William Lane Craig does not think that the problem of evil is a decisive objection to theism. This is one area about which he is disastrously wrong. He wrote an article explaining why he doesn’t find the argument persuasive that both totally missed the force of the argument and trivialized it beyond recognition, in a way that was both condescending and bad philosophy. It seriously reminded me of someone who claims that evolution is just a theory, and that if it’s true, why are there apes still?
The problem of evil is certainly the greatest obstacle to belief in the existence of God. When I ponder both the extent and depth of suffering in the world, whether due to man’s inhumanity to man or to natural disasters, then I must confess that I find it hard to believe that God exists. No doubt many of you have felt the same way. Perhaps we should all become atheists.
But that’s a pretty big step to take. How can we be sure that God does not exist? Perhaps there’s a reason why God permits all the evil in the world. Perhaps it somehow all fits into the grand scheme of things, which we can only dimly discern, if at all. How do we know?
As a Christian theist, I’m persuaded that the problem of evil, terrible as it is, does not in the end constitute a disproof of the existence of God. On the contrary, in fact, I think that Christian theism is man’s last best hope of solving the problem of evil.
In order to explain why I feel this way, it will be helpful to draw some distinctions to keep our thinking clear. First, we must distinguish between the intellectual problem of evil and the emotional problem of evil. The intellectual problem of evil concerns how to give a rational explanation of how God and evil can co-exist. The emotional problem of evil concerns how to dissolve people’s emotional dislike of a God who would permit suffering.
This is obvious well poisoning. Dividing the problem into an intellectual version and an emotional version before addressing it is not productive. It would be silly to say “There’s an intellectual version of theism and also an emotional version,” because pointing out that people are driven by emotion to hold certain views is not unique to the problem of evil and is not productive for analyzing ideas.
He says God might have a reason that we don’t know about. This runs into a ton of problems and is a terrible explanation. Okay, maybe Newtonian theory can explain all of the data that disconfirm it. However, if there are quite literally millions of things that it doesn’t predict, then it’s a terrible explanation. I give a list of evils that theism can’t explain at all here.
Now let’s look first at the intellectual problem of evil. There are two versions of this problem: first, the logical problem of evil, and second, the probabilistic problem of evil.
According to the logical problem of evil, it is logically impossible for God and evil to co-exist. If God exists, then evil cannot exist. If evil exists, then God cannot exist. Since evil exists, it follows that God does not exist.
But the problem with this argument is that there’s no reason to think that God and evil are logically incompatible. There’s no explicit contradiction between them. But if the atheist means there’s some implicit contradiction between God and evil, then he must be assuming some hidden premises which bring out this implicit contradiction. But the problem is that no philosopher has ever been able to identify such premises. Therefore, the logical problem of evil fails to prove any inconsistency between God and evil.
But more than that: we can actually prove that God and evil are logically consistent. You see, the atheist presupposes that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world. But this assumption is not necessarily true. So long as it is even possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, it follows that God and evil are logically consistent. And, certainly, this does seem at least logically possible. Therefore, I’m very pleased to be able to report that it is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers that the logical problem of evil has been dissolved. The co-existence of God and evil is logically possible.
This is a common apologist talking point. However, we have no reason to think it’s true. Many like Sobel, Mackie, and many others have had compelling versions of the problem of evil. The notion that no one takes it seriously is just absurd. Evil is prima facie bad, so it can only be justified for a greater good. Yet an omnipotent being doesn’t need evil for a greater good. He is omnipotent and can bring about the greater good without needing the evil.
Generally people say that they think that the evidential problem of evil is a better argument than the logical problem of evil. However, people don’t usually say that the problem of evil is dead. That there would be no evil if there were a God would be accepted by all utilitarians, most deontologists (threshold deontologists would hold that there would be no evil because God could make an infinitely good hedonic paradise), and any philosophical pluralist. So now, it’s not agreed that the problem is bunk. People just usually say that the proposition
A) God couldn’t have a reason for creating evil
is harder to defend than
B) God wouldn’t have a reason for killing tens of thousands of children every day through disease, creating pedophilic sexual urges, making humans be able to undergo immense agony for weeks on end while they’re being tortured, and causing horrific suffering on animals for billions of years before humans were ever around.
