I love the ambition here, but I think this explains far too much: under it, everything that looks deliberately arranged is evidence for theism in general, while everything that isn't is evidence for the make-the-world-look-indifferent theistic goal.
Sometimes science flips whether things look deliberately arranged: for instance Darwiniism makes the evidence for biological fine-tuning much weaker, or how calculation of the cosmological constant makes physics fine-tuning more plausible. It probably shouldn't be the case that both versions of each would serve as evidence for "shy theism!"
This isn't to say there might not be some theistic goal that represents the pattern here. I think you're on the right track that if there's theistic design, particular evils are probably downstream of locally indifferent laws, but in turn I would expect local indifference to be a function of divine aesthetic considerations, or cosmic warfare (morally imperfect angels running simulations or whatever), or multiworld theodicy subject to some kind of simplicity constraint. Re: aesthetic value it *seems* right to me that a mechanically consistent universe is more beautiful than a relatively arbitrary one, but also that a psychophysically harmonious universe is more beautiful than a disharmonious one, etc. Aesthetic value is different from moral value, but if it would be simple for an agent to have a particular set of aesthetic values, that might point towards a relatively high probability hypothesis for a van Inwangenian simple creator with aesthetic goals. (I'm skeptical of aesthetic realism but if it can do that kind of explanatory work, so much the worse for my skepticism.)
Like you, I’ve never found the purported proofs of the internal inconsistency of theism persuasive. At best, they show that a particular analysis of some attribute or set of attributes is inconsistent, but it’s never clear to me why a theist has to be committed to the particular target analysis. But I do wonder if those kinds of arguments might raise problems for the idea that theism is a simple hypothesis with all the logical or probabilistic consequences we’d like it to have. If it’s so hard to give a satisfactory analysis of omnipotence, etc., can it really be true that all the properties we want to attribute to God—along with everything else we want theism to explain—just fall naturally out of the supposedly simple hypothesis that there is a perfect being?
I'm not sure I understand how a Theistic Theory "explains" things. There's a sense in which "God did it" is an explanation, but I'm not sure I see how it's better than "that's just the way it is." To me, a good explanation unifies and simplifies a bunch on observations - like gravity explains observations of the motion of the planets - and / or makes predictions about things we don't know. I don't see how Theism achieves that.
For example - I don't know why God would create the universe, or create humans, or prefer minds to no minds or an ordered world to chaos, or moral laws to no moral laws Is it just that there seems to be intent/design behind the world? Is that what seems to have some non-trivial likelihood?
I think you need to go through all the arguments here and reevaluate them with the law of conservation of expected evidence in mind, because the majority of pro-theism argument that you mention here keep contradicting it.
The most blatant example is claiming that both miracles and laws of the universe are somehow benefiting theism compared to naturalism. Either the existence of miracles works in theism favor or the abscence of miracles, but not both.
All the naturalistic universes have to be lawful, behaving in a "clockwork" manner, while universes created by a God can just work on a divine will which is beyong comprehension. Therefore, the appearance of lawful universe is evidence in favor of naturalism compared to theism. Theism, in this regard, doesn't get as much penalty as, say, solipsism but still it loses quite some probability.
Likewise, suppose that life *did not* go through the many steps required to get intricate and complex creatures like us . Suppose that there was no plausible causal story, explaining why such complex creatures as us exist. Would you then think that theism is *less likely* than naturalism? I can't imagine why would anyone think that. Therefore, the fact that we have a plausible causal history explaining our existence, reducing to imperfect replication of patterns is a huge evidence in favor of naturalism.
By including a thodicy of indifference you're essentially including the competing theory in your theory. It's the equivelant of my including in my naturalism the claim that we live in a simulation and that the simulaters want us to believe there is a God. In this way virtually all possible evidence for Theism is accounted for just like your theodicy of indifference account for all evidence favoring the hypothesis of indiference.
What do you think are the consequences of Transhumanism for this view? I think it's somewhat likely that we'll be able enhance our experience this century to limit our suffering, increase longevity, experience better virtual worlds, etc. Wouldn't this sort of thing cast doubt on the idea that our universe is specifically set up for us to become closer to God? If we're suffering so that we'd more freely accept God, for example, it'd be weird if we could solve our suffering. Surely that'd make us think "Sorry pal, don't need you!"
I’m not a fan of Huemer’s model of infinity, but wouldn’t it make omnibenevolence impossible, because good’s a pretty intensive concept as far as I can tell
I love the ambition here, but I think this explains far too much: under it, everything that looks deliberately arranged is evidence for theism in general, while everything that isn't is evidence for the make-the-world-look-indifferent theistic goal.
