Intuitions Vs Their Absence
Why you should trust the people who have intuitions in a dispute over those that don't
Here and there, every now and again, I have views about philosophy. Some view will seem to me to either be correct or incorrect and after assessing the relevant arguments, I’ll come to some conclusion about it. There are two different ways I form philosophical views:
I have some strong intuition about the case that is incompatible with all the views except one.
I don’t have any especially strong intuitions, but I participate in the lengthy and drawn-out process of comparing the various views on offer to see which one is best.
An example of the first type is utilitarianism. When I think about utilitarianism, I feel as though there is some deep sense in which I grasp the truth of utilitarianism; I can see where others are going wrong and why they are wrong. The countervailing intuitions strike me as the types of shallow common-sense intuitions people sometimes have about economics when they think, for example, that free trade is bad. I can see why they think that, and yet I grasp why they’re wrong.
Of course, I don’t think this settles these debates. Telling people “I grasp that you’re wrong,” never convinces them, and it’s good that it doesn’t. Philosophy would be vaporized if people just had an automatic trump card in declaring that they grasp something that their interlocutors don’t, and thus their interlocutors are wrong. In addition, it’s often the case that both sides of the case think that the other is missing something.
That utilitarianism—and specifically hedonic utilitarianism—is correct is my most controversial strongly held view. I give it above 50% chance of being true, even though few philosophers accept it. I am confident in this view because I feel as though there is some deep sense in which I grasp its truth, in which I see with my intellect that it is correct. I see the intuitions that others have about rights, for example, and yet I recognize that those are just shallow, quasi-linguistic intuitions, not the types of intuitions that are actually worth trusting.
The experience that I perceive myself as having in regard to utilitarianism is akin to the experience one has when they know the right answer to a math problem. I can see where my dissenters go wrong, and I recognize why they’re wrong. Of course, there are lots of people who insist that they have the opposite intuition—that they grasp the falsehood of utilitarianism—so I can do little more than insist that I really do grasp where they’re going wrong. Suffice it to say, while this convinces me, insisting that “I know that you go wrong, trust me,” convinces no one but the speaker. But nonetheless, the views like this, where I have some strong, often hard-to-convey intuition are the cases where I’m most confident in my views, where I feel I have access to private evidence and don’t have to give significant weight to the dissent of smart people.
But there are lots of cases where I don’t have strong intuitions, where I just pursue the general abductive project of trying to find the best explanation of various phenomena. One example of such a case is the AI risk debate: I don’t have any special knowledge, I just have a decently functioning brain (hopefully) and, as such, can consider the general arguments at roughly the level of competence one would expect. Delving into these issues often leaves me deeply uncertain.
Lance Bush seems to just not have the moral realist intuitions that lots of people seem to have. Now, as someone who does have them very strongly such that I think moral realism is blatantly obvious, it’s hard to take Lance’s position seriously. But if one doesn’t have the intuitions, it’s hard to talk them into having them. But here, I’ll argue that someone like Lance shouldn’t be that confident in anti-realism—if you just lack some requisite set of intuitions, then you should be near agnostic, rather than very confident that something doesn’t exist. In short, the first process of coming to beliefs is more reliable—and should consequently produce higher credences—than the second.
Suppose that there are lots of really smart people who claim to have grasped some mathematical formula. You ask them to explain it, they try, but you find yourself unable to understand it. It seems unintelligible to you, and you’re not sure what intuitions they’re even supposed to be having. It just sounds like gibberish to you, and they explain their concepts in self-referential terms—you ask them to explain what a Morax Xephlorbinator is, and they make reference to a Slearax Zenzifrelator.
Now, it’s possible that you’re going wrong. But it seems very unlikely that all these people who think they grasp something are just missing something. If you have a contrary seeming—if you feel you grasp why they’re wrong—that would be one thing, but if you just don’t have their intuitions, if you just don’t possess their intellectual seemings, it seems hard to be confident that they’re wrong.
If we think of intuitions as intellectual appearances, as grasping something about apparent reality, then, just as if many people see a bear and some don’t, you’d expect there to be a bear, we should defer to the havers of intuitions over the people that don’t have them. The fact that you don’t grasp some particular thing about reality doesn’t give you any good reason to think that it isn’t true, but the fact that you do grasp things does give you a good reason to believe they are true. Just as you’d defer to have havers of mathematical intuitions, assuming they’re not crazy, so too should you in the moral case, and in various other philosophical cases.
