At the object level, parochialism is not obviously false.
It can't be disputed that a much de facto morailty relates to human biology. For instance, human infants are highly dependent on their parents, so child abandonment is a horrible crime. But many species leave their young to fend for themselves.
Is it really so clear that moral naturalists will have to characterize the primary intension of moral terms in a way that makes them vulnerable to open-question-style objections? How do moral naturalists usually go about determining the meanings of moral terms? Do they say the meanings are fixed by the Ramseyfication of the conjunction of a bunch of moral platitudes or something?
> that somehow moral naturalism would be unable to accommodate morality in Flatland—which would be a pretty hilarious argument.
I was expecting this from your title and now I feel robbed.
As for your two arguments against synthetic naturalism… I am very confused. Here are a few very confused thoughts.
> To tell if some alternative earth has water, you need to know facts about the actual earth
No. You just need to know facts about water. Location and the “actual earth” have nothing to do with it. The meaning of “Water” is a universal thing, it has nothing to do with location. We discover the properties of “water” once, then compare other things to those properties to determine if they are in fact water.
> To tell whether some act is right, committed on another world, you do not need to know where you are located
1. But this is just like the laws of physics. They are certainly discovered over time, but once discovered they are constant. Why not say the same is true of morality?
2. It could very well matter that you are somewhere else. If moral facts about acts on earth have been discovered, those moral facts could well vary based on location. For example on Earth trapping someone in a bubble and siphoning 99% of their atmosphere is bad, but on Venus it could be good. If you are instead talking about an act “all things considered” in a way that takes into account location, then I fail to see how you can decry naturalism for also requiring one to reconfirm moral facts based on location. Location’s impact is probably slight, but why is this an argument?
You say that
> I know this is the actually existing clear liquid that fills lakes and rivers and has such and such nutritional properties akin to water, but is it water?
is an absurd thing to ask, while
> yes, I know that’s what actually existing speakers approve of, but is it right.
Is reasonable to say
But I think there are two problems.
1. Both of these seem equal. One could suspiciously ask if the substance filling the lakes and looking like water *really* is water. Maybe they think it’s a simulation or something. That’s reasonable. Someone could also question if what a majority of the speakers say is *really* what a majority says… maybe they thing the elections are rigged
2. The examples you’ve chosen seem sorta persuasive because you chose sentences that appear incorrect or correct based on our social contexts independent of this meta question. No one asks “is this thing that acts exactly like water really water” because when would that ever come up. On the other hand many people say “a majority of speakers is wrong about morality!” because we live in polarized times. If your example was changed to be
“Is this good colored bar with the same weight and density and surface chemical properties as gold REALLY gold”
Versus
“Is this thing which makes the word better from an impartial point of view REALLY moral”
At the object level, parochialism is not obviously false.
It can't be disputed that a much de facto morailty relates to human biology. For instance, human infants are highly dependent on their parents, so child abandonment is a horrible crime. But many species leave their young to fend for themselves.
Is it really so clear that moral naturalists will have to characterize the primary intension of moral terms in a way that makes them vulnerable to open-question-style objections? How do moral naturalists usually go about determining the meanings of moral terms? Do they say the meanings are fixed by the Ramseyfication of the conjunction of a bunch of moral platitudes or something?
> that somehow moral naturalism would be unable to accommodate morality in Flatland—which would be a pretty hilarious argument.
I was expecting this from your title and now I feel robbed.
As for your two arguments against synthetic naturalism… I am very confused. Here are a few very confused thoughts.
> To tell if some alternative earth has water, you need to know facts about the actual earth
No. You just need to know facts about water. Location and the “actual earth” have nothing to do with it. The meaning of “Water” is a universal thing, it has nothing to do with location. We discover the properties of “water” once, then compare other things to those properties to determine if they are in fact water.
> To tell whether some act is right, committed on another world, you do not need to know where you are located
1. But this is just like the laws of physics. They are certainly discovered over time, but once discovered they are constant. Why not say the same is true of morality?
2. It could very well matter that you are somewhere else. If moral facts about acts on earth have been discovered, those moral facts could well vary based on location. For example on Earth trapping someone in a bubble and siphoning 99% of their atmosphere is bad, but on Venus it could be good. If you are instead talking about an act “all things considered” in a way that takes into account location, then I fail to see how you can decry naturalism for also requiring one to reconfirm moral facts based on location. Location’s impact is probably slight, but why is this an argument?
You say that
> I know this is the actually existing clear liquid that fills lakes and rivers and has such and such nutritional properties akin to water, but is it water?
is an absurd thing to ask, while
> yes, I know that’s what actually existing speakers approve of, but is it right.
Is reasonable to say
But I think there are two problems.
1. Both of these seem equal. One could suspiciously ask if the substance filling the lakes and looking like water *really* is water. Maybe they think it’s a simulation or something. That’s reasonable. Someone could also question if what a majority of the speakers say is *really* what a majority says… maybe they thing the elections are rigged
2. The examples you’ve chosen seem sorta persuasive because you chose sentences that appear incorrect or correct based on our social contexts independent of this meta question. No one asks “is this thing that acts exactly like water really water” because when would that ever come up. On the other hand many people say “a majority of speakers is wrong about morality!” because we live in polarized times. If your example was changed to be
“Is this good colored bar with the same weight and density and surface chemical properties as gold REALLY gold”
Versus
“Is this thing which makes the word better from an impartial point of view REALLY moral”
The intuitions flip.