Ayn Rand was off the rails
My response to Ayn Rand
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is written to be unbiased and merely to report the facts. It does this job quite admirably, avoiding partisanship and staking out strong opinions on controversial philosophical issues. And yet, despite this impressive objectivity—far more robust than the vast majority of allegedly objective sources—its article on Ayn Rand reads like a hit piece.
This is not intentional, nor is it caused by bias. It just happens to be the case that an objective portrayal of the facts necessarily pans Ayn Rand, the same way that an assessment of the Manson family will, even if written with maximal objectivity, leave most readers generally opposed to the Manson family. If it were truly being polemical, it could have been one of the most strongly worded articles written in the history of the world.
In this article, I shall review “The Objectivist Ethics, in The Virtue of Selfishness.” I intend to show that, contrary to the claims of her fervent advocates, Rand’s philosophical reasoning is very poor. Her rejection in mainstream philosophy comes not from an insular desire to ignore outsiders, but rather from the fact that her arguments are just bad.
Rand’s claim at the outset is that moralists have nearly all concluded that ethics is arbitrary convention. This claim is false unless we play very fast and loose with nearly all. Moral realism is the majority view. Even when it wasn’t, it wasn’t rejected by nearly everyone.
(It’s formatted so that you can’t copy and paste text, so some of the text will be quotes from Huemer’s quotes of it. Huemer has good contributions so read his article too.)
Rand seems to feel very strongly that all other philosophers aren’t interested in trying to use reason to get ethics, writing “No philosopher has given a rational, objectively demonstrable, scientific answer to the question of why man needs a code of values.” It’s unclear what she means by this. The obvious reason for having a code of values is because those values are good so people following them is also good. Sidgwick, Bentham, Mill, Aristotle, and thousands of others have argued for a particular ethical system. It straightforwardly follows from an ethical system being the correct account of the good that we should follow it.
Rand claims that most philosophers took ethics for granted and didn’t care about its objective implications. She gives no citation for this or justification. As Hitchens said “claims made without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.” It’s amusing the dismissive attitude she takes towards other philosophers. Good philosophy does not claim to be the first philosopher since aristotle to be opposed to irrationality and stupidity and ethics.
She next claims that the neomystics replaced the will of god with the good of society. I have no idea what neomystics she’s referring to, but ethical realists generally hold that things goodness has no relation to particular societies. A utilitarian like myself would hold that you should do what produces the most good, regardless of which society benefits. Neomystic is obviously a term of abuse, not an argument.
Rand is upset about those damn neomystic cultural relativists (which is apparently the main view in philosophy) holding that whatever society does is good. This is a view held by virtually no one except undergraduates prior to taking an ethics class. It’s obviously false because it entails that Nazi Germany was fine.
She then proclaims that this is the consensus view among philosophers who declare that ethics is outside of the power of reason. I have no idea where she is getting this idea. Cultural relativism is held by approximately zero people. Maybe she’s including non cognitivism and error theory in this category, but it’s still not a majority. This does, however, explain why she names her philosophy objectivism, despite there being oodles of other moral realist theories that claim morality is objective. Rand is under the delusion that she’s basically the only person who thinks ethics is objective. This confusion has resulted in lots of linguistic contortions for those of us moral realists who want to explain our view while also making it clear that we’re not Randian objectivists.
Rand next utters the incredible sentence “Whatever else they may disagree about, today’s moralists agree that ethics is a subjective issue and that the three things barred from its field are: reason—mind—reality.” This is false. Most philosophers are moral realists according to the phil papers survey. There is certainly no universal agreement about subjectivism. Many philosophers like Parfit, Nagel, Singer, Railton, and hundreds of others think that morality is about reasons. I have no idea what it would mean form orality not to be about mind or morality. The subjectivists think that it’s mind dependent so wouldn’t that be including mind? It’s not clear.