If we accept this then this will mean that we should have slightly higher credences in various things that people have strong intuitions about. Of course, it’s easy to trick oneself into thinking they grasp something if they’re motivated—so this doesn’t give us great reason to believe the trinity, for example; Christians would find it intelligible even if it weren’t. But in the case of robust free will, for example, it should raise our credence in them—it’s possible that people like Michael Huemer are just confused, but we shouldn’t think it that likely.
And it will also mean that we should lower our credence in anti-realism. Those of us who have morally realist intuitions shouldn’t pay much heed to what anti-realists like Lance say—I’m very confident that I grasp the moral facts, and will continue to be in the absence of a powerful debunking account. If people like Lance don’t, all the worse for them.
And this doesn’t require thinking that these people are dumb or deficient. There are lots of things that all of us except Von Neumann can’t grasp. People have some intuitions that others don’t—so if people lack intuitions that you have, after suitable reflection, you shouldn’t give them weight. You are in possession of evidence that they are not and, as such, you shouldn’t take their belief, formed in the absence of the relevant evidence especially seriously.
I strongly agree with this piece. I also think that, when it comes to ethics specifically, it's easy for non-realists to dismiss realist intuitions as the product of socialization, cultural norms, or evolutionary pressures without ever considering that there may be equal and opposite influences pushing some people towards "intuitive" anti-realism. Lance is a very intelligent person and I respect the work he does, but I must admit that the few times I've engaged with him have been frustrating because he would slip into this very common attitude that realism and only realism was the culturally mandated, personally comforting position and that everyone just believes it for those reasons. But obviously, especially among secularists and materialists, there are also plenty of non-rational social influences that push people towards a sort of hyper-skepticism that sees any realist views as vaguely spooky and unacceptably "religious" or whatever. It can be frustrating to engage with non-realists because so many implicitly or explicitly have this mindset. It's like they can't imagine that anyone would ever be a non-realist for any reason other than pure, cold rationality - even though realism is decidedly uncool in a lot of these spaces and there's tons of pressure to give it up.
//Lance Bush seems to just not have the moral realist intuitions that lots of people seem to have. //
It’s interesting you say I don’t *seem* to. I have been explicit that I have no such “seemings.” Do you think I might have these seemings anyway? I grant that it’s possible, if so, but it’s strange that your remark hints at the possibility that you don’t take my word for it. I have more to say on this pending what you’d say in response. Note that if I cannot be trusted to be a reliable report about my own seemings, it’s not entirely clear why I should grant that you, or Huemer, or anyone else is. Skepticism about the contents of other people’s seemings is a two-way street.
A second concern is with the remark “that lots of people seem to have.” I’d be interested in hearing you elaborate on this. I don’t deny that lots of analytic philosophers and people who read analytic philosophy have these seemings (or should I say that they seem to have the seemings?). However, I do not think these populations comprise a large or representative body of human beings. So while the proportion of people who have these seemings may be large if we confine the population of interest to “people who study analytic philosophy” or something like that, this is not, itself, that large of a population relative to the world’s population. So “large” here is a bit underspecified. The amount who endorse such views may be large relative to some populations but very small relative to others.
//Now, as someone who does have them very strongly such that I think moral realism is blatantly obvious, it’s hard to take Lance’s position seriously.//
Note that to Christians who find God’s existence blatantly obvious, it’s hard to take atheism seriously. Obviousness isn’t a very impressive quality of a belief.
//But if one doesn’t have the intuitions, it’s hard to talk them into having them//
That’s plausible, but strikes me as an empirical question. And it may vary case-to-case. I don’t think there’s at least some evidence nonphilosophers don’t typically have qualia/hard problem of consciousness intuitions, but it may be fairly easy to talk them into having them.
