What about this: The reason that limits the possibility of god is that if god was possible he'd be necessary and thus actual. God doesn't exist so therefore he isn't possible.
I mean sure, it presumes that God doesn't exist but so what? I'm not trying to argue for the claim merely show it doesn't lead to a contradiction -- so I can assume it and show it implies a reason for limitation of possibility exists. And water is necessarily H2O shows you must be able to include facts about what's actual as reasons.
I think this shows the argument really needs formalization in some modal logic with a clear explication of what counts as a reason.
You aren't being sufficiently careful in explicating your notion of possibility. Sure, if you have a syntactic notion (being possible is a property of something like sentences) then the bit about limits on possibility needing a reason isn't implausible. But once you try and fully spell that out it doesn't even really make sense to talk about a being which exists necessarily if it exists. Possibility talk is all just talk about certain descriptions so you just can't say: Is it possible there is a being x with properties...and s.t. if x is possible then x is necessary. That's because possibility isn't a property of things but descriptions.
OTOH exactly the reason you might think a semantic account is preferable is to not collapse it all down into some formal sentence properties ...but doing that is giving up on the restrictions need a reason in the sense you need (still might have a reason like...just not how possible world facts are but u need reason to mean an argument we can identify)
1. To ensure validity, I am reading (1) as implicitly including the premise that whatever is impossible has some limit on its possibility.
2. Reminds me of an argument from possible explanations of limits. E.g., Limits on possibility *possibly* have an explanation, but there is no possible explanation of a limit on God's possibility (else: (i) limits on perfection possibly have an explanation, but (ii) there cannot be a non-circular explanation of imperfection itself unless possibly, something is perfect...).
I'd like to think more about it! (There's territory here to explore.)
3. I agree that the Godelian ontological argument is more convincing than this one, though I prefer versions that don't rely on explosion, but just rely on necessary existence being a positive property if one is a perfect being.
“I’ve been sellin’ my soul, workin’ all day, overtime hours, for bullsh*t pay-off” - Anselm, paraphrasing Oliver Anthony, when he realised his argument falsely pre-supposed Meinongianism.
More seriously, you say: “If limits require explanation, then there can’t be a necessary limited thing, because its limits would need something else to explain it.”
Why can’t the limits be explained by some deeper (metaphysically necessary) fact about the fully-fleshed-out nature of a perfect being? (An explanation we wouldn’t expect to detect a priori, given that a perfect being is about as far-removed from the metaphysically humdrum as it’s possible to be.)
I think they could. But its fundamental nature can't be limited. A perfect island, for example, has a limited fundamental nature because islands are, by their nature, limited.
What about this: The reason that limits the possibility of god is that if god was possible he'd be necessary and thus actual. God doesn't exist so therefore he isn't possible.
I mean sure, it presumes that God doesn't exist but so what? I'm not trying to argue for the claim merely show it doesn't lead to a contradiction -- so I can assume it and show it implies a reason for limitation of possibility exists. And water is necessarily H2O shows you must be able to include facts about what's actual as reasons.
I think this shows the argument really needs formalization in some modal logic with a clear explication of what counts as a reason.
You aren't being sufficiently careful in explicating your notion of possibility. Sure, if you have a syntactic notion (being possible is a property of something like sentences) then the bit about limits on possibility needing a reason isn't implausible. But once you try and fully spell that out it doesn't even really make sense to talk about a being which exists necessarily if it exists. Possibility talk is all just talk about certain descriptions so you just can't say: Is it possible there is a being x with properties...and s.t. if x is possible then x is necessary. That's because possibility isn't a property of things but descriptions.
OTOH exactly the reason you might think a semantic account is preferable is to not collapse it all down into some formal sentence properties ...but doing that is giving up on the restrictions need a reason in the sense you need (still might have a reason like...just not how possible world facts are but u need reason to mean an argument we can identify)
Neat!
Reflections:
1. To ensure validity, I am reading (1) as implicitly including the premise that whatever is impossible has some limit on its possibility.
2. Reminds me of an argument from possible explanations of limits. E.g., Limits on possibility *possibly* have an explanation, but there is no possible explanation of a limit on God's possibility (else: (i) limits on perfection possibly have an explanation, but (ii) there cannot be a non-circular explanation of imperfection itself unless possibly, something is perfect...).
I'd like to think more about it! (There's territory here to explore.)
3. Not sure it's the *best* ontological argument. ;) Cf. https://worldviewdesign.substack.com/p/new-thoughts-about-my-new-godelian.
1. yes, that's right.
2. interesting!
3. I agree that the Godelian ontological argument is more convincing than this one, though I prefer versions that don't rely on explosion, but just rely on necessary existence being a positive property if one is a perfect being.
“I’ve been sellin’ my soul, workin’ all day, overtime hours, for bullsh*t pay-off” - Anselm, paraphrasing Oliver Anthony, when he realised his argument falsely pre-supposed Meinongianism.
More seriously, you say: “If limits require explanation, then there can’t be a necessary limited thing, because its limits would need something else to explain it.”
Why can’t the limits be explained by some deeper (metaphysically necessary) fact about the fully-fleshed-out nature of a perfect being? (An explanation we wouldn’t expect to detect a priori, given that a perfect being is about as far-removed from the metaphysically humdrum as it’s possible to be.)
I think they could. But its fundamental nature can't be limited. A perfect island, for example, has a limited fundamental nature because islands are, by their nature, limited.