1 Finishing Feser’s First Proof
Feser’s book was remarkably long, containing a whole host of objections. Thus, it will take more than one article to respond to even his first argument. So, this article will continue responding to Feser’s badly confused first argument about change, actualizations of potential, and the like. Given that Feser’s argument has 50 premises (50!—I’m not kidding), even if they all seem plausible, the conjunctive probability of all of them is near zero. If you were 95% sure of each premise, the collective probability of all the premises would still be less than 8%. Feser says
Why an unmovable mover? Even if it is granted that the Aristotelian proof takes us to an unmoved mover, a critic might object that it does not thereby get us to a mover that is unmovable. Or rather (to use the language I have said is less colloquial but more precise) the critic might suggest that even if there is a first actualizer, it need not be a purely actual actualizer, one devoid o f potentiality. For why not suppose instead that it has potentialities which are simply not in fact being actualized, at least not insofar as it is functioning as the first actualizer in some hierarchical series of causes?
Good question!
To see what is wrong with this objection, recall once again that though the argument begins by asking what explains the changes we observe in the world around us, it moves on to the question of what explains the existence, at any moment, of the things that undergo changes. So, the regress of actualizes that we are ultimately concerned with is a regress of the actualizes of the existence o f things. The first actualizer in the series is “ fist” , then, in the sense that it can actualize the existence of other things without its own existence having to be actualized. So, suppose this first actualizer had some potentiality that had to be actualized in order for it to exist. What actualizes that potential? Should we suppose that it is something other than the first actualizer that actualizes it? But in that case, the so-called first actualizer isn’t really the first actualizer after all, contrary to hypothesis; it would be this further actualizer that is the first, or perhaps some yet further actualizer that is the first. Should we say instead that the first actualizer has some purely actual part that actualizes the part that is merely potential? But in that case, it will be this purely actual part that is the true first actualizer, and the potential “ part” will not really be a part o f the first actualizer, but rather merely the first o f its effects. Or should we say instead that the first actualizer’s potential is actualized by some part o f it that is not purely actual, but a mixture o f actual and potential? But what actualizes the potentialities o f that part? Some yet further part that is a mixture o f potential and actual? But in that case we are back to a vicious regress and haven’t reached a first actualizer after all. So, there really is no sense to be made o f a first actualizer o f the existence o f things which is not purely actual. If we acknowledge a first actualizer at all, we have to acknowledge thereby a purely actual actualizer. And thus we have to acknowledge an actualizer that has all the divine attributes which follow from being purely actual.
No! Feser’s argument gets us to something that changes other things without previously being changed by other things. It does not get us to something that cannot change. It can have actuality (the ability to change things), without being unchangeable in the sense that there is no metaphysically possible world in which it changes.
So now, let’s revisit Feser’s ridiculous syllogism.
1. Change is a real feature o f the world.
This one is questionable—on the B theory it’s not really, but this premise has some plausibility.
2. But change is the actualization o f a potential. ‘
Perhaps. This is not a common view of change but it’s somewhat plausible.
3. So, the actualization o f potential is a real feature o f the world.
This would follow.
4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it (the principle o f causality).
This is also plausible. However, it’s far from certain—it could very well be that things begin to exist without a cause, without something purely actualizing them bringing them into existence.
5. So, any change is caused by something already actual.
This would follow, however, the previous premises are uncertain.
6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
Depends on how we define things and substances.
7. The existence o f S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.
This is not true if we accept Existential inertia.
8. So, any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A o f its existence.
No—things can persist in existence without needing some special actualizer.
9. A ’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A ’s being purely actual.
No! A can actualize itself and if we accept EI, A doesn’t need something always actualizing its existence.
10. If A ’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress o f concurrent actualizes that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
No—it can terminate in an actual actualizer without being a purely actual actualizer.
11. But such a regress of concurrent actualizes would constitute a hierarchical causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely
False—such a series can continue infinitely.
12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization o f A.
False for the reasons described earlier.
13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence o f a purely actual actualizer.