This strange succession of claims—unabashedly self aggrandizing, unjustified, and fully orthogonal to correct historical information, make Rand exciting to read yet devoid of any semblance of a decent argument. It would be like a mediocre historian proclaiming that “No historian for centuries has investigated any pre enlightenment history. What ever else contemporary historians agree upon (oh by the way they’re also mystics, forgot to mention that) they all agree that the world pre enlightenment was a black box that historical methods can’t investigate.”
She next blames this subjectivism for the world collapsing, which seems to overestimate the role that academic philosophers have.
Next she says “"'Value' is that which one acts to gain and/or keep."""
This is obviously false. One who is being tortured yet cannot prevent their torture still is experiencing something invaluable, yet they cannot act to prevent it. Similarly, the elegance of mathematics is something that I think is valuable, yet I don’t act to gain or keep it. Finally, this presupposes value subjectivism. Something could be valued by no one but still valuable. If a person does not care about their future joy, that wouldn’t render their future joy not valuable.
Rand further claims that “The concept ‘value’ is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.”
This presupposes values subjectivism. One could find something valuable without it actually being valuable. It might be valuable for me to meditate, even if I don’t find meditation valuable. Presumably Rand would hold that her account of value would remain even if no one valued it. Thus values don’t require a valuer.
Values also don’t presuppose the ability to affect those values. I think that the truth of utilitarianism is very valuable—it would be a shame if pleasure didn’t matter. However, I do not act to make pleasure matter. This is because it’s mattering is not dependent on me, or anyone else valuing it.
Attempting to present a dichotomy Rand says "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence..." It’s not clear what she means by this. Obviously all things either exist or don’t. However, all things are also either red or not red. That does not mean that redness is some fundamental alternative with meta-ethical implications. She then says existence pertains only to living organisms. It’s not clear what this means. She says life can choose to exist of to cease to exist, but life can also choose to cause inanimate organisms to exist or to cease to exist. It’s not clear why this has normative implications.
She then claims that life is a prerequisite for value. This is false, a sentient robot would possess moral value. If atoms could suffer, they would possess value.
She next says "To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured, or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values..."
This is obviously false. If the robot experiences brutal torture that would still be bad and bring about things that have negative value. The happiness I get from understanding words that other people say is not something I can control but it still has value. There is no argument for this bold claim, as is true of many of Rand’s claims.
Next, the argument is made that only a living entity can have goals and that those goals all have to be directed towards the maintenance of the organism’s life. This is false—lots of organisms (especially people) have altruistic motivations and care about other people, not just their own life. She also doesn’t explain why having goals immediately confers value. I can imagine a being with goals that does not experience pleasure or pain and is thus not the conduit of value. Finally, even self interested people have goals other than maintaining their lives. Some self interested people commit suicide and nearly everyone aims at their happiness, even when it doesn’t increase their survival.
The fact that x is a prerequisite for making choices doesn’t mean that all choices should aim at maximizing the probability of x. Oxygen is a prerequisite for me writing this essay, but that does not mean that this essay should have its primary aim be to increase the Oxygen in the world.
She continues “Only living things have goals, and "On the physical level, the functions of all living organisms, from the simplest to the most complex—from the nutritive function in the single cell of an amoeba to the blood circulation in the body of a man—are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism's life.”
This is false. Rand herself often goes off about people’s excessive altruism, not just in pursuit of people’s goals. Amoeba aren’t sentient so they don’t have goals. Also, goals are not inherently good. Valued is not the same as valuable, we can value things that don’t really matter. People sometimes sacrifice their lives for the greater good.
She then says “An organism’s life depends on two factors: the material or fuel which it needs from the outside, from its physical background, and the actions of its own body, the action of using that fuel property. What standard determines what is proper in this context? The standard is the organism’s life, or: that which is required for the organism’s survival.”
This relies on the assumption that organisms should only care about their own life, which is false. Consider some counter examples.