The fact that there isn’t a contradiction in the definitions of the words does not mean that the ideas can’t be in tension. Craig would hold that God is necessary, meaning that God would necessarily create this world. Thus, he thinks there couldn’t be a different world from this one—such as a world of pure torture—even though that seems imminently metaphysically possible.
But we’re not out of the woods yet. For now we confront the probabilistic problem of evil. According to this version of the problem, the co-existence of God and evil is logically possible, but nevertheless it’s highly improbable. The extent and depth of evil in the world is so great that it’s improbable that God could have morally sufficient reasons for permitting it. Therefore, given the evil in the world, it’s improbable that God exists.
Now this is a much more powerful argument, and therefore I want to focus our attention on it. In response to this version of the problem of evil, I want to make three main points:
1. We are not in a good position to assess the probability of whether God has morally sufficient reasons for the evils that occur. As finite persons, we are limited in time, space, intelligence, and insight. But the transcendent and sovereign God sees the end from the beginning and providentially orders history so that His purposes are ultimately achieved through human free decisions. In order to achieve His ends, God may have to put up with certain evils along the way. Evils which appear pointless to us within our limited framework may be seen to have been justly permitted within God’s wider framework. To borrow an illustration from a developing field of science, Chaos Theory, scientists have discovered that certain macroscopic systems, for example, weather systems or insect populations, are extraordinarily sensitive to the tiniest perturbations. A butterfly fluttering on a branch in West Africa may set in motion forces which would eventually issue in a hurricane over the Atlantic Ocean. Yet it is impossible in principle for anyone observing that butterfly palpitating on a branch to predict such an outcome. The brutal murder of an innocent man or a child’s dying of leukemia could produce a sort of ripple effect through history such that God’s morally sufficient reason for permitting it might not emerge until centuries later and perhaps in another land. When you think of God’s providence over the whole of history, I think you can see how hopeless it is for limited observers to speculate on the probability that God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting a certain evil. We’re just not in a good position to assess such probabilities.
This has already been addressed earlier in the article and in other articles (these two in particular. The chaos theory stuff doesn’t make sense because God is infinitely powerful, so he can bring about any good, without needing horrific suffering. Additionally, if a child dying of cancer produces ripple effects that are overall good for the world, then we shouldn’t try to prevent child cancer. It does, after all, prevent positive ripple effects. This also can be used by the naturalist to address all arguments for God. We’re not in a good position to understand the universe—so there goes all arguments for God!
2. The Christian faith entails doctrines that increase the probability of the co-existence of God and evil. In so doing, these doctrines decrease any improbability of God’s existence thought to issue from the existence of evil. What are some of these doctrines? Let me mention four:
a. The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God. One reason that the problem of evil seems so puzzling is that we tend to think that if God exists, then His goal for human life is happiness in this world. God’s role is to provide comfortable environment for His human pets. But on the Christian view this is false. We are not God’s pets, and man’s end is not happiness in this world, but the knowledge of God, which will ultimately bring true and everlasting human fulfillment. Many evils occur in life which maybe utterly pointless with respect to the goal of producing human happiness in this world, but they may not be unjustified with respect to producing the knowledge of God. Innocent human suffering provides an occasion for deeper dependency and trust in God, either on the part of the sufferer or those around him. Of course, whether God's purpose is achieved through our suffering will depend on our response. Do we respond with anger and bitterness toward God, or do we turn to Him in faith for strength to endure?
This is a terrible explanation!!
A) If this is true, then we shouldn’t try to eradicate suffering because it might make the world better—causing us to turn to God.
B) Utilitarianism is obviously correct, as I’ve spent many articles arguing.
C) This can’t explain why God doesn’t reveal himself. If he uses evils to let people know about him, why doesn’t he just give us knowledge of him?
D) This can’t explain any of the specific facts about evil that I’ve given in my article about the problem of evil and the facts that need to be explained.