This relies on the previous (false) premises.
14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer.
This also relies on the previous false premises.
15. In order for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer, there would have to be some differentiating feature that one such actualizer has that the others lack.
This is true.
16. But there could be such a differentiating feature only if a purely actual actualizer had some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have.
This is false. If we accept that there are some laws of physics that change other things that can’t change, they would be purely actual, but different ones could be different. The same is true with different gods.
17. So, there can be no such differentiating feature, and thus no way for there to be more than one purely actual actualizer.
False for the reasons described earlier!
18. So, there is only one purely actual actualizer.
See above.
19. In order for this purely actual actualizer to be capable o f change, it would have to have potentials capable o f actualization.
I suppose this is true. However, then this undercuts the previous premises. None of the previous premises establish the metaphysical impossibility of the entity changing. Maybe it can’t change prior to changing other things, but that doesn’t mean it can’t change at all.
20. But being purely actual, it lacks any such potentials.
False—see above.
21. So, it is immutable or incapable o f change.
False—see above.
22. If this purely actual actualizer existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.
This is false on the b theory of time. There’s no reason why something in time has to change, just a generalization that things in time usually do.
23. So, this purely actual actualizer is eternal, existing outside of time.
This would follow from the previous premises which happen to be false.
24. If the purely actual actualizer were material, then it would be changeable and exist in time, which it does not.
This is false, there could be types of quantum fields from which time emerges which are not changeable.
25. So, the purely actual actualizer is immaterial.
This would follow from the previous false premises.
26. If the purely actual actualizer were corporeal, then it would be material, which it is not.
27. So, the purely actual actualizer is incorporeal.
These would follow from previous false premises.
28. If the purely actual actualizer were imperfect in any way, it would have some unactualized potential, which, being purely actual, it does not have.
This is false—it relies on bizarre notions that badness is merely something not meeting its purpose, which is false. Something may be a good torture device or child molesting robot , without being morally good. Lots of things in nature are evil despite being natural and meeting their purpose. Also evil is not the absence of good because there could be worlds worse than merely non good worlds.
29. So, the purely actual actualizer is perfect.
This would follow from previous false premises.
30. For something to be less than fully good is for it to have a privation— that is, to fail to actualize some feature proper to it.
This is false—nothing existing wouldn’t be good and would have a privation of good, but a world of pure torture would be worse.
31. A purely actual actualizer, being purely actual, can have no such privation.
There’s no reason it can’t have privations. Why does this follow from pure actuality?
32. So, the purely actual actualizer is fully good.
This would follow from previous false premises.
33. To have power entails being able to actualize potentials.
This is plausibly true.
34. Any potential that is actualized is either actualized by the purely actual actualizer or by a series of actualizes which terminates in the purely actual actualizer.
This follows from previous false premises.
35. So, all power derives from the purely actual actualizer.
This follows from previous false premises.
36. But to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent.
This is false. Imagine if god had a parent somehow who was totally ordinary and couldn’t do much. They wouldn’t be omnipotent despite being that from which all power derives.
37. So, the purely actual actualizer is omnipotent.
This follows from previous false premises.
38. Whatever is in an effect is in its cause in some way, whether formally, virtually, or eminently (the principle o f proportionate causality).
This premise is too unclear to evaluate but false the way Feser employs it. My parents are the cause of me and thus the cause of this blog post, but the blog post was not in my parents either formally, virtually, or eminently. What does that even mean?
39. The purely actual actualizer is the cause of all things.
40. So, the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes must in some way be in the purely actual actualizer.
In some way is doing a lot of work here. This relies on false premises. For the previous premises to be supportable, in some way must be broad, but then it won’t support future premises.
41. These forms or patterns can exist either in the concrete way in which they exist in individual particular things, or in the abstract way in which they exist in the thoughts o f an intellect.
This begs the question against Platonism. Math isn’t true because of the way it exists in an intellect—the way it exists in an intellect is determined by the way it actually exists.
42. They cannot exist in the purely actual actualizer in the same way they exist in individual particular things.
This premise is unclear.
