In theory if we someone invented a way to make farm animals unable to feel pain (modyfing their genes to disable noceptors) would it be beneficial thing to do?
You’ve defended epiphenomenalism elsewhere (https://benthams.substack.com/p/epiphenomenalism-defended). At minimum, your third general consideration (the evolutionary one) feels in tension with epiphenomenalism? If the actual experience of pain isn’t causing the aversive behavior, then it’s unclear that the experience itself would be evolutionarily advantageous.
I don’t think your other behavioral arguments besides this one are inconsistent with epiphenomenalism (e.g., even if the thrashing around isn’t caused by the conscious experience, it seems like it relates to a brain state which is associated with -- or even causes -- a conscious experience in us, so it’s still some evidential support) per se, although I think a lot of the evidence for epiphenomenalism you cite in your above article suggests that all sorts of behaviors can be produced by things that aren’t exactly consciousness or conscious experience.
Of course, I accept that even epiphenomenalists should probably not be very confident about epiphenomenalism, and I agree with the weak version of your thesis (that it’s at least plausible and we shouldn’t be very confident that many of these animals aren’t conscious). (I am also not an epiphenomenalist, so this doesn’t affect my views significantly.)
> Even if consciousness doesn’t cause behavior, we know it correlates with certain kinds of aversive behavior.
While I don’t think those correlations are all that strong (in part due to my background beliefs about animal consciousness), even if this is true, I think it still would probably undermine the evolutionary argument as stated, because the argument appears to be that conscious experience -- not aversive behavior -- is the thing to evolve, and the correlation could be explained by something other than “aversive behavior causes, or automatically comes with, the conscious experience” (e.g., that they both share something in common, but if evolution over a long evolutionary timescale is only optimizing for one, the correlation isn’t enough for both to happen).
(Indeed, I could imagine that evolving the neural correlates of consciousness under epiphenomenalism is mostly unrelated to the advantage of evolving aversive behavior.)
What if intensity of pain isn't a single axis? It seems plausible that size/sophistication of brain is one axis, and fraction of experience dominated by the pain is another axis, and there just isn't a single natural axis that combines the two things. That sure would complicate moral reasoning.
I read through this and liked it but was not convinced that moderate (and not just intense pain) would be enough to modify behavior (the way that studies show).
Feel free to clarify and either way, I still agree with your conclusion: it's better to be safe than sorry when it comes to uncertain degrees of sentience
Excellent article.
In theory if we someone invented a way to make farm animals unable to feel pain (modyfing their genes to disable noceptors) would it be beneficial thing to do?
This was a good writeup and the conclusion is very well-supported by your arguments!
Thanks!
Wonderful article. I've often wondered about this "widespread agony" thesis, but never investigated it so deeply. Thank you!
You’ve defended epiphenomenalism elsewhere (https://benthams.substack.com/p/epiphenomenalism-defended). At minimum, your third general consideration (the evolutionary one) feels in tension with epiphenomenalism? If the actual experience of pain isn’t causing the aversive behavior, then it’s unclear that the experience itself would be evolutionarily advantageous.
I don’t think your other behavioral arguments besides this one are inconsistent with epiphenomenalism (e.g., even if the thrashing around isn’t caused by the conscious experience, it seems like it relates to a brain state which is associated with -- or even causes -- a conscious experience in us, so it’s still some evidential support) per se, although I think a lot of the evidence for epiphenomenalism you cite in your above article suggests that all sorts of behaviors can be produced by things that aren’t exactly consciousness or conscious experience.
Of course, I accept that even epiphenomenalists should probably not be very confident about epiphenomenalism, and I agree with the weak version of your thesis (that it’s at least plausible and we shouldn’t be very confident that many of these animals aren’t conscious). (I am also not an epiphenomenalist, so this doesn’t affect my views significantly.)
I strongly reject epiephenomenalism--I'd forgotten that I ever found it plausible haha.
Don't think it's in much tension. Even if consciousness doens't cause behavior, we know it correlates with certain kinds of aversive behavior.
> I strongly reject epiephenomenalism.
Excellent news, me too!
> Even if consciousness doesn’t cause behavior, we know it correlates with certain kinds of aversive behavior.
While I don’t think those correlations are all that strong (in part due to my background beliefs about animal consciousness), even if this is true, I think it still would probably undermine the evolutionary argument as stated, because the argument appears to be that conscious experience -- not aversive behavior -- is the thing to evolve, and the correlation could be explained by something other than “aversive behavior causes, or automatically comes with, the conscious experience” (e.g., that they both share something in common, but if evolution over a long evolutionary timescale is only optimizing for one, the correlation isn’t enough for both to happen).
(Indeed, I could imagine that evolving the neural correlates of consciousness under epiphenomenalism is mostly unrelated to the advantage of evolving aversive behavior.)
What if intensity of pain isn't a single axis? It seems plausible that size/sophistication of brain is one axis, and fraction of experience dominated by the pain is another axis, and there just isn't a single natural axis that combines the two things. That sure would complicate moral reasoning.
Did the essay win?
I read through this and liked it but was not convinced that moderate (and not just intense pain) would be enough to modify behavior (the way that studies show).
Feel free to clarify and either way, I still agree with your conclusion: it's better to be safe than sorry when it comes to uncertain degrees of sentience
Cosmic fih ❤️
Is "censor" a technical term? I would expect you to use "sensor" instead.
Typo