A Potent Objection To Desire Theory

One of the many reasons desire theory is untenable

The desire theory of well-being says that what makes a person well off is achieving their desires. Such a view has many powerful objections—many of which I spelled out here. However, I recently came across a paper that presents a powerful objection to desire theory—one that should be the nail in the coffin of desire theory. Spaid has a very simple thesis.

This dissertation argues that the desire satisfaction theory, arguably the dominant theory of well-being at present, fails to explain why depression is bad for a person. People with clinical depression desire almost nothing, but the few desires they do have are almost all satisfied. So it appears the theory must say these people are relatively welloff. A number of possible responses on behalf of the theory are considered, and I argue that each response either fails outright, or requires modifications to the desire satisfaction theory which make the theory unattractive for other reasons.

It also had this amusing dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, without whom neither it nor I would exist.

One might object that appeal to deeper desires can explain why this is not so.  However, as Spade explains (p.36)

“The problem with this response is that empirical evidence indicates that, in many cases, depression eliminates even these deeper desires. Of the criteria listed by the DSMV for a diagnosis of a major depressive episode, one of two criteria that must be met is “markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day”32 This suggests that depression involves a general loss of interest in things, rather than the loss of merely superficial desires. Not only is the depressed person unmotivated to shower or go to work, but they are also unmotivated to spend time with friends and family and engage in leisure activities they once enjoyed.33.”  

Spade adds (p.38)

“However, while it may be true that all depressed people continue to make evaluative judgments, there is evidence that, in some cases of depression, these judgments do not reflect the kind of deep desires which could explain why their life is not going well. Some depressed people say that nothing is worth doing, that there is no purpose or point in life, or that they feel empty.38 In an autobiographical account of his depression, author Andrew Solomon says that, in his depression, “...the meaninglessness of every enterprise and every emotion, the meaninglessness of life itself, becomes selfevident. The only feeling left in this loveless state is insignificance.”39 Computational neuroscientist Walter Pitts writes, “I have noticed in the last two or three years a growing tendency to a kind of melancholy apathy or depression. [Its] effect is to make the positive value seem to disappear from the world, so that nothing seems worth the effort of doing it, and whatever I do or what happens to me ceases to matter very greatly…”40 The evaluative judgments expressed in these claims appear to reflect either an absence of concerns altogether, or concerns of the wrong sort.”  

Spade provides objections to a series of other ways of attempting to rescue the desire theory.  He argues none of these are successful.  Definitely worth reading if you’re interested in the subject of desire theory!