43. So, they must exist in the purely actual actualizer in the abstract way in which they exist in the thoughts o f an intellect.
This relies on a bunch of very dubious premises.
44. So, the purely actual actualizer has intellect or intelligence.
This follows from previous false premises.
45. Since it is the forms or patterns o f all things that are in the thoughts o f this intellect, there is nothing that is outside the range o f those thoughts.
This follows from previous false premises.
46. For there to be nothing outside the range o f something’s thoughts is for that thing to be ominiscient.
This is plausible.
47. So, the purely actual actualizer is omniscient.
48. So, there exists a purely actual cause o f the existence of things, which is one, immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, fully good, omnipotent, intelligent, and omniscient.
49. But for there to be such a cause of things is just what it is for God to exist.
50. So, God exists.
All of these rely on false premises.
2 Moving To Feser’s Second Proof, The Neo-Platonic Proof
The things of our experience are made up of parts. Suppose you are sitting in a chair as you read this book. The chair is made up of parts, such as the chair legs, the screws that hold the legs to the frame o f the chair, the seat and back of the chair, and a cushion and the fabric that covers it. The book itself is made up of parts, such as the cover, the pages, the glue that secures the pages to the cover, and the ink on the pages. You are yourself made up o f parts, such as your arms and legs, eyeballs and ears, bones and muscles, and all the rest.
This is true!
There is a sense in which, in each o f these cases, the parts are less fundamental than the whole. After all, we understand what a leg or an eyeball is by reference to the whole organism whose leg or eyeball it is. A leg is something which helps an organism to move about, and an eyeball is something which allows the organism to have visual experiences o f objects in its surrounding environment. The parts of the book and the chair are also to be understood by reference to the whole. A book cover is something that protects the pages o f the book and indicates, via the words written on it, the author o f the book and something o f the book’s contents. A chair leg is something which holds the chair up, a cushion something that functions to make the chair comfortable for the person sitting in it, and so forth.
What does this even mean? Is there a fact of the matter about whether my finger is more fundamental than my hand? This question just seems conceptually confused—what does it mean for something to be more fundamental than something else.
Still, there is obviously also another sense in which each o f these wholes is less fundamental than its parts. For the whole cannot exist unless the parts exist and are combined in the right way. For example, if there were no chair legs, no frame, or no seat, the chair would not exist. Neither would it exist if these parts were simply thrown in a pile
Neither of these senses seem coherent.
So, the things of our experience are composite, or composed of parts. And a composite is less fundamental than its parts in the sense that its existence presupposes that its parts exist and are put together in the right way.
This isn’t necessarily true. My body existing doesn’t presuppose my hands. It would continue existing absent my hands.
So, a composite depends on its parts not merely (and indeed not necessarily always) in a temporal sense, but more fundamentally (and always) in an atemporal sense
I don’t understand what sense Feser is talking about. If he’s talking in a counterfactual sense (I.E. I wouldn’t be absent my hands), that’s just false. If he just means that I’d be different, that’s true but trivial.
At any particular moment, a composite thing’s existence will presuppose that its parts exist and are put together in the right way at that moment, and this will be the case whether or not that composite thing has existed always, or only for a certain number of minutes, hours, days, or years, or only for an instant.
This is again false. My existence doesn’t require that all my cells exist—I could do without many of them.
How do the parts of a composite come together to form the whole? It can’t be the composite itself that causes this to happen. This is obvious enough when w e’re thinking in temporal terms. Chairs, for example, don’t assemble themselves.
This is far from obvious. If we accept humeanism about laws, then they do. They exert an effect on each other, leading to their combination. Chairs have a combiner, but planets don’t. However, if we accept neo-humeanism, then some fundamental laws cause the combination.
In fact, o f course, the existence and arrangement o f the chair’s parts at any moment does not depend on the chair itself, but on myriad other factors. For example, the chair legs are at any moment at which the chair exists fastened to the frame o f the chair by screws, and friction ensures that the screws stay in place. The legs and screws themselves exist at that moment because their respective molecules exist and are combined in certain specific ways, and the existence of the molecules themselves is explained in turn by the existence o f the atoms that make them up and those atoms being combined in certain specific ways
The most fundamental things exert effects which cause composition. No god needed!
