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Dominik's avatar

Wow, we actually agree for once! Panpsychism is so much more plausible than reductive physicalism.

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Alex's avatar

The qualitativeness (1) and the absence of analysis (6) are challenges that should give a physicalist some doubt and humility. But they're not positive arguments for dualism or any alternative. They're just implications to think harder and to solve the hard problem.

Otherwise, this entire list just seems like different expressions and consequences of not personally thinking that consciousness is physical.

Eg. P-zombies obviously can't exist if consciousness is physical - they'd be conscious. Obviously it's *conceivable* to have a non-conscious zombie, but that's just saying that dualism itself is conceivable. I don't think many physicalists would deny that dualism is possible - they just don't think it's true.

I'm very willing to believe I'm just one of the people who's conceptually confused here, but it would be good to have it pinpointed.

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