1 Taking a 1 in 1000000000000000000000000000000000000 risk of death to save the entire continent of Asia.
2 Taking a 1 in 10000000000000000000000000000000000000000 risk of death to prevent one from enduring infinite torture.
3 Sacrificing one’s life to save their entire family.
4 Crossing the street to go to a party, despite it risking death.
5 Eating slightly unhealthy food, despite health risks.
6 Going on a date, despite it increasing the risk of being brutally murdered.
All of these prove the principle false. Rand has also disappointingly left her thesis wholly unjustified.
She then says “No choice is open to an organism in this issue: that which is required for survival is determined by its nature, by the kind of entity that it is.”
To the extent that it’s derived from natural facts, this would be the naturalistic fallacy. Proven that organism’s do x in nature doesn’t show it’s good. Malaria is natural and bad. Even if its nature necessitates something that doesn’t make that thing good. Imagine making a species of beings who all aim at torturing and murdering. Surely that wouldn’t make it morally good for them to torture and murder.
She then repeats her thesis a few times in question begging ways. She then explains that goals are needed which is true but doesn’t show why her particular goal is needed.
She then says “Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action.” This is false—happiness is treated as an end and can be constantly maintained by action. It’s not clear what adding metaphysically gets her here, or why any of this matters.
She then says that the is ought divide is not a problem because entities existence necessitates survival as a value. Perhaps existing requires an entity valuing their survival, but that doesn’t make it ultimately valuable. This does not pass the is ought gap.
She then says that we become acquainted with value through pleasure and pain. I agree with this, but her view would seem to entail only caring about one’s own life, rather than their own pleasure. She then says pain signals threats to one’s body and pleasure things good for one’s body. This is true, but it fails to explain why pain matters. If one experienced horrific suffering in ways that didn’t affect their survival, that would still be bad. Pain is not just a means towards survival, it’s an end.
Rand argues next that consciousness is the way we survive. It’s certainly a big part of it, but it’s not clear exactly what this means or why it matters. She says this means we need conceptual knowledge to survive which is false—some people may be alive while not understanding concepts in any depth. This also establishes nothing normative.
She then says this means we need to use reason. I’m all for using reason, but it doesn’t seem like we should use it just because it increases our survival. Even in cases where it doesn’t, it’s still reasonable to be reasonable.
Rand’s next unjustified inference is that this means that we need ethics to survive ,which is false—error theorists survive just fine. Following this up, she makes the odd claim that humans who are not self sufficient but who parrot others rely on other’s for their existence which is bad because…they’re parasites which are bad because… it’s not clear. Everyone relies on their parents to exist. That has no normative implications.
Rand argues next that those who survive by force or fraud are parasites. She doesn’t justify why this has normative implications other than the fact that she has a derogatory term for them. Following this up, Rand claims that humans who use force can’t survive because they are using animalistic methods which makes them unable to survive, much like a tiger trying to reason wouldn’t survive. However, the empirical evidence of people who do this not being dead disproves this. It’s not clear why using force is unique to animals or runs afoul of reason.
Rand next claims that man’s values are their goals. This rests on unjustified assumptions. She then rejects utilitarianism based on it requiring service to others, which is true, yet she doesn’t explain why people shouldn’t try to help others.
Rand follows this up with the bizarre assertion that hedonism and altruism claim that people can only be happy at other’s expense. This is trivially false. It just says that one should sacrifice their happiness to make others very happy. Rand is wrong to reject this. Consider a few counterexamples to her theory.
1 You can take a 1 in 100000000000000000000000000000 risk of death to save a parallel world with lots of happy people, who you don’t care about.
2 You see a child that you don’t know or care about very much drowning in a pond. You can save their life but you’d get all wet.
3 You can press a button to save a continent but you don’t know anyone in that continent and you have arthritis so it would hurt your hand a little bit.
4 You can endure a pinprick to save an alien civilization.
All of these seem decisive.
She then says that rational self interest never clashes. This is obviously false. If one person is deciding whether to donate to save another’s life, there is a conflict between their self interest and the interests of the other person. Donating would make the other’s life better, but not donating would make their life better.
She next argues that trade is the only way to justify helping others. This is false—if you could save an alternative world, even for nothing in return, you should do so.