What is true of the chair is true o f all the other composite things o f our experience. At any moment at which they exist, their parts exist and are arranged in just the right way, and that is the case only because various other factors exist and are combined in just the right way at that moment.
This is not necessarily true if we accept humeanism. We may need nothing beyond the composite parts. Now, in the real world there happen to be other things because real world objects don’t exist in a vacuum, but this is a contingent fact.
The chair exists only because its parts exist and are combined in the right way, the parts in turn can exist and be combined in the right way only insofar as certain other factors exist and are combined in just the right way, and so on. If the latter factors don’t “ hold together” , neither will the chair hold together
Right—the laws of physics (whatever they are), hold them together.
We started out by considering parts o f everyday material objects which are themselves everyday material objects— chair legs, screws, paper, eyeballs, muscles, and so forth— but as the discussion has progressed, we have made reference to parts that are not everyday material objects (such as atoms) or which are not objects at all (such as temperature). And the parts o f a thing can be more exotic still, as they are according to various metaphysical theories. For example, according to Aristotelian philosophers, all physical substances are composites of form and matter.
SHOCK!! Scientists confirm material objects are combination of form and matter—whatever that means.
Other metaphysical parts too might be identified. For example, Thomist philosophers hold that we can distinguish between the essence o f a thing and its existence— that is, between what the thing is and the fact that it is.
SHOCK!! Scientists separate out essence and existence in a laboratory!
Now, if some composite thing is caused by another composite thing and that by yet another in a hierarchical causal series, then for the reasons set out in the previous chapter, that series must have a first member. But the first member cannot itself be composite, for then it would require a cause of its own and thus not be first. So, it must be something noncomposite, something utterly simple in the sense of having no parts of any kind— no material parts, and no metaphysical parts like form and matter or essence and existence.
It doesn’t have to be only one thing! It can be a variety of the simplest features of reality all interacting together.
Informal statement o f the argument:
Stage 2 What is the One like? For example, is it unique? Could there be more than one of the One? There could not be. For suppose there were two or more noncomposite or utterly simple causes o f things. Then there would have to be some feature the possession o f which distinguishes one of them from the other. Noncomposite or simple cause A would differ from noncomposite or simple cause B insofar as A has feature F, which B lacks, and B has feature G, which A lacks. But in that case neither A nor B would really be simple or noncomposite after all. A would be a simple or noncomposite cause plus F, and B would be a simple or noncomposite cause plus G. F and G would be different parts, one of which each of these causes has and the other of which it lacks. But a simple or noncomposite cause has no parts. So, there can be no feature one such cause has and the other lacks. So, there can be no way one such cause could differ from another, and so there just couldn’t be more than one such cause. The One is “ one” , then, not just in the sense o f being simple or noncomposite, but also in the sense of being unique. It is the same one simple or noncomposite cause to which all the composite things of our experience ultimately trace
This is conceptually confused for a few reasons.
We don’t need something absolutely simple in the philosophical sense, just something that is the most fundamental feature of reality from which other things emerge, which emerges from nothing else.
Things can have no parts but still have properties. For example, nothing has no parts but it has properties, including that of not being an elephant.
The first stage of the argument just shows that there must be some fundamental entities—say laws of physics and quarks, to make things simple. Nothing about this shows that the fundamental entities have to all have identical properties. Laws of physics are different from quarks, but both can be fundamental.
The One must be changeless or immutable. For to change entails gaining or losing some feature, and if the One could gain or lose some feature, it would not be simple or noncomposite. Rather, it would be a simple or noncomposite thing plus this feature, in which case the feature would be a part, and thus the One just wouldn’t really be simple or noncomposite.
