The Environmental Ethicists Are Worse Than The Stereotypes About Bioethicists
Some of them at least
There’s an (arguably incorrect) stereotype about bioethicists in effective altruist circles—namely, that they’re foolish, unconsequentialist, and strangely want to restrict consenting adults from taking risks that will be good for society overall (E.G. testing new drugs). However, having read recent papers from people defending the intrinsic value of nature, I can say those people are the bioethicist stereotypes.
I’ll begin by presenting my arguments for why nature is not intrinsically valuable. Holding that nature is intrinsically valuable leads to absurdities.
If nature is intrinsically valuable then an infinite amount of non-sentient nature would be infinitely valuable. One has to either except this verdict or accept that at some point, extra nature loses its intrinsic value in virtue of all the existing nature. Neither of these responses will do.
The second response has truly bizarre implications. Why should evaluation of a particular piece of nature hinge on the existence of other, causally distinct, far away nature that doesn’t interact with the first piece of nature. If this were true then, if two people were in a cave and were deciding the importance of conserving the nature in the cave, their judgment would hinge on how much nature there is outside of the cave--nature that they’ll never interact with. This is deeply implausible--how much extra nature devoid of sentient beings there is can’t be the deciding factor in terms of whether or not to preserve a particular piece of nature.
The first response has objectionable implications. If it is truly the case that nature has intrinsic value, then a sufficiently large chunk of nature would have enough intrinsic nature to outweigh any bad thing in human history. A lifeless piece of nature the size of the galaxy could have enough value to more than offset every single person being horrifically tortured to death.
If nature has intrinsic value then if one had to pick on of the following options
Destroy an infinitely large chunk of nature that has no sentient life and will never have sentient life.
Put a billion people in Auschwitz style death camps.
They would have to choose the second option. After all, infinite disvalue will be greater than the immense though finite disvalue of death camps. Yet this verdict is absurd! A billion people being put in death camps would be far worse than any amount of destruction of nature.
We have additional reasons to discount this intuition. For one, nature is instrumentally valuable. Given that nature in the real world has value it’s hard to, for the purpose of thought experiments, separate out its instrumental value from all things considered value.
Additionally, as Chappell and Meisner argue, the utilitarian has a reasonable reply in such cases. Destroying nature does tend to be evidence for viciousness of character. Given the close connection between our judgment of the wrongness of acts and our judgments of the character of those who partake in those acts, character judgments about the hypothetical people who would destroy nature can undermine our intuition about those cases.
This view also faces the difficult problem of defining what nature is and why it’s good. It does not seem intuitive that, for example, a distant star system with no life has intrinsic value. The only instances of nature that seem to possess intrinsic value seem to be the ones that have a close connection to positively impacting the happiness of conscious creatures.
Under what conditions is nature intrinsically valuable? If everything in nature was painted blue, that would be an unnatural process. However, if everything was painted blue by paint that had no negative effect on anything, that doesn’t seem like it would undermine the value of nature.
Thus, the view that nature is intrinsically valuable rests on two things--a confusion of instrumental value and intrinsic value, and falsely assuming that things must have intrinsic value merely in virtue of looking nice to us. In order for it to be a coherent, complete view, proponents of such a view must give a working definition of nature--or at least describe which of its features ought to be preserved in virtue of their intrinsic value. I suspect they shall be unable to, for our intuitions about nature are too vague, ill-defined, ambiguous, and shallow to withstand rigorous codification.
To see that nature being beautiful is behind much of our belief that nature is intrinsically valuable, imagine a hideous pile of slime, filth, and vomit. Additionally, imagine that this was natural and couldn’t have any life. It seems hard to imagine that this would have intrinsic value. Our intuitions about the intrinsic value of nature are largely dependent on whether the plot of nature looks nice.
Now, let’s turn to what the crazy defenders of nature’s intrinsic value say for their position.
(Rolston, 2006) attempts to defend the intrinsic value of nature, writing (p.53)
“A plant is not a subject, but neither is it an inanimate object, like a stone. Plants do not have ends in view, and in the familiar sense they do not have goals. But plants are quite alive, and if our ethics respects life, we must figure in the plants.”
This is true if we value life in and of itself. However, we should not value life in and of itself. Bacteria are alive, yet they do not matter morally. There is no justification offered for why life matters intrinsically. What is the moral significance of being composed of cells and able to reproduce? Rolston continues
“All this, from one perspective, is just biochemistry – the whir and buzz of organic molecules, enzymes, proteins – just as humans are from one perspective. But from an equally valid – and objective – perspective, the morphology and metabolism that the organism projects is a valued state. Vital is a more applicable word than biological.
“A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its programme, making a way through the world, checking against performance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure success. On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what is and what ought to be. The organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds and resists death. A life is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a good of its kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind. The plant, as we were saying, is involved in conservation biology. Does not that mean that the plant is valuable, able to value itself on its own?”
My new favorite sentence of all time is “On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what is and what ought to be.” Plant apparently have solved the is ought problem.