//But here, I’ll argue that someone like Lance shouldn’t be that confident in anti-realism—if you just lack some requisite set of intuitions, then you should be near agnostic, rather than very confident that something doesn’t exist.//
This remark strikes me as a bit obscure. It seems to draw on a putative asymmetry, but I’m not entirely sure what you take our respective stances to be with respect to our position towards realism and antirealism. What do you take an intuition to be? And do you think you have intuitions in favor of realism, but I have no intuitions in favor of antirealism? I have some concerns here that I’ll abstain from expressing pending clarification on what you take our differences to be.
You also suggest I shouldn’t be confident if I “just” lack some requisite set of intuitions, but why should I put much stock in the intuitions of any particular group of people, such as you and other realists? What have you got going for you that should lend itself to agnosticism rather than skepticism? Presumably, there are a bunch of factors that are relevant to endorsing agnosticism or a skeptical stance towards some particular view. Among these are one’s assessment of factors relevant to the epistemic status of those reporting a particular set of intuitions. If it’s only a small, insular group of people that mostly interact with one another, or people only report the intuitions while on LSD, or if only people who join a particular cult claim to have the intuitions, these would strike me as reasons to be skeptical and to lean away from agnosticism. In the case of realists reporting realist intuitions, for me, what matters is why they are reporting those intuitions. I don’t know if I’m under any obligation to grant that the intuitions you and Huemer and others have are more reliable than the second process you describe; I’m also not sure my way of forming beliefs is strictly limited to the two processes you describe, nor whether my views exclusively fall into the latter category in the first place.
//In short, the first process of coming to beliefs is more reliable—and should consequently produce higher credences—than the second.//
When you say the “first process” do you mean these?:
“1. I have some strong intuition about the case that is incompatible with all the views except one.
2. I don’t have any especially strong intuitions, but I participate in the lengthy and drawn-out process of comparing the various views on offer to see which one is best.”
//Suppose that there are lots of really smart people who claim to have grasped some mathematical formula. You ask them to explain it, they try, but you find yourself unable to understand it. It seems unintelligible to you, and you’re not sure what intuitions they’re even supposed to be having. It just sounds like gibberish to you, and they explain their concepts in self-referential terms—you ask them to explain what a Morax Xephlorbinator is, and they make reference to a Slearax Zenzifrelator.//
How do you think I’d react to a situation like this? Do you think that if I encountered mathematicians that used concepts I couldn’t grasp that I’d think they weren’t saying anything meaningful?
//If we think of intuitions as intellectual appearances, as grasping something about apparent reality, then, just as if many people see a bear and some don’t, you’d expect there to be a bear, we should defer to the havers of intuitions over the people that don’t have them. //
The causal mechanisms behind why some people report having certain “appearances” and others don’t matter. Suppose much of the population is raised in a highly religious community. Most members of this community report having the intellectual seeming that God exists. Those outside the community are nonreligious. Very few report having the seeming that God exists. Should the members of the nonreligious community defer to the members of the religious community, and grant that given the reliability of intellectual seemings that God probably exists?
//The fact that you don’t grasp some particular thing about reality doesn’t give you any good reason to think that it isn’t true//
I don’t grant that you are grasping anything about reality. I think that I grasp reality as it is, and it doesn’t involve stance-independent moral facts any more than it involves pixies or unicorns.
//but the fact that you do grasp things does give you a good reason to believe they are true. //
There’s a big difference between reporting that one has the intellectual seeming that X and it being the case that “you do grasp things.” I’m not granting that you are grasping anything. It should come as no surprise to you that I think you *aren’t* grasping things and are instead mistaken.
//Just as you’d defer to have havers of mathematical intuitions, assuming they’re not crazy, so too should you in the moral case, and in various other philosophical cases.//
Is your view that if you don’t have intuitions about something that you should defer to those who do?
//And this doesn’t require thinking that these people are dumb or deficient. There are lots of things that all of us except Von Neumann can’t grasp. People have some intuitions that others don’t—so if people lack intuitions that you have, after suitable reflection, you shouldn’t give them weight.//
There are situations where some people genuinely understand reality as it is in ways others do not, and cannot. Perhaps some mathematicians or quantum physicists understand reality in ways you and I couldn’t fathom. But there are also people who are conceptually confused or mistaken, and as a result, believe they grasp reality as it is. Why should we think that you and other moral realists are in the former category, rather than the latter?