Sometimes science flips whether things look deliberately arranged: for instance Darwiniism makes the evidence for biological fine-tuning much weaker, or how calculation of the cosmological constant makes physics fine-tuning more plausible. It probably shouldn't be the case that both versions of each would serve as evidence for "shy theism!"
This isn't to say there might not be some theistic goal that represents the pattern here. I think you're on the right track that if there's theistic design, particular evils are probably downstream of locally indifferent laws, but in turn I would expect local indifference to be a function of divine aesthetic considerations, or cosmic warfare (morally imperfect angels running simulations or whatever), or multiworld theodicy subject to some kind of simplicity constraint. Re: aesthetic value it *seems* right to me that a mechanically consistent universe is more beautiful than a relatively arbitrary one, but also that a psychophysically harmonious universe is more beautiful than a disharmonious one, etc. Aesthetic value is different from moral value, but if it would be simple for an agent to have a particular set of aesthetic values, that might point towards a relatively high probability hypothesis for a van Inwangenian simple creator with aesthetic goals. (I'm skeptical of aesthetic realism but if it can do that kind of explanatory work, so much the worse for my skepticism.)
Like you, I’ve never found the purported proofs of the internal inconsistency of theism persuasive. At best, they show that a particular analysis of some attribute or set of attributes is inconsistent, but it’s never clear to me why a theist has to be committed to the particular target analysis. But I do wonder if those kinds of arguments might raise problems for the idea that theism is a simple hypothesis with all the logical or probabilistic consequences we’d like it to have. If it’s so hard to give a satisfactory analysis of omnipotence, etc., can it really be true that all the properties we want to attribute to God—along with everything else we want theism to explain—just fall naturally out of the supposedly simple hypothesis that there is a perfect being?
You’re so real for this.
I'm not sure I understand how a Theistic Theory "explains" things. There's a sense in which "God did it" is an explanation, but I'm not sure I see how it's better than "that's just the way it is." To me, a good explanation unifies and simplifies a bunch on observations - like gravity explains observations of the motion of the planets - and / or makes predictions about things we don't know. I don't see how Theism achieves that.
For example - I don't know why God would create the universe, or create humans, or prefer minds to no minds or an ordered world to chaos, or moral laws to no moral laws Is it just that there seems to be intent/design behind the world? Is that what seems to have some non-trivial likelihood?
I think you need to go through all the arguments here and reevaluate them with the law of conservation of expected evidence in mind, because the majority of pro-theism argument that you mention here keep contradicting it.
The most blatant example is claiming that both miracles and laws of the universe are somehow benefiting theism compared to naturalism. Either the existence of miracles works in theism favor or the abscence of miracles, but not both.
All the naturalistic universes have to be lawful, behaving in a "clockwork" manner, while universes created by a God can just work on a divine will which is beyong comprehension. Therefore, the appearance of lawful universe is evidence in favor of naturalism compared to theism. Theism, in this regard, doesn't get as much penalty as, say, solipsism but still it loses quite some probability.
Likewise, suppose that life *did not* go through the many steps required to get intricate and complex creatures like us . Suppose that there was no plausible causal story, explaining why such complex creatures as us exist. Would you then think that theism is *less likely* than naturalism? I can't imagine why would anyone think that. Therefore, the fact that we have a plausible causal history explaining our existence, reducing to imperfect replication of patterns is a huge evidence in favor of naturalism.
By including a thodicy of indifference you're essentially including the competing theory in your theory. It's the equivelant of my including in my naturalism the claim that we live in a simulation and that the simulaters want us to believe there is a God. In this way virtually all possible evidence for Theism is accounted for just like your theodicy of indifference account for all evidence favoring the hypothesis of indiference.
You should read “The Man Who Was Thursday.” An excellent Chesterton book.
What do you think are the consequences of Transhumanism for this view? I think it's somewhat likely that we'll be able enhance our experience this century to limit our suffering, increase longevity, experience better virtual worlds, etc. Wouldn't this sort of thing cast doubt on the idea that our universe is specifically set up for us to become closer to God? If we're suffering so that we'd more freely accept God, for example, it'd be weird if we could solve our suffering. Surely that'd make us think "Sorry pal, don't need you!"
I’m not a fan of Huemer’s model of infinity, but wouldn’t it make omnibenevolence impossible, because good’s a pretty intensive concept as far as I can tell