A Real Spectrum From Torture to Dust Specks
Showing what the spectrum would actually look like
Lots of people think that torture is so horrible that no number of dust specks can ever add up to be as awful as torture. This, I think, has devastating counterarguments — the best of which is this.
The problem gets worse for those who think that one should prevent the torture over the dust specks. To think this, they must accept that there are some types of suffering that are so heinous that no lower level sufferings can ever outweigh.
However, this view is mistaken. Suppose that we were deciding between 1 torture causing 1000 units of pain (which we’ll take to be the amount of pain caused by tortures on average) versus 1000 tortures each causing 999 units of pain. It seems clear that the thousand tortures would clearly be worse. Now, we can do this process again. Which would be worse 1000 tortures with 999 units of pain or 1 million tortures each with 998 units of pain. This process can continue until we conclude that some vast numbers of “tortures” each inflicting as much misery as a speck of dust should be preferred to 1 torture causing 1000 units of pain. To hold the view that there’s a lexical difference between different types of pain, one would have to hold the view that there’s some threshold of pain which has the odd characteristic of being the cutoff point. At this cutoff point any tiny amount of suffering above the cutoff point outweighs any amount of suffering below the cutoff point. For example, if one claims that the cutoff point is at an amount of pain equivalent to stubbing one's toe, then they’d have to claim that infinite people experiencing pain one modicum below a toe stub is less bad than 1 person having a 1 in 100 quadrillion chance of experiencing one unit of suffering above a toe stub
The basic insight is that there is a spectrum of possible things where things get gradually worse. If you think that, at each step of the way, the things right next to it are only a bit less bad, such that you’d trade some amount of them for each other, then if you keep trading, eventually you get to the level of lots of dust specks. Lots of people are unmoved by this argument. Here, I’ll present a few actual concrete examples of the spectrum argument.
1 The First Spectrum
One torture is less bad than some number of deaths.
Each death is less bad than some number of people having their lifespan shortened 20 years (after all, all that death does is delay one’s lifespan some number of years).
20 years is 10,512,000 minutes. For each number of minutes lost of a humane life, it is less bad than some greater of number of people losing the same number of minutes minus 1.
Therefore, each person having their life span shortened 20 years is less bad than some number of people having their live span shortened by 1 second.
Thus, transitively, some number of people having their life shortened by one second is worse than a torture.
Some number of dust specks are worse than some number of people having their life shortened by one second.
Therefore, by transitivity, some number of dust specks are worse than torture.
2 The Second Spectrum
One torture is less bad than some number of deaths.
Each death is less bad than some number of people being permanently paralyzed.
Each person being permanently paralyzed is less bad than some number of people being paralyzed except for one limb.
Each person being paralyzed except for one limb is less bad than some number of people being paralyzed except for two limbs.
Each person being paralyzed except for two limbs is less bad than some number of people being paralyzed except for three limbs.
Each person being paralyzed except for three limbs is less bad than some number of people breaking ten bones.
Each person breaking ten bones is less bad than some number of people breaking nine bones, which is less bad than some number of people breaking eight bones… which is less bad than some number of people breaking one bone.
Each person breaking one bone is less bad than some number of people fracturing a bone.
Each person fracturing a bone is less bad than some number of people spraining their wrist.
Each person spraining their wrist is less bad than some number of people hurting their wrist pretty badly, though not spraining it.
Each person hurting their wrist pretty badly is less bad than some number of people hurting their wrists somewhat badly, though not that badly.
Each person hurting their wrists some amount is less bad than some number of people hurting their wrists slightly less badly.
Therefore, each person hurting their wrist pretty badly is less bad than a bunch of people just slightly hurting their wrist, equivalent to a minor scrape.
A quadrillion people getting dust specks in their eyes is worse than one person getting a minor scrape.
Thus, some number of dust specks is worse than a torture.
First
No one can define what a “unit” “of” “pain” is with any specificity.
Maybe (maybe) we can imagine that “1000 units of pain” is the average “pain” of a torture. Though again no one can actually define pain without appealing to assertive logic.
But I cannot actually comprehend how one can turn that into “999 units of pain”. It is gibberish to me.
Second
The “pain” caused by torture and the “pain” caused by dust specks are simply incommensurable. Perhaps there’s a fuzzy diving zone where the ratio between the two grows hyperbolically, but ultimately they cannot be compared.
Third,
Death is often preferable to torture. It is easy to find historical examples of such torture.
Fourth,
There is an a priori deontological duty to not commit certain acts of torture.
This is at least as clear to me as the raw assertion that pleasure is good at the heart of your utilitarian calculus.
Torture for whom, dust specks for whom? Tiny micro aggravations experienced by huge numbers of people aren't experientially equivalent to agonising pain experienced by one subject.. utilitarianism says that the are morally equivalent, because you just multiply number of people by amount of pain....but you don't have to believe that. Since the two situations actually are different, why should they be weighted the same?