Again, this confuses properties with parts. It has no parts but that doesn’t mean it can’t change or have properties that change. If the most fundamental feature of reality consists of vibrating 1 dimensional strings, as I’m pretty sure string theory suggests, they would be simple but wouldn’t be unchangeable.
If the One is changeless or immutable, then it is also eternal or outside time, since to be in time entails undergoing some change. It must also be eternal in the sense o f neither coming into being nor passing away. For if it came into being, it would have a cause, which entails that it has parts which were combined at the time it was caused; and it has no parts. If it could pass away, then that would entail that it has parts it could be broken down into; and again, it has no parts
I agree with this, the simplest thing must not be caused because it is the ultimate cause of other things.
Furthermore, as is noted by William Vallicella (who defends an argument similar to the argument of this chapter), “ everything is either a mind, or a content in a mind, or a physical entity, or an abstract entity.”
Why is this true. Things can be
Laws of physics which are not material.
Some amorphous force causing change.
Fundamentally irreducible information
Some basic metaphysical principle like that of modal realism.
Etc.
3 Now, the One cannot be an abstract entity, because abstract entities are causally inert. (For example, while a stone can break a window, the abstract pattern of being a stone cannot break a window, or do anything else for that matter.) But the One is the cause o f the existence o f composite things. Nor can the one be a physical or material entity, because material entities have parts which need to be combined in order for them to exist,
This begs the question. Why can’t there be a non composite physical entity, for example strings, or simple particles following the Shroedinger equations?
Now, the One must be the cause o f all things other than itself, for since it is unique, anything other than itself is composite, and we have already seen that anything that is composite must ultimately depend for its existence on the One. I have also argued that the One is itself uncaused, simple or noncomposite, unique, immutable, eternal, immaterial, and a mind or intellect. That much would already justify us in calling the One “ God” . But much more can be said. The One also has to be regarded as purely actual rather than a mixture of actuality and potentiality. Obviously it has to be at least partially actual, for the reasons set out in the previous chapter— namely, that nothing that is merely potential can do anything, and the One is doing something insofar as it is the cause o f all things other than itself. But if it was less then purely actual, then it would be partially potential. In that case it would have parts— an actual part and a potential part— and it has no parts. So, again, it must be purely actual
The purely actual point was addressed above. We have no good reason to say that it’s only 1.
One might ask, if the One is omnipotent, is an intellect, and so forth, doesn’t that entail that it has parts? For aren’t omnipotence, intellect, and the like different attributes, and thus different parts of the One? Part of the answer to this objection is to note that while the statement that “ the One is omnipotent” doesn’t mean the same thing as the statement that “ the One is an intellect” , it doesn’t follow that they are not statements about the same one reality. The logician Gottlob Frege famously distinguished between the sense of an expression and its reference. The expression “ the evening star” doesn’t have the same sense as the expression “ the morning star” , but both expressions refer to one and the same thing— namely, the planet Venus. Similarly, “ the One’s omnipotence” and “ the One’s intellect” don’t have the same sense, but they refer to the very same thing, to a single, simple, or noncomposite reality.
Okay but in this case that sentence is equivalent to saying “the star that rises in the morning happens to be the same as the one that rises in the evening.” It is different from saying that “the properties of rising in the morning and the evening are the same property.”
For however we construe laws of nature— and we will consider the various possible accounts of what a law of nature is in a later chapter— any explanation in terms of laws of nature will inevitably just leave us with some further thing made up of parts whose composition requires an explanation, thus continuing rather than terminating the regress of causes. For instance, if we say of some composite thing composed of parts A and B that it is a law o f nature that things o f type A and things of type B will combine under such-and-such circumstances to form the whole, then we have to ask why things o f type A and type B are governed by that particular law rather than some other. A and B as well as the law governing them will together constitute a kind o f composite whose existence is just a further instance o f the sort of thing for which the critic o f the Neo-Platonic proof was supposed to be providing an alternative explanation
If this is the simplest part of reality, it is not composite and needs no deeper explanation.
I won’t go through the entire syllogism, but it has 38 steps in the argument, making it implausible, given that it requires a vast number of controversial premises to be true.