The claim that plants operate in a valued state will depend on whether it is valued by any being. Something can’t be valued by a being that is not sentient. Even though plants are spontaneous and self maintaining, this doesn’t show that they matter morally. There is no moral significance to descriptive facts about how they operate, insofar as they’re not sentient.
The claim that plants are axiological but not moral seems badly confused. Given that axiology is about value, if it’s not moral value, then it’s a type of value that doesn’t matter. A dollar bill in an otherwise empty universe would have monetary value in one sense, but that doesn’t mean it would matter morally. The claim that the plant has a good of its kind is ambiguous. A plant only has a good if it matters morally, so this is question begging.
Merely pointing out that a plant is, in some sense, goal directed does nothing to show that plants matter morally. Atoms are similarly goal directed in some sense, yet they are not morally relevant.
To see if something matters morally, one should ask themselves if they would care about what happened to that thing if they became that thing. If one was slowly turned into a pig, after they became a pig, they would still have a strong preference for not being tortured. However, after one was a non sentient plant, they would have no preference for what happened to the plant. The plant can’t have any experiences of any type.
Rolston continues (p.53-54)
“Some will object that even though plants have a good of their own, they are not able to value because they are not able to feel anything. Nothing matters to a plant. There is plant good, but not plant value. There is no valuer evaluating anything. Plants can do things that interest us, but the plants are not interested in what they are doing. They have only their merely functional goods. But, though things do not matter to plants, things matter for them. We ask, of a failing plant, 'What's the matter with that plant?' If it is lacking sunshine and soil nutrients, and we arrange for these, we say, The tree is benefiting from the sunshine and the soil nutrients'; and benefit is – everywhere else we encounter it – a value word. Objectively, it is difficult to dissociate the idea of value from natural selection. Biologists regularly speak of the 'survival value' of plant activities; thorns have survival value. These survival traits, though picked out by natural section, are innate (= intrinsic) in the organism; that is, stored in its genes and expressed in its structure and behaviour. It will be protested, however that careful philosophers will put this kind of 'value' in scare quotes. This is not really value at all, because there is no felt experience of choosing from alternatives, no preferences are being exercised. This so-called value is not a value of interest to people valuing nature because it is not a value with interest in itself. But is the organism not valuing what it is making resources of? Not consciously, but we do not want to presume that there is only conscious value or valuing. That is what we are debating, not assuming. The tree defending the good of its kind is an observation of value in nature with just as much certainty as the tree's metabolism is biological fact. Trees appear to be green, but perhaps we do not want to call the electromagnetic waves actually there 'greenness'. Meanwhile, trees photosynthesize with or without humans watching them. Matters can be better or worse for the tree, and this amounts to saying that the tree on its own has its goods and harms.”
The claim that things matter for plants is question begging. Merely pointing out that we often describe things as being bad for plants does nothing to show that plants matter morally. When we describe something as being bad for a plant, we’re claiming it diminishes the function of the plant, rather than making a moral claim. People similarly say things like “when you jump on the bed, it’s bad for the bed,” yet this doesn’t commit them to the view that beds matter morally.
The question of whether the value is moral shows that this argument is entirely question begging. We often describe things as being bad for plants. However, whether that badness is moral value is the entire point in dispute. This argument gives us no reason to think things can be bad for plants, merely that plants have functions. On the basis of this argument, there is no difference between cars and plants, given that things are described as being bad for both of them, and in neither case is there a principled argument for supposing that value is moral.
Rolston continues (p.54-55)
“There are still more objections. It might be that x has a good of its own, but that the pursuit of that value is bad for people, for example poison oak or skunks. That x has a good of its own does not entail that the good of x should be promoted. Do not forget the distinction with which we started: 'What is x's good?' versus 'What is x good for?' Disease germs have a good of their own, but we do not wish to promote that good, because disease is not good for us. The first is biological fact; the second is a normative judgment. Some kinds of plants or animals can, of course, at times be bad for people. No one denies that. The deeper question here is more comprehensive, more objective. Are these bad kinds in an otherwise good place? Leave people out. Might it be that x has a good of its own, but the pursuit of that value is bad for the ecosystem, for example weeds or parasites? Here, however, if we return to basic Darwinian theory, in wild nature biologists discover 'niches' which each of these organisms is found to be located as an 'adapted fit'. That invites thinking about the interdependence and community in which organisms participate. If so, we need to move from 'x has a value of its own' to 'x is valuable in the system'. If x serves a role as an adapted fit, we might often find that x expresses some value not otherwise present in the system, enriches it by being there. There are individual goods, yes; but individual goods have to be fitted into a good adapted fit in ecosystems. With a more systemic set of facts, in wild nature there are no 'weeds'. The burden of proof will be on those who single out skunks, weasels, poison oak, as bad kinds. There are parasites, but parasitism is a subroutine in a larger value-capture system. The whole idea of parasitism is conceptually parasitic on values elsewhere present and flourishing enough to be parasitized. The parasite that loses skills borrows those skills because these remain in the host. The disvalue, parasitism, is privative on some value, autonomous life; and all life is interdependent. Parasites can be important in ecosystem stability, population control, metabolism; parasites have niches and roles like all other organisms.”
