The Phenomenal Object Argument

Consciousness is non-physical

When I show up at nerd gatherings—Caplacon, Manifest, EA global—the opinion most likely to get me pelted with eggs is my view that the mind isn’t physical. The world is composed of two very different sorts of things—physical stuff, made of atoms, composed to form increasingly complex structures; and the mind, composed of thoughts, feelings, and sensations. Neither reduces to the other.

I’ve given a list of arguments for this position a few years ago, and have not really changed position since. As far as I can tell, physicalism is wholly unworkable, a bit like the position that simply putting blocks together in the right formation will eventually get you the number two. The physical world is composed of stuff—of structure and function—that produces only more complicated structure and function through its behavior. But consciousness is not about structure and function—it’s about what it’s like to be in a certain state, not what the state is.

Recently, when I was at Caplacon, a friend of mine gave an argument for dualism that seems to be correct. I’m less sure that this argument works than the others, so don’t bet your life savings on it succeeding (people often bet their life savings on the conclusions of my articles), but I think it’s likely correct. If it’s right, it establishes that consciousness is non-physical.

Suppose that I have the experience of imagining a purple square. There is an image of a purple square that I see in my mind’s eye. Question: where is the purple square?

I don’t think the purple square is anywhere physical. It’s in the mind. But the physicalist, so long as they’re explaining rather than eliminating consciousness, thinks that the purple square exists somewhere in the physical world. So the question is: where?

The most common answer is that it exists in the brain. But this is flatly false—if we open up a brain, we find neurons, not purple squares. Opening up a brain never turns up a purple square! If, however, the purple square existed, it would have to be somewhere. However, there’s no place that it could be.

Consider an analogy. Suppose we see a field of rice. You claim that a buffalo is constituted by the field of rice—that a buffalo exists, yet is nothing more than bits of the field of rice arranged in particular ways. I ask you “so then where is the buffalo?” Your response is to simply say “in the field of rice.”

If we go through the field of rice and never find a buffalo, then the buffalo can’t simply be particular arrangements of a field of rice. If we go through the brain and never find a purple square, then the purple square in my mind can’t just be particular arrangements of atoms. Now, you can deny the purple square just as you deny the buffalo, but that would involve denying the existence of consciousness.

Mental states are private—on the outside, you can’t see what’s being experienced on the inside. But physical states are not private; a third party can observe any physical state. They therefore cannot be identical. The experience of imagining a purple square can’t simply be composed of atoms, for you can see the composition of atoms by looking—you can never see the experience of imagining a purple square simply by looking.

I think this refutes physicalism, but I’m not positive. The argument formalized is:

1. If physicalism is true, then when I imagine a purple square, the purple square is part of the physical world.

2. If the purple square is part of the physical world, it’s either part of my brain or part of the physical world outside of my brain.

3. The purple square isn’t part of my brain.

4. The purple square isn’t part of the physical world outside of my brain.

5. Therefore, physicalism isn’t true.

The only controversial premise, so far as I can tell, is 3. But we can support it by:

1. If the purple square were part of my brain, you’d see it when you looked at my brain.

2. If you looked at my brain, you wouldn’t see the purple square.

3. So the purple square isn’t part of my brain.

The argument also highlights another absurd feature of physicalism: it implies that pain, pleasure, love, and the experience of paprika are made of atoms. But this is silly—thoughts aren’t made of atoms, they don’t have a size or a shape or a weight. So physicalism must be false.