“For example, the modal non-rationalist (or, following Ayn Rand's naming conventions, irrationalist) thinks that there’s no deeper account of why zombies, ghosts, or inverted qualia scenarios are impossible.”
This is not, in fact, what all those who deny a freewheeling modal rationalism think. Many don’t.
O’Connail gives a pretty standard argument here for why the conceivability of zombies doesn’t show that they’re possible. ( https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01665-6 ). Why does his argument commit him to the view you ascribe to all mitigated modal skeptics?
“For example, the modal non-rationalist (or, following Ayn Rand's naming conventions, irrationalist) thinks that there’s no deeper account of why zombies, ghosts, or inverted qualia scenarios are impossible.”
This is not, in fact, what all those who deny a freewheeling modal rationalism think. Many don’t.
O’Connail gives a pretty standard argument here for why the conceivability of zombies doesn’t show that they’re possible. ( https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-021-01665-6 ). Why does his argument commit him to the view you ascribe to all mitigated modal skeptics?