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funplings's avatar

With veganism I don't think people are getting "negatively polarized" - most people eat meat to begin with, and don't want to give up their meat-eating, so they're predisposed to dismiss vegetarians/vegans and fixate on the annoying ones as a justification for not doing what they already didn't want to do in the first place. And I suspect something similar is happening politically, though perhaps to a different degree.

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Noah McKay's avatar

Good take! But here are some objections to consider:

(1) That those who believe p are unlikeable can be evidence against p, given that those who believe p are unlikeable in relevant ways. If they're unlikeable because they melt down the moment their political views are challenged, for example, that constitutes evidence that their political views haven't been refined through thoughtful argumentation. And political views that haven't been refined through thoughtful argumentation tend to be false. So, it might be rational to doubt a political ideology once you realize that most of the people you know of who hold it are prone to hysterical meltdowns. (I'm not granting that leftists are more prone than others to hysterical meltdowns, by the way -- this is an empirical question that can't be resolved by surveying non-randomly sampled social media posts.)

(2) It's possible to acquire evidence for an ideology as a (causal) consequence of spending more time with people who hold that ideology. It may be that those who are driven rightward by leftist misbehavior undergo the following, two-step process: first, they stop associating with leftists and start associating with conservatives because they find the latter less annoying than the former; second, as a result of associating with conservatives, they encounter arguments for conservative policies they haven't heard before (or objections to liberal policies they haven't heard before) and shift rightward ideologically in response to those arguments.

(3) You assume that rank-and-file voters should choose how to vote based on which policies are most likely to work. But a growing number of applied political philosophers deny this. According to them, the probability that your vote will change the outcome of a democratic election is so tiny that it's foolish to vote for the sake of changing the outcome. If you're rational, you'll instead vote for social reasons -- e.g., reinforcing your relationships with those close to you. If partisanship is really just a vehicle for strengthening social bonds, then it might be rational to vote for the party whose members you personally like better. (I hate this view, but it's not easy to articulate what's wrong with it.)

To clarify, I substantially agree with the content of your post. But considerations like (1)-(3) have given me food for thought recently.

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