Ultimately, Rand’s arguments were strings of assertions loosely tied together by fallacious justification, with little justification as she haphazardly jumps from false claim to false claim. Her philosophy should be utterly unpersuasive to everyone. Trying to make it a syllogism would result in the following.
1 Other theories are neomysticism which claim that what matters is societal will
2 Value is that which we aim to gain or keep
3 Value requires a valuer
4 We have to either exist or not exist
5 Life is a prerequisite for value because robots wouldn’t have values if they were indestructible and omnipotent
6 Therefore all things must be aimed at preserving life
7 Therefore life is metaphysically an end in and of itself
8 Therefore we must use reason
9 If we didn’t use reason we’d be parasites so we really must use reason
10 Therefore one’s aims are what are really valuable
This is not an argument. It’s a stream of repeated confusion stacked on top of itself. I have no idea why anyone finds it persuasive.
GPT3 is an ai that can write essays arguing for things. I asked it to argue for ethical egoism. It was waaaaaaaaaaaaaay more persuasive than Rand. It wrote
“In any given situation, individuals face a choice between acting in their own self-interest or in the interest of others. The philosophy of rational egoism holds that the best choice in any situation is to act in one's own self-interest. This may seem counterintuitive, but a closer examination of the philosophy reveals that it is the most logical and rational course of action. Rational egoism is based on the belief that individuals are the best judges of their own interests. In any situation, individuals are in the best position to determine what is in their own best interests. This is not to say that individuals always make the best decisions, but that they are in the best position to do so. Another key principle of rational egoism is that individuals are rational beings. This means that they are capable of making reasoned decisions based on their own self-interest. In other words, individuals are capable of thinking for themselves and of making decisions that are in their best interests. Rational egoism also holds that individuals are the best judges of the consequences of their actions. In other words, individuals are in the best position to know what the consequences of their actions will be. This includes both the positive and negative consequences of their actions. Finally, rational egoism holds that individuals are the best judges of the means to their own ends. In other words, individuals are in the best position to know how to achieve their own goals. This includes both the means and the ends themselves. When all of these principles are taken together, it is clear that rational egoism is the most rational and logical philosophy. It is based on the belief that individuals are the best judges of their own interests, and that they are capable of making reasoned decisions based on that information. It also holds that individuals are the best judges of the consequences of their actions and the means to their own ends. This makes rational egoism the most rational way for individuals to live their lives.”
Ayn Rand was not a fan of CS Lewis. She called him an abysmal bastard, a monster, demonstrative of The cheap, awful, miserable, touchy, social-metaphysical mediocrity!, a bastard again, an old fool, a lousy bastard, a mystic, monstrous, a God-damn, beaten mystic, a bastard again, and abysmal scum. Scott Alexander expressed that reading Macintyre left him with a similar desire to write a stream of invective in the margins, based on how poor the arguments were. Ironically, reading Rand left me with this desire more strongly than any other author I’ve read. Her ironclad confidence in every single claim, combined with belittling of her detractors, leaves her incredibly frustrating to read. It seems even the SEP has found that desire to criticize her irresistible.
I’ll leave my string of insults rather brief. Rand is disastrously wrong in nearly every sentence she writes. She expresses near complete ignorance of the history of philosophy. She belittles those who disagree with her in a rather childish way. Her arguments are sufficiently poor to be only persuasive to a sparse selection of undergraduates, which is why she’s not taken seriously in philosophy. Her attempt to deduce a priori philosophical principles, squeezed out of definitions and descriptive claims, is bound to fail. Moral claims have to be substantive, they can’t just follow from the definitions of words. Contrary to the aim of her philosophical project, Rand is no advocate of reason. She is antithetical to the project of reasoning about ethics, preferring to claim that she’s the first to undertake the project, and then spectacularly failing in upholding the burden of providing an objective justification for ethics. Those inclined to using reason to understand ethics would do well to read Parfit over Rand, and ignore all of her utterances.
Unreason never had an advocate as vociferous and beneficial as Rand.