want an account of realism to accomplish. Naturalist accounts strike me as, at best, trivial, consisting of little more than labeling some set of descriptive facts "moral."
Great post!
I could see some naturalists try to push back by insisting that they're not trying to offer an *analytic* (or conceptual) reduction, but merely a *metaphysical* one, which need not be transparent to ordinary language users.
Even so, I think something in this vicinity -- the challenge of how to account for the substantiveness of boundary disputes -- provides the most fundamental reason to reject naturalism (about both normativity and qualia): https://www.philosophyetc.net/2016/03/the-basic-reason-to-reject-naturalism.html