Parasitism may be “good,” for ecosystems in the sense that it maintains biodiversity and ecosystem health. However, this does nothing to show that parasitism is morally good. It is very clear that a parasite with no experiences that consumes the flesh of small children is morally bad, because it causes harm to lots of beings who can experience.
Would Rolston really hold that parasites that eat the faces of babies are good because they’re natural and part of the ecosystem. Even if they’re good for ecosystem health and sustainability, parasites consuming the flesh of small children would still be bad. Absurd doesn’t do justice to just how insane this statement is.
Next, Rolston defends the intrinsic value of species, writing (p.57)
“Plants and animals not only defend their own lives; they defend their kinds. Such kinds are the dynamism of life. A shutdown of the lifestream on Earth is the most destructive event possible. In threatening Earth's biodiversity, the wrong that humans are doing is stopping the historical vitality of life. Every extinction is an incremental decay in this stopping of life. 'Ought species x to exist?' is a distributive increment in the collective question, 'Ought life on Earth to exist?' As life on Earth is an aggregate of many species," when humans jeopardize species, the burden of proof lies with those who wish deliberately to extinguish a species and simultaneously to care for life on Earth.”
This line of argument is both factually mistaken and obviously fallacious. For one, organisms don’t defend their species, evolution results in them doing the things that will make them most likely to pass on their genes. Second, the fact that life on earth is the set of all species does not mean that our verdict about the destruction of species and the destruction of all life on earth must be the same. There is a strong utilitarian reason to think a 1/N chance of destruction of all life on earth, where N is the total number of species, is far worse than certainty of one species being destroyed.
Hitler was one human. However, one can think that the death of Hitler was a very good thing, without thinking that all people dying is good. If a set has many diverse members, there is no reason ones verdict about the destruction of one member of the set must be the same as their verdict about the total destruction of the set.
Rolston continues (p.57)
“Value is something dynamic to the specific form of life. The species is a bigger event than the individual with its interests or sentience. The appropriate survival unit is the appropriate location of persistent valuing, where the defence of life goes on in regeneration, as individual members of a species are given over to survival of their kind.”
None of these statements are defended. If value describes what we’d care about if we were totally rational and impartial, it’s not clear why the species should be valued. Additionally, species are generalizations about nature, based on which organisms are able to reproduce together. Species are not clearly delineated in nature--rather, there’s a gradation of viability of offspring. Thus, valuing species is valuing an arbitrary man made categorization of things in nature, no more natural or independently defensible than valuing preserving all life forms of a particular weight, and using weights instead of species as the benchmark of intrinsic value.
Next, on (p.59) Rolston says
“'A thing is right', concluded Aldo Leopold, 'when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.'”
This is clearly false. If nazi germany had increased biotic stability it would still have been immoral. Horrendously torturing infinite people in an artificial world, thereby preventing all harm to nature, would be morally wrong, despite being good for the ecosystem.
Next, Rolston says (p.59-60)
“An ecosystem generates a spontaneous order that envelopes and produces the richness, beauty, integrity and dynamic stability of its component parts. Though these organized interdependencies are loose in comparison with the tight connections within an organism, all these metabolisms are as vitally linked as are liver and heart. The equilibrating ecosystem is not merely a mass of push pull forces. It is an equilibrating of values. The selective forces in ecosystems at once transcend and produce the lives of individual plants and animals. Evolutionary ecosystems over geological time have increased the numbers of species on Earth from zero to five million or more. Superimposed on this, the quality of individual lives in the upper trophic rungs of ecological pyramids has risen. One-celled organisms evolved into many-celled, highly integrated organisms. Photosynthesis evolved and came to support locomotion – swimming, walking, running, flight. Stimulus-response mechanisms became complex instinctive acts. Warm-blooded animals followed coldblooded ones. Neural complexity, conditioned behaviour and learning emerged. Sentience appeared – sight, smell, hearing, taste, pleasure, pain. Brains evolved, coupled with hands. Consciousness and selfconsciousness arose. Persons appeared with intense concentrated unity. The products are valuable, able to be valued by these humans; but why not say that the process is what is really value-able, able to produce these values?”
This is an obvious equivocation on the word valuable!! Valuable, in this context, means worth valuing, not able to produce value. By this standard atoms are intrinsically valuable, because they’re able to create value. The fact that ecosystems create valuable things doesn't mean they’re intrinsically valuable. To determine whether they’re intrinsically valuable, rather than instrumentally valuable, we must ascertain whether they have value independent of the things they create. They clearly do not.
This is far from an adequate defense of the intrinsic value of nature. The only “defense,” involves question begging and equivocating on terms. It’s truly absurd!! How was this published?