E) This can’t explain why God doesn’t reveal to us his purpose. If we understood his purpose then far fewer people would use evil to turn away from God!!
F) If so many turn away in bitterness from God, then God isn’t doing a great job.
G) If God wants to be known, yet most people don’t know the true God, then God is doing a terrible job. An omnipotent God wouldn’t fail in his modest goal to convince beings with 0% of his cognitive ability to embrace him.
H) This can’t explain animal suffering.
I) This can’t explain the spatiotemporal contingency of evil.
b. Mankind is in a state of rebellion against God and His purpose. Rather than submit to and worship God, people rebel against God and go their own way and so find themselves alienated from God, morally guilty before Him, and groping in spiritual darkness, pursuing false gods of their own making. The terrible human evils in the world are testimony to man’s depravity in this state of spiritual alienation from God. The Christian is not surprised at the human evil in the world; on the contrary, he expects it. The Bible says that God has given mankind over to the sin it has chosen; He does not interfere to stop it, but lets human depravity run its course. This only serves to heighten mankind’s moral responsibility before God, as well as our wickedness and our need of forgiveness and moral cleansing.
This is once again a terrible explanation.
A) It can’t explain why God makes natural suffering that’s been going on for billions of years before humans were ever around.
B) It can’t explain why God punishes the innocent. Maybe some humans deserve to suffer but babies certainly don’t.
C) It can’t explain natural facts that exacerbate suffering such as pedophilic sexual urges, malaria, flesh eating parasites, and humans capacity to experience pain continuously as they’re tortured.
D) It can’t explain why God’s solution to sin is to bring horrific suffering into the world. What kind of a God sees that humans sin and then creates malaria just to spite them, or sets up a mechanism to create malaria in response to sin.
E) Why doesn’t God make everyone super moral? If God created us evil, he can’t be mad at us.
F) Free will+ God are incoherent, because God knows everything we’ll do in advance.
G) This can’t explain our lack of moral knowledge. Maybe God wouldn’t prevent us from doing evil, but why would he make us do evil by accident, when we’re trying to do good but are morally ignorant.
H) This also can’t explain why God creates evils that thwart good aims. Why does God, for example, make infectious disease that punishes people for interacting with others. Surely that’s a good thing? Why wouldn’t God promote it?
c. The knowledge of God spills over into eternal life. In the Christian view, this life is not all there is. Jesus promised eternal life to all who place their trust in him as their Savior and Lord. In the afterlife God will reward those who have borne their suffering in courage and trust with an eternal life of unspeakable joy. The apostle Paul, who wrote much of the New Testament, lived a life of incredible suffering. Yet he wrote, “We do not lose heart. For this slight, momentary affliction is preparing us for an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, because we look not to the things that are seen, but to the things that are unseen, for the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal” (II Cor. 4:16-18). Paul imagines a scale, as it were, in which all the sufferings of this life are placed on one side, while on the other side is placed the glory that God will bestow on his children in heaven. The weight of glory is so great that it is literally beyond comparison with the suffering. Moreover, the longer we spend in eternity the more the sufferings of this life shrink toward an infinitesimal moment. That’s why Paul could call them “a slight and momentary affliction”—they were simply overwhelmed by the ocean of divine eternity and joy which God lavishes on those who trust Him.
This is also a terrible defense.
The reward that God gives many of us, who are atheists, Muslims, or Jews, is eternal conscious torment. God allows the holocaust victims to be punished in life for things they didn’t do by the Nazi’s, and then he burns them forever after they die. That way, they experience infinitely more torture at God’s hands than at the hands of the Nazis. Sounds moral.
This isn’t an explanation of things. If I claimed to be the worlds best ever chess player and then lost my first ten games, the fact that there are infinite games left, where I claim I’ll play perfectly, is not an explanation of my terrible play the first ten games. The same is true here.
This could sanction any evil, because all suffering will be outweighed in the afterlife. Thus, by this standard, a serial killer who brings a few people to Jesus would be overall good for the world.
This can’t explain animal suffering, because animals won’t be infinitely repaid in the afterlife.
d. The knowledge of God is an incommensurable good. To know God, the source of infinite goodness and love, is an incomparable good, the fulfillment of human existence. The sufferings of this life cannot even be compared to it. Thus, the person who knows God, no matter what he suffers, no matter how awful his pain, can still say, “God is good to me,” simply by virtue of the fact that he knows God, an incomparable good.’’
This can’t explain why God hides his existence from so many people, why those who won’t know God still suffer, or any of the other evils. It just asserts that there will be lots of good things, so shut up and stop complaining! This, however, is no justification for allowing millions of babies to die in horrific painful ways.
3. Relative to the full scope of the evidence, God’s existence is probable. Probabilities are relative to what background information you consider. For example, suppose Joe is a student at the University of Colorado. Now suppose that we are informed that 95% of University of Colorado students ski. Relative to this information it is highly probable that Joe skis. But then suppose we also learn that Joe is an amputee and that 95% of amputees at the University of Colorado do not ski. Suddenly the probability of Joe’s being a skier has diminished drastically!
I’ve already addressed Craig’s shoddy case here.
He then does the typical apologist trick.
Thus, paradoxically, evil actually serves to establish the existence of God. For if objective values cannot exist without God and objective values do exist—as is evident from the reality of evil—, then it follows inescapably that God exists. Thus, although evil in one sense calls into question God’s existence, in a more fundamental sense it demonstrates God’s existence, since evil could not exist without God.’
This is false for two reasons.
The moral argument is a terrible argument that serious philosophers don’t take seriously.
This isn’t an answer to the problem of evil. If theism entails that objective morality exists, and if the existence of objective morality and a perfect being are incompatible with theism, then that would mean that evil disproves theism. It’s an internal critique.
But that takes us to the emotional problem of evil. I think that most people who reject God because of the evil in the world don’t really do so because of intellectual difficulties; rather it’s an emotional problem. They just don’t like a God who would permit them or others to suffer and therefore they want nothing to do with Him. Theirs is simply an atheism of rejection. Does the Christian faith have something to say to these people?
It certainly does! For it tells us that God is not a distant Creator or impersonal ground of being, but a loving Father who shares our sufferings and hurts with us. Prof. Plantinga has written,
As the Christian sees things, God does not stand idly by, coolly observing the suffering of His creatures. He enters into and shares our suffering. He endures the anguish of seeing his son, the second person of the Trinity, consigned to the bitterly cruel and shameful death of the cross. Christ was prepared to endure the agonies of hell itself . . . in order to overcome sin, and death, and the evils that afflict our world, and to confer on us a life more glorious that we can imagine. He was prepared to suffer on our behalf, to accept suffering of which we can form no conception.
You see, Jesus endured a suffering beyond all comprehension: He bore the punishment for the sins of the whole world. None of us can comprehend that suffering. Though He was innocent, He voluntarily took upon himself the punishment that we deserved. And why? Because He loves us. How can we reject Him who gave up everything for us?
When we comprehend His sacrifice and His love for us, this puts the problem of evil in an entirely different perspective. For now we see clearly that the true problem of evil is the problem of our evil. Filled with sin and morally guilty before God, the question we face is not how God can justify Himself to us, but how we can be justified before Him.
So paradoxically, even though the problem of evil is the greatest objection to the existence of God, at the end of the day God is the only solution to the problem of evil. If God does not exist, then we are lost without hope in a life filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering. God is the final answer to the problem of evil, for He redeems us from evil and takes us into the everlasting joy of an incommensurable good, fellowship with Himself.
The fact that God himself suffers doesn’t justify the suffering of others. If a person helps lots of people—no part of the situation would be improved if they subsequently get tortured on a cross. After I donate money to ea organizations, the world would be no better if I then died on a cross, to forgive sins.
Craig’s solution here is just a guilt trip. Sure, you think that it’s bad that your four year old died of Leukemia in your arms, but I also suffered, so stop complaining. Oh also, your 4 year old who died is in a better place now, so the world is actually better because of this fact.
Suffice it to say, my emotional qualms